PRISM

Challenges and Opportunities

About

PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America's security and development

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FEATURES

The Tswalu Dialog

BY MICHAEL MIKLAUCIC

"A foutre for the world and worldlings base!
I speak of Africa and golden joys."

The Second part of King Henry the Fourth
William Shakespeare

For centuries Africa has provided the stuff of dreams for explorers, adventurers, conquerors, colonizers, soldiers, plunderers, and state-builders. It has also been the backdrop for the nightmares of slavery, famine, war, genocide, and other tragedies. Africa is at once a geographical illusion and a potent political symbol. Its emergence and recent impressive economic growth have altered the geo-strategic calculations of all the global powers. With its abundant natural and human resources generating increasing political and economic capital, Africa's importance on the global stage will only continue to grow. However this growth will be conditioned by how African states individually and collectively respond to the myriad challenges and opportunities facing the continent.

What do we mean by describing Africa as a geographical illusion? Look at the map of Africa: fifty-four states, each distinct and discretely colored to convey the attributes of sovereign identity and equality. Yet the fundamental Westphalian principle of sovereignty is actually challenged throughout Africa as in no other region of the world. Of Africa's 54 recognized states, how many can actually claim to effectively govern their territory, so as to prevent serious challenges from indigenous security threats? How many effectively govern their borders to control the flow of goods and persons, licit and illicit, in and out of the country? How many can claim that national identity overrides other sub-national identities for the majority of the population? While not implying the legitimacy or illegitimacy of national sovereignty claims, the answer in each case is a small minority of Africa's countries. The map of Africa has the additional historical handicap of having been drawn not from organic political development as in Europe, but by the hand of Europeans with little concern for or knowledge of the state-building enterprise, leaving many African states with a substantial legitimacy deficit among their populations. Thus the political

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map of Africa conveys the illusion of much more sovereignty than is actually present.

A further geographical illusion derives from the classic Mercator projection of the world and the way Africa is taught in many places as a single entity. In the Mercator projection, the continent's actual size is vastly underrepresented. Moreover, it conveys an illusion of integration that underappreciates the radical diversity of Africa. Africa is indeed a single continent, but one that, by some counts, is home to, over 3300 different ethnic groups and distinct languages. Cultures in Africa vary widely from region to region, and even within regions. They often provide a stronger identity for populations than their respective states. While Mauritanians and Mozambicans are both Africans, they share little else in common, and the likelihood of a Mauritanian ever visiting Mozambique is slight. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the 11th largest country in the world, has fewer than 1500 miles of paved roads. For ordinary citizens the most common options for transportation are their feet, bicycles, and dugout canoes. Congolese from Goma rarely ever get to visit their capital Kinshasa and vice versa – there is no way to get from one to the other besides air travel, which is far beyond the means of the ordinary Congolese. This is "real geography:" as with the real economy, real geography takes into consideration contextual factors that distort the nominal value of a measure. In a country with only 1500 miles of paved roads, the distance between Goma and Kinshasa is much greater than the equivalent distance in the U.S., where many people cross the country daily. The implications of real geography throughout Africa are self-evident: the problems of infrastructure, regional and

continental integration, communication, trade, and transportation are merely a few of them.

As diverse as Africa is, there is nevertheless a continental solidarity borne of the shared experiences of slavery, colonization and wanton exploitation. When Libya won its independence from Britain in 1951, it became only the fifth independent African state. In the next 15 years, 34 more African states achieved independence. The Organization of African Unity was established in 1963 (with 32 signatories) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states, and to speak collectively for Africa. Nearly every African state is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, reflecting a shared detachment from the interests of the great powers and an independence of purpose. A widely felt African spiritualism bridges the numerous distinct cultures, and for many, their African identity is far stronger than their national identity. From these shared attributes and experiences comes a symbolic political salience for the continent that exceeds the actual unity or level of real cooperation among and between African countries. This political salience gives meaning to such phrases as, "African solutions for African problems."

For the United States, Africa's recent emergence offers both challenges and opportunities. U.S. national security is threatened – perhaps not yet directly, but certainly potentially – by the proliferation of violent extremism in many of the continent's sub-regions. Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Ethiopia, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in both the Mediterranean and Sahelian States practice extreme violence against their own populations and those of neighboring countries. They are also virulently hostile to the United States and American interests. Although they have

not yet engaged in overtly anti-American acts, as have their counterparts in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the potential for such direct violence against the United States is not a figment of the imagination.

Such violent organizations pose a direct, even existential threat to some of America's most important partners in Africa. Nigeria is a key troop contributor to peace, stabilization, and military operations throughout the continent, and is at serious risk of losing sovereignty over its northern territories due to escalating violence and aggression by Boko Haram. Kenya, another key U.S. partner, has been repeatedly attacked by al-Shabaab terrorists. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was nearly able to bring down the Malian state. Previously considered a great development success story, Mali was only saved with the help of French military intervention. In the twilight of the United States' big footprint interventions, growing reliance on partner nations in the struggle against terrorism, against narcotics and other illicit trafficking, against violent extremism, and many other national security concerns, such threats to major partner states are very disturbing.

The increasingly pervasive presence of China in Africa adds another factor in the security algorithm for the United States. Proliferating economic and financial relationships between China and many African states reduce America's strategic leverage. With access to Chinese capital, conditional U.S. or international financial institution aid has less impact. China is an alternative provider of military hardware, but without the western proselytizing about human rights or democracy. Moreover China's stunning economic growth over recent decades, coupled with its authoritarian form of capitalism, provides an

attractive politico-economic model for many African states not persuaded that democracy represents the most sensible political course for their future development.

In addition to direct and indirect security threats, the major social disruptions caused by insurgency and constant conflict weigh heavily on the international community. Substantial U.S. resources are committed each year to respond to the heartbreaking plight of large refugee and internally displaced populations throughout Africa.

This is also, however, a time of opportunity for the United States in Africa. A strategic backwater throughout the better part of the 20th century, Africa today offers important economic and geo-strategic opportunities for the United States. Its dynamic economies represent market opportunities for American business while the development of its natural and human resources broaden global competition, increasing choices for goods and services. From a security perspective many African states are in peril, facing both internal and external threats. The threat posed by violent extremism and radical Islam is existential to many. Their recognition of the American commitment to defeating global terrorism makes the United States a partner of choice in this enterprise. U.S. Africa Command, launched as a full-fledged combatant command in 2008, has established military-to-military relations with nearly all countries on the continent, and supports a wide range of activities, from counter-terrorism training to the global effort to contain the Ebola virus outbreak. We might even hope that America has learned from the backlash against its aggressive and sometimes singular promotion of democracy in recent decades. A more nuanced and humble approach to calibrating our relationships will

permit less cantankerous relations with those African states pursuing social change along other trajectories or at slower velocities.

For Africa and its 54 countries and thousands of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups, this is a time of accelerated transitions with attendant challenges and opportunities. African economies are coming of age, and information, telecommunication, and transportation technologies are enabling African states to integrate into the global system as never before. African institutions promoting good governance have arisen and recent evidence suggests a declining tolerance for military disruptions of civilian governance. Most African states have adopted basic democratic political institutions and, although the practice of democracy varies widely throughout the continent, the aspiration for freedom in Africa has never had greater potential to become reality.

Many challenges remain and the progress of recent years could be reversed. Even though economies are growing, they are subject to deceleration. Economic sluggishness in Europe and Japan, and a slow-down in Chinese commodity imports will inevitably have an impact on African economies. Demographic trends are alarming with a growing youth population in many countries. It will be difficult for economic growth to keep pace with population growth in many countries. Africa continues to be a geographical region plagued by violent conflict. In 2014, twenty African states experienced an increase in violence, contributing to a 13 per cent increase in violence overall on the continent for the year. Violent conflict impedes economic development and creates large, disfranchised refugee and displaced populations that become hotbeds for more violence.

Will African leaders rise to meet the challenges of the 21st century? Will they build institutions capable of harnessing the continent's human, natural, and capital resources to generate sustainable progress and development? Or will the opportunities be squandered, lost to interminable and intractable violent conflict, corruption, and waste? The United States and other countries may offer and provide assistance, but ultimately the responsibility lies upon the leaders of Africa's 54 diverse states. Many of them are not only cognizant of this responsibility, but indeed deeply committed to relieving the poverty and suffering still plaguing the continent, reducing and ultimately ending the many violent conflicts, and realizing the potential of the great African peoples.

The Tswalu Dialog, hosted annually by the Brenthurst Foundation, in the Kalahari Desert, is a venue for discussion of these challenges and opportunities among African thought leaders. The most recent Tswalu Dialog focused on the growing African institutional capacity for peace operations. As many of the following articles describe, African armed forces have gained a great deal of experience in peace operations, and are able to accept growing responsibility. However, much more capacity is needed before the armed forces of Africa can fully provide an African solution to the problem of violent conflict in Africa. Although not all the articles featured in this issue of PRISM were presented at Tswalu, the Dialog was the catalyst for putting them all together in this issue of PRISM. This issue would not have been possible without the partnership of the Brenthurst Foundation and the support of United States Africa Command. PRISM

Female students in Sudan

50th Anniversary African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

On the State of Peace and Security in Africa

BY OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

Recent developments and security threats in Mali, Central African Republic and Nigeria are alarming. And we cannot forget South Sudan and the endless conflicts in Somalia and the Great Lakes. The African Union (AU), at its 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, pledged not to bequeath to future generations of Africans a legacy of wars and conflicts, by silencing the guns by 2020. But 2020 is around the corner. What is the way out of this situation?

Background to Today's Security Concerns

The African continent has no doubt witnessed many transformations in the last several decades, ranging from advances in the use of communication technology, to rapid economic growth triggered by an expanding market for Africa's commodities, and a burgeoning youth population able to innovate in this environment. At the same time, our potential to translate these transformations into stable peace and development for African people is hampered by the continuing threat of armed conflict, along with its transmutations. Armed conflicts have become a recurrent reality in Africa since independence.

From 1960 until the present day, fifty percent of Africa's states have been ravaged by one form of conflict or another. The post-Cold War conflict resurgence is particularly disturbing. Peace and security scholars have attempted to classify armed conflicts on the continent into various categories – some of which understandably only feature in our discourses in a historical sense. Categorization at this point is necessary, if only as an indication of how far we have come as a continent.

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■ *Post-colonial conflicts* arising from agitations for liberation from the control of colonial settlers in countries such as Zimbabwe (1980); Namibia (1990); and apartheid in South Africa (1994).

■ *Boundary and territorial conflicts* such as the Angolan Bush War in South Africa (1966-1989); the Algeria–Morocco conflict over the Atlas Mountain area (1963); the territorial tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998–2000); the Kenya–Somali war (1963–67); the Somali–Ethiopian conflict (1964–78); the Egypt–Libya conflict (1977); and the Cameroon–Nigeria conflict over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula (1994) – the settlement of which I was part of.

■ *Conflicts linked to secessionist ambitions* such as the case of Sudan and South Sudan (1983–2011); the age-long Cassamance rebellion in Senegal; the Cabinda agitations in Angola; and the Biafra civil war in Nigeria (1967–70).

■ *Resource-based conflicts* such as the Sudan and South Sudan conflict over the Abyei region; the Congo-Brazzaville conflict (2007); the Senegal/Mauritania conflict (1989); and the conflict raging in eastern Congo over the last decade.

■ *Identity-based conflicts* such as inter-ethnic or inter-tribal conflicts. Examples of these are the 1994 Rwandan Genocide; the Burundi massacres; the Tuareg uprising in Mali; clan fighting in Somalia and Liberia; Algerian Berbers fighting against the ruling Arab class in Algeria; and the ongoing South Sudan conflict.

■ *Annexationist conflicts* such as the occupation of the Western Sahara by Morocco in 1975; and British Southern Cameroons in 1961.

■ *Poverty, denial and perceived or real injustice induced conflicts* like the militancy in the Niger Delta of Nigeria or the current Boko Haram insurgency.

Even though a substantial decline in the occurrence of inter-state conflicts, including many of those mentioned above, was experienced in the 1990s, an alarming rise in the number of intra-state conflicts, and what some scholars refer to as "new wars" in their various forms and shades, is taking place. By nature, these conflicts tend to be more intense and intractable. They range from large-scale warfare to low intensity conflicts; and of late we have seen how public protests and people's movements can set off a chain of violent, even if transformative events. Over the past years, countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia- Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Mali, Central African Republic, and Nigeria have witnessed one form of escalating conflict or another with their attendant consequences. Some of these countries are still undergoing heart-wrenching episodes of violence at the moment. The gory events of the last month of 2013 in South Sudan and the horror witnessed on the streets of Bangui in Central African Republic attest to this and, in my view, should challenge our resolve as Africans to silence the guns in these places forever.

Further additions to these are growing and menacing terrorist activities and insurgencies taking place in Somalia, Mali, Kenya, and North Eastern Nigeria to date. In some respects, these conflicts and forms of insecurity are not as new as some peace and security scholars might claim. For one, their root causes

and triggers are not necessarily new. We have long spoken about the structural violence that underlines armed conflict. The Constitutive Act of the AU pays particular attention to this. We have also noted that the triggers of these conflicts are numerous and interwoven. Several are worth highlighting.

Triggers

Politically, poor governance, state building processes such as the struggle for control of power, and unconstitutional changes of government remain key conflict drivers. Economically, corruption, struggle for ownership, management and control of natural resources, as well as unequal distribution of these resources constitute major factors that trigger conflicts across the continent. Socially, inadequate capacity for diversity management, the real or perceived inequality and discrimination against minorities, marginalization along ethnic and religious lines as well as the alienation and consequent disillusionment of the youth are further additions. Internationally, colonial legacies, and foreign interference in political transition and governance have equally triggered conflicts.

But what is indeed new is the pattern of mutation of old conflicts. As a result we sometimes see their manifestation in more extreme forms of militancy. To be certain, this extreme expression of violence is not the unique preserve of Africa. However, while it is tempting to conclude that what we are experiencing is copycat stealing of "narratives" from all over the world, we must reflect on how deeply militant groups believe in those narratives. Initial evidence suggests that despite a copycat method of expression, these are reactions to local rather than global conditions. We now know that we cannot ignore the "power of

Africa's streets" both in its violent and non-violent manifestations. The phenomenon in which largely young populations take to the streets to voice their feelings of exclusion through mass non-violent protests; and another phenomenon in which a form of socialization causes young people to throw bombs on themselves and are ready to kill deserves closer attention. As a result we see the threat landscape changing. We therefore must ask ourselves whether this threat landscape is changing fundamentally and whether we are still looking at the right framework for addressing the breadth of security challenges confronting the continent.

Politically, poor governance, state building processes such as the struggle for control of power, and unconstitutional changes of government remain key conflict drivers. Economically, corruption, struggle for ownership, management and control of natural resources, as well as unequal distribution of these resources constitute major factors that trigger conflicts across the continent. Socially, inadequate capacity for diversity management, the real or perceived inequality and discrimination against minorities, marginalization along ethnic and religious lines as well as the alienation and consequent disillusionment of the youth are further additions.

The consequences of conflicts, in their various manifestations, on state, human, and collective security, are enormous. It is therefore imperative for African leaders to muster the necessary resolve and determination to ensure that these deadly conflicts and their negative

consequences on our citizens become a thing of the past.

Politically, Africa's ability to establish secure, democratic, and economically prosperous states is being hampered. State institutions and infrastructures are eroded, thereby undermining the integrity of the state. Formal economies have collapsed, giving room for the rise of shadow states where warlordism, impunity, and criminality thrive.

At the global level, the United Nations has supported the restoration of peace and security in Africa through the adoption of various resolutions, which established peacekeeping missions across the continent

Socially, the humanitarian dilemma across the African continent is huge. The incalculable loss of human lives, the damage to material infrastructure and environmental resources and the massive flows of refugees and internally displaced persons is a scar on our conscience.

Economically, the loss of income and assets, damage to infrastructure, diversion of resources from socio-economic development to peacekeeping, collapse of trading systems, cuts in social spending and capital flight, are some of the negative consequences of these armed conflicts.

Our actions as decision makers, private stake-holders and civil society should complement the relentless efforts of national governments, the AU, regional economic communities, and the international community on the prevention, management and resolution of these conflicts.

National governments have adopted several measures, policies, and initiatives to enhance peace and security in affected countries. At the regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has, in accordance with the Constitutive Act of the AU, consistently condemned unconstitutional changes of governments in the region, imposed sanctions against defaulting member states, and facilitated mediation processes in these conflicts. It has deployed peacekeepers and human rights observers to conflict affected countries. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has also intervened in resolving conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia.

At the continental level, the African Union, since its transformation from the OAU to the AU in 2001, embarked on a paradigm shift from its principle of non-interference to a principle of non-indifference and the right to intervene. Guided by the principle of "African solutions to African problems" the AU has taken significant actions to enhance peace and security in the continent. The adoption of the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, in December 2003, and its framework for conflict-prevention, management, and resolution in Africa – the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) – are commendable.

The AU has undertaken several peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Comoros, Somalia, Darfur, and Central African Republic with significant results. Also worth mentioning are the evolving AU Agenda 2063, which places balancing state and human security as one of its core priorities, the African Common Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda which explores the interconnectedness between peace, security and sustainable development,

and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) which aims at promoting good governance for sustainable peace and security.

At the global level, the United Nations has supported the restoration of peace and security in Africa through the adoption of various resolutions, which established peacekeeping missions across the continent. These efforts have been furthered by financial and technical support from various development partners and non-state actors across the globe.

Will these efforts be enough to eradicate conflict by 2020? Certainly not! We need to do more. Much also depends on our ability to engage in hard collective thinking and "horizon scanning" in ways that enable us to inject flexibility when required, into our existing response frameworks. The Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa offers an important contribution to a process of collective thinking. If we must achieve sustainable peace in Africa, the following non-negotiable priorities to fast-track the implementation of already existing mechanisms are of utmost importance:

Priorities for Peace

■ Democracy and good governance must form the basis for management of affairs in every country in Africa. Peace, security and good governance are fellow passengers.

■ African leaders and decision-makers must reaffirm their commitment in terms of resources, and demonstrate the political will required to ensure the operationalization of an African-owned APSA. "African solutions" will ring hollow if we fail to fund our initiatives and programs.

■ The implementation of the African Governance Architecture must be accorded the needed priority as APSA and AGA are two sides of one coin. While AGA focuses on broader questions of governance, APSA places emphasis on the mechanisms for conflict management, resolution, and peacebuilding. These two must work together to bring about peace and security in the continent.

■ All components of APSA should be equally implemented for a more coherent and comprehensive approach to managing peace and security in Africa.

■ African stakeholders – government, private sector, and civil society – must make concerted efforts to support existing mechanisms and initiatives, building strong infrastructure of government and viable institutions.

A pivotal moment is now upon us. The long-running debate on achieving sustainable peace and security in Africa is like running a marathon. Implementing existing frameworks and initiatives will require resilience, dedication, resources, and patience; perhaps more patience than we would like. We must all set our minds and put our hands together to achieve this imperative order for Africa.

In the words of the late South African President Nelson Mandela, "It always seems impossible until it's done." Let us press on in this conviction therefore – strongly and consistently, towards our goal of achieving sustainable peace and human security in our dear continent, Africa. PRISM

A boy in the town of Biaro in northern CAR which was largely burnt down during fighting in 2007

Emerging Risks and Opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa

BY JEFFREY HERBST AND GREG MILLS

This article examines the recent past and prospective developments (over a 2-3 year timeframe) for sub-Saharan African countries in three areas of major concern to American foreign-policy makers: peace and security, democracy and governance, and economic growth and development. Each topic area is discussed separately at the continental level to place sub-Saharan Africa in comparative perspective, at the regional level, and then at the country-level. Attention is given to recent, specific country incidences to establish possible trends.

Peace and Security

While in the 1960's and 1970's, Asia was the region with the most armed violence (as measured by number of casualties), Africa suffered from the most conflict in the following two decades. In the 2000's, especially with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a notable number of peace settlements in Africa, the continent ceded its role as the leading arena for conflict, although wars still continued, notably in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia. From 2000 to 2006, more wars ended, on average, in Africa each year than began.

More recently, however, there have been fears that Africa will regain its position as the world area where conflict is most heavily located. Part of this concern can be tied to U.S. pullbacks from Iraq and Afghanistan. However, recently, there has also been the breakout of conflict in a number of countries. The advent of civil war in Mali and the subsequent French intervention is particularly notable because Mali had been seen as a good performer and had received significant U.S. military aid to professionalize its army. There has also been the emergence of less surprising conflict in Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan, both poor, divided and weak states. Finally, violence in Nigeria has increased as the army seems unable to suppress Boko Haram. There are also warning signs that the settlement in Mozambique—site of one of the great successes in African conflict resolution—are coming undone, although we do not believe that political settlement will be challenged.

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Greg Mills is the Director of the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation.

Decade	Average Number of Conflict Onsets per Year	Average Number of Conflict Terminations per Year
1950-1959	0.1	0.3
1960-1969	2.1	1.3
1970-1979	2.0	2.0
1980-1989	2.6	2.3
1990-1999	4.0	3.9
2000-2006	2.4	3.1

Table 1. Number of Conflict Onsets and Terminations in Sub-Saharan Africa (1950-2006)[1]

It is therefore not surprising that the *Fund for Peace Failed State Index* for 2013,[2] which includes a number of military, ethnic, political and institutional variables designed to predict state fragility, shows that overall many African states have lost ground over the past five years. As a result, African states remain disproportionately represented globally amongst the states that are most vulnerable to conflict. The following table from the *Fund for Peace* shows their estimation of the forty most vulnerable countries. African countries have seven of the ten lowest positions and, perhaps more striking, eight of the ten spots between 11 and 20. Africa, despite the gains that have been made, is still home to the most countries that are vulnerable to conflict.

Given the number of fragile states that continue to exist in Africa, it was probably incorrectly assumed that the period of relative peace that Africa experienced in the 2000's was a permanent condition. There are too many predictors of conflict present in Africa for conflict to not re-emerge. The states are poor, the governments weak, and societies are divided by ethnicity, religion, and geography. Population numbers and changing demographics (Africa's population will increase from 949 million currently to 1.7 billion by 2040 and to 3.5 billion by 2090 at current trends[3]) can only serve to further intensify

these schisms in the absence of massive further reform by states. In particular, urban concentrations of large numbers of energetic yet unskilled, unemployed and frustrated youth, is a cause for concern.

The state institutions critical to suppressing conflict—armies, police, intelligence services—are weak. And the surrounding countries may export conflict (as happened to Mali) as there are more than enough guns for low-level conflict to emerge. The period of relative peace in the 2000's can better be understood as a low point in the cycle that was natural after the flare-up on the continent in the 1990's when a number of wars began due to the shuffling of cards that came with the end of the Cold War and the consequent end of external support for regimes in Addis Ababa, Kinshasa, Mogadishu, and Monrovia, among others.

Accordingly, there is probably no one structural factor supporting the upsurge in the number of countries experiencing conflict. Rather, given the preconditions for conflict, it was inevitable that the conflict curve would pick up after a period of relative peace. No one could be particularly surprised about CAR and South Sudan, although the details will always be novel, but Mali holds out a warning that even those countries that have seemingly

1	Somalia	11	Iraq	21	Syria	31	Mauritania
2	Congo (D. R.)	12	Cote d'Ivoire	22	Uganda	32	Timor-Leste
3	Sudan	13	Pakistan	23	N Korea	33	Sierra Leone
4	South Sudan	14	Guinea	23	Liberia	34	Egypt
5	Chad	15	Guinea-B	25	Eritrea	35	Burkina Faso
6	Yemen	16	Nigeria	26	Myanmar	36	Congo (Rep)
7	Afghanistan	17	Kenya	27	Cameroon	37	Iran
8	Haiti	18	Niger	28	Sri Lanka	38	Mali
9	CAR	19	Ethiopia	29	Bangladesh	38	Rwanda
10	Zimbabwe	20	Burundi	30	Nepal	40	Malawi

Table 2. Forty Most Vulnerable Countries

accomplished a great deal can disintegrate quite rapidly.

Trying to predict future violence is extremely difficult. At the regional level, countries in the different parts of Africa are all well represented in the *Fund for Peace* Index with the exception of Southern Africa. Zimbabwe is ranked 10th from the bottom by the *Fund for Peace* but it is the only Southern African country that seems currently at risk. We agree with the implied judgment that Mozambique is not currently at risk.

Certainly, Nigeria stands out as extremely vulnerable and is rated 16*th* by the *Fund for Peace*. Given its size and position in West Africa, and its role as a global supplier of gas and oil, anything that happens in Nigeria must be of significant concern to American policymakers. As the chart below suggests[4], violence in Nigeria has been episodic but there is no evidence that the government has found a means of controlling the instability. Indeed, the Nigerian security forces are such a blunt instrument that their operations tend to antagonize many populations who observe innocents being killed almost carelessly in the hunt for the terrorists.

Most of the other African states in the "bottom twenty" of the failed state index have been there for some time (e.g., Somalia) and are also the subject of significant policy attention (e.g., South Sudan). In terms of potential downside and significance to American policymakers, Kenya is the state that stands out as having the greatest potential for violence, and that would be a new arena of immediate concern for policymakers. In the Index's five year review between 2008 and 2013, Kenya is actually the sub-Saharan African country that deteriorated the most in the rankings, after Libya and Mali (which both fell apart in that period), Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Eritrea. While the source of the violence has been in part contained by the election pact between the two main ethnic protagonists as represented by vice president William Ruto (a Kalenjin) and president Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu), there is no guarantee that the compact will hold. Al-Shabab is another source of potential destabilization and is unlikely to dissipate so long as there is strife in Somalia, Kenyan forces are in situ, and members of the Somali population in Kenya can potentially be mobilized against the government.

The failed states model presupposes a descent into violence, along the lines of Somalia, Mali or the CAR. However, African states exist on a spectrum of failure, where

state functions may be weak and fail to deliver basic services and the state slowly atrophies. There is no one, sudden violent moment. This is the arc that both Kenya and Nigeria may be proceeding down. These conditions may create more insidious long-term challenges for Western policy-makers, given both their lengthy period of stagnation and decline without external media or government attention.

The larger the state, almost by definition, the more severe the consequences of failure. However, it is clear that sudden violence in almost any state can destabilize neighbors. For instance even a small amount of violence recently caused more than a thousand people to flee Mozambique for Malawi. Long-term failure brings its own consequences. South Africa, for instance, has borne the brunt of Zimbabwe's slow collapse, having to absorb perhaps two million Zimbabweans with the accompanying social dislocation. U.S. foreign policy makers cannot focus on every country equally and therefore it is only natural to gravitate to the larger countries. However, it should not be a surprise that even a small country can destabilize a neighborhood.

International Responses to Upsurges in Violence

The French intervention in Mali was a surprise and harkened back to a previous era of European interventions in former colonies. Our view is that the French intervention in Mali is probably not a harbinger of a new period of adventurism because the conditions in Mali were uniquely tied to the continuing evolution of Libya, where Paris had also been the first-mover. In addition, the real atrophy that France's military has suffered in recent years will constrain its ability to act, even if its leaders had a desire to be lead interveners elsewhere. Paris's much more restrained response to Central African Republic shows the limits to its actions.

African countries have become more centrally involved in peacekeeping in recent years, reacting to the vacuum caused by western disinterest in direct intervention, their own growing capabilities and ability to cooperate with each other (often funded by western countries), and the very real fear that violence could spillover. In general, most African militaries cannot operate far from their borders and have

Graph 1: Deaths Over Time

a difficult time pursuing sustained combat. The exceptions are a few militaries (e.g., Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda) that have, in general, become more capable in recent years. The Kenya intervention in Somalia was especially notable but perhaps unique because Kenya was pursuing its own interests in preventing further terrorist attacks launched from Somalia rather than having a pure peacekeeping motive. Certainly, despite all the work that has been done, African military cooperation remains a relatively weak reed upon which to base a conflict resolution strategy. American foreign policy makers are probably incorrect if they believe that demands for western intervention will be attenuated in the near future by growing African military capabilities.

There probably are no other outside countries that have the capability to intervene to fundamentally alter the course of an African conflict. Therefore, most conflicts in the near future will follow the same arc as demands begin for outside intervention, western countries mainly demur, and Africans are then drawn increasingly into the mix. Whether African countries intervene will depend critically on whether there is a lead country that cares enough and has the capability to affect what is inevitably a confusing and dynamic battlefield.

The Chapter Seven resolution that empowered African peacekeepers to fight in eastern Congo was a new development that demonstrated the ability of the international community led by Africans to respond to a conflict. However, the actual fighting followed a relatively old pattern. The intervening force was able to "defeat" M23 because the rebel group really did not want to fight the 3,000 or so soldiers that were arrayed against it. While

they took some casualties, the guerrillas dispersed before a final defeat, perhaps to fight again another day or perhaps to simply melt away. There is little evidence that the new force has been able to secure stability in eastern Congo without a political settlement that provides sufficient confidence for ethnic minorities and the regime in Kigali.

Democracy and Governance

Democracy (the selection of rulers by citizens) and governance (the appropriate economic management of the economy) are distinct topics. In the long-term, the two are correlated. For instance, it is no coincidence that Botswana —the only continental African country to have regularly scheduled elections that have been conducted in a free and fair manner since the 1960's—also routinely has the highest governance scores. However, given that most African democratic structures are young, weak, and ill formed, the correlation between democracy and governance can be nebulous in the short-to-medium-term. For instance, Rwanda and Ethiopia have high governance scores but are authoritarian regimes that tolerate little to no democratic opposition. Zambia, on the other hand, has had a series of successful elections but has suffered over many years from poor economic management.

Democracy

Freedom House provides a reasonable way to evaluate the democratic performance of regions and countries through its now famous *Freedom in the World* rankings.[5] Countries ranked, as below, 1-2.5 are considered "free" while those ranked 5.5-7 are "not free" with those in between (3-5) labelled "partly free." As the table indicates, sub-Saharan Africa at the continental level is now considerably freer

than the Middle East but lags other developing regions.[6]

As the next chart indicates, there has not been much change in comparative regional democratic performance over the last few years. Africa shows a slight drift toward authoritarianism, from 4.2 to 4.5 between 2006 and 2014. Mali—one of countries listed for many years as "free" but now in the "partly free" category — is a striking illustration of this shift. In the table below that lists freedom status by country, the number of those categorized as "partly free" is now one less than those in the "not free" category. For many years, the "partly free" category had contained the most African countries. However, Africa's mild democratic deterioration over the last few years did not change its position vis-à-vis other regions.

Sub-Saharan Africa	4.5
South and Central America	2.45
Asia	3.37
Middle East	5.5

Table 3. Freedom House score by area, 2014

A slight move back to authoritarianism after the many transitions away from one-party or military rule is hardly surprising given how hard it is to construct functioning democracies and the fact that many democratic systems only reach a stable point after learning from

failure. As with the conflict curve, the pendulum is simply swinging the other way.

What is perhaps most notable is that the drift away from freedom has been mild and that there has not been a more severe correction. The vast majority of African countries still hold regularly scheduled elections, admittedly of widely varying quality. Political conversation, aided by the continent becoming increasingly wired, has increased. There is, as of yet, no intellectual alternative to democracy in Africa.

Within Africa, there is significant variation by region.[7] The overall findings—with Southern Africa most free and the Horn least—would not be a surprise to most observers. More interesting is the fact that West Africa does not have that different a score from Southern Africa despite the long-held perception that Southern Africa has performed relatively well. The result comes about because both West and Southern Africa include a set of countries that are becoming arguably more diverse. Thus, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa are listed as "free" but Angola, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe are in the "not free" category. West Africa has fewer countries in the "free" category but is well-represented in the "partly free" area.[8]

At the same time, it is interesting to note that there have not been any recent instances of a country moving into the "free category." All those listed have been recognized for their democratic achievements for some time. The pattern appears to be that African countries made some impressive gains in the first five years or so after the Berlin Wall fell as multiparty electoral systems replaced the old one-party or no party systems. In retrospect, it is clear that these transitions came about because of the economic bankruptcy of the old regimes

Free	Partly Free	Not Free
Benin	Burkina Faso	Angola
Botswana	Burundi	Cameroon
Cape Verde	Cote d'Ivoire	Central African Republic
Ghana	Guinea	Chad
Lesotho	Kenya	Congo (Brazzaville)
Namibia	Liberia	Congo (Kinshasa)
Senegal	Madagascar	Equatorial Guinea
South Africa	Malawi	Eritrea
	Mali	Ethiopia
	Mozambique	Gabon
	Niger	Gambia, The
	Nigeria	Guinea-Bissau
	Sierra Leone	Mauritania
	Tanzania	Rwanda
	Togo	Somalia
	Uganda	Sudan
	Zambia	Swaziland
		Zimbabwe

Table 4. Freedom House classifications, 2014

rather than a groundswell of support for democracy. However, very few countries have been able to institutionalize democratic gains to the extent of being considered "free." In particular, recently, the number of incumbents who lose power via elections has diminished significantly compared to the 1990-1995 period. As a result, countries enter in a difficult and hazy condition of having important democratic forms (notably multiparty elections which have persisted in the vast majority of countries) but are unable to institutionalize further gains. They are thus vulnerable to democratic backtracking, which appears to have occurred in the last few years.

The retreat from democratization reminds us that the process of democratic consolidation is difficult, especially in the context of material deprivation. Never before in human history have so many poor countries attempted to both grow and democratize as in today's Africa. Consequently, failure or, even more common, ambiguity of result is to be expected. Whatever the overall benefits to the growth that Africa has recently experienced, there may have been too much optimism about the ability of poor countries to quickly institute democracy. It remains the case that in most African societies democratic institutions are weak, skills are low, finances scarce, incentives in favor of the private sector rare, and identity and patronage remain operating principles of the political and economic system, while the capabilities of local civil society are extremely limited.

African leaders have also closely observed the now many dozens of elections that have occurred across the continent in recent years. They have adapted to the new democratic context by managing elections so that they win but remain in the good graces of the international community by not ostentatiously violating the norms of free and fair contests to the extent that monitors feel forced take the unwanted (by all) decision of challenging the legitimacy of the vote. Apparently, donor activity has made little long-term impact on domestic processes, particularly on reforms that challenge the prevailing domestic political operating systems and economic orthodoxy, focused as it largely is on extraction rather than popular inclusion and social investment.

Governance

It is probably even harder to measure governance than democracy because the former concept covers such a large area. The Heritage Foundation's *Index of Economic Freedom*

provides a reasonable overall measurement of governance, rating countries for corruption, protection of property rights, and regulation in a large number of areas. Clearly modelled on the Freedom House work, the Index divides countries on a scale of 1-100 into "free (100-80)," "mostly free (79.9-70)," moderately free (69.9-60)," "mostly unfree (59.9-50)," and "repressed (49-0)."

Given the *Index's* scale, the areas of the world are actually bunched fairly close together, reflecting diversity of performance in every area. In terms of an absolute ranking, Africa remains substantially lower than other parts of the world. However, the next figure makes clear that Africa as a continent in absolute terms has improved since 2009 while the performance of the other regions is more ambiguous, with South and Central America experiencing an absolute decline in performance while the Middle East and North Africa have been volatile.[9]

When Africa is disaggregated by region, there is, again, considerable diversity. Not surprisingly, Central Africa has performed poorly.

What is more impressive is the record of East African countries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) that actually outperform Southern Africa, the region that has traditionally had the best reputation for economic management. Again, it is the diversity of the region that is most striking. Botswana is categorized as "mostly free" with a world rank of 27 that puts it above, among others, South Korea. In contrast, DRC, Eritrea and Zimbabwe are ranked, respectively, 172, 174, and 176 out of 178, with only Cuba and North Korea "beating out" Zimbabwe.[10]

Attempts at reform have often collided with patronage political networks necessary for electoral success, and often distributed along ethnic, religious or regional lines. In the short-term, democratization and governance do not likely go together, although in the longer-term the two historically coincide. The very need for African leaders to stand for election on a regular basis puts pressure on them to both fund their parties and consolidate their support bases. This is compounded by "big man" tendencies to accumulate wealth through state contracts and contacts. The rise of China has,

Graph 2. Index of Economic Freedom by Area

in this regard, diluted donor influence on governance, both directly (through contracting) and indirectly (as source of alternative finance, and as a state-led economic development model).

The question of the timing and sequencing of political and economic reform is amongst the most interesting in Africa. The next chart combines the Index of Economic Freedom and the Freedom in the World rankings to understanding comparative progress in political and economic liberalization.

Some of the populations in the cells are hardly a surprise. For instance, the grouping of countries that are considered both economically "repressed" and politically "not free' is large. And it is no surprise that Botswana alone scores an *Index* ranking of "mostly free' and a *Freedom House* ranking of "free." Most countries tend toward the middle of the table, having modest success in both economic reform and promoting freedom.

What is perhaps most striking is the number of countries of interest to American foreign policy-makers that earn a "modestly free" governance ranking but a political ranking of "not free." In particular, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Cameroon seem to have had some economic success but reform of their political systems is lagging behind. The political economy these countries are developing raises the question of whether a new model is nascent in Africa that draws from the authoritarian political practices but liberalized economic models of East Asia. This is not so much a "Beijing Consensus" as was much-discussed a few years ago because there is no evidence that China is driving the ideological economic debate in Africa, aside from being a pretext for this type of state behavior.

Rather, we may be observing the nascent stages of what eventually could become the "Kigali consensus" as more countries take note of the economic performance of Rwanda and other authoritarian countries. Superficially, the Rwandan experience looks appealing. The country has gone from utter destruction after the genocide in 1994 to a consistent economic

Mostly free	Moderately free		Mostly unfree	Repressed
Botswana	Zambia	Ethiopia	Malawi	Zimbabwe
	Swaziland	Sierra Leone	Mali	Eritrea
	Madagascar	Guinea-Bissau	Benin	DRC
	South Africa	Burundi	Kenya	Congo, Republic of
	Ghana	Liberia	Côte d'Ivoire	Equatorial Guinea
	Rwanda	Cameroon	Tanzania	Chad
		Mauritania	Gabon	Central African Republic
		Guinea	Burkina Faso	Angola
		Nigeria	Namibia	Lesotho
		Mozambique	Gambia	Togo
		Niger	Uganda	
		Senegal		

Table 5. Index of Economic Freedom categories, 2014

performer. Kigali is clean, it works, and the country has great ambitions. It seems to be able to focus on transformative projects, in contrast to many African countries whose economic systems are growing but not transforming.

Appealing to African leaders, President Paul Kagame has created a political system where he faces no credible political opposition and holds elections that he always wins. Yet, he still passes muster with Western countries and is celebrated by many pundits who occasionally parachute into Africa. Despite the authoritarian nature of the regime, the donors have showered Rwanda with aid, although Freedom House, for one, is not fooled as it consistently rates Rwanda "Not Free." Indeed,

Kagame has consistently been able to manipulate Western countries in a way that is both obvious and appealing to other African nations, notably his stated desire to wean his country quickly off aid even as he receives more of it. Kagame is seen in some circles as the African equivalent of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, the gentle autocrat who can guide a country to a radically different future than had been imagined. We have been impressed in the last year how often the Rwandan experience is mentioned (always in a positive light) in discussions with senior African leaders across the continent. Whether the "Kigali Consensus" becomes a long-term threat to the appeal of the democracy in Africa will be an important question to observe in the next few years.

	Eco Mostly free	Eco Moderately Free	Eco Mostly Unfree	Eco Repressed
Pol Free	Botswana	South Africa	Benin	Lesotho
		Ghana	Namibia	
		Senegal		
Pol Partly Free		Zambia	Malawi	Togo
		Sierra Leone	Mali	
		Burundi	Kenya	
		Liberia	Cote d'Ivoire	
		Guinea	Tanzania	
		Nigeria	Burkina Faso	
		Mozambique	Uganda	
		Niger		
Pol Not free		Swaziland	Gabon	Zimbabwe
		Rwanda	Gambia	Eritrea
		Ethiopia		DRC
		Guinea-Bissau		Congo, Rep.
		Cameroon		Eq. Guinea
		Mauritania		Chad
				CAR
				Angola

Table 6. Comparative Progress in Political and Economic Liberalization

There appear to be relatively few regional patterns in the chart that compares democratization and governance. It does stand out that the overwhelming number of countries considered politically "free" is in Southern Africa. However, when it comes to economic regulation, the Southern African countries rated highly by Freedom House can be found in every column from Botswana in the economically "mostly free" classification to Lesotho in the economically repressed. Within much of Southern Africa (Angola and Zimbabwe are exceptions), there seems to be a consensus about democracy but not about economic management. No other clear regional patterns exist, especially given that African countries mainly have middling performance in both political and economic freedom.

Economic Growth and Development

There has recently been considerable excitement about Africa's economic prospects. Countries south of the Sahara have had, compared to their post-independence history, high and sustained growth since 2000, and near-term prospects of five percent growth at the continental level seem reasonable. Still, it is important to understand Africa's actual position and disaggregate recent experience. On a continental level, Africa is now the second-poorest region although, given the inevitable error in statistics, it can reasonably be said to be tied with South Asia.[11]

Setting GDP per capita in 2005 to 100, it is clear that Sub-Saharan Africa has done well but so have all of the other regions (data for the Middle East for this period has not been collected). Indeed, it would have been notable if Africa had not grown, given the buoyant international economy characterized by the high commodity prices and investment from China coupled with an increased appetite for returns by Western investors in riskier markets.

Between 2005 and 2012, continental per capita income increased by roughly 15 percent.

Region	2012 Per capita income
East Asia & Pacific (developing only)	$5,187
Europe & Central Asia (developing only)	$6,939
Latin America & Caribbean (developing only)	$9,192
Middle East & North Africa (developing only)	$4,616
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only)	$1,417
South Asia	$1,386

Table 7. Regional Per Capita Economic Growth (2012)

That is an impressive accomplishment but not yet transformational. African populations continue to grow at a relatively high level, thereby moderating the effects of the relatively high growth rates recently achieved.

By sub-region in Africa, there are significant variations. It is also hard to evaluate regional per capita income because one country in a region with an outsized income can distort the figure for the entire group of countries. The following chart shows per capita income for each region and what happens when the average is recalculated by eliminating the highest-ranked country. Southern Africa is clearly the richest area, in good part because it is not dominated by one relatively rich country.

The table is also a warning that, while Africa is certainly growing, some of the continental growth statistics routinely cited are disproportionately influenced by what is

Graph 3. Growth in constant GDP per capita, 2005=100

happening in a few small countries (e.g., Equatorial Guinea).

The chart below shows that when Africa's per capita income is weighted by the population size of each country, so that, for instance Ethiopia accounts for ten percent of the calculation rather than 1/48, average continental income is lower and the curve somewhat flatter.[17] In particular, the "average African" has seen her income rise over the last seventeen years (in constant 2005 dollars) from $736 to $1,090, an increase of 48 percent. This is good but not as impressive as the increase from $1,165 to $1,908 (64 percent) that is derived by simply averaging the performance of countries together without regard to population.

In particular, the average per capita incomes of the three largest African countries by population (DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria[13]) that together account for approximately 35 percent of all people on the continent are lower than the continental average. Nigeria, as the chart makes clear, has closed the gap in recent years largely on the back of relatively high oil prices but the other two are still very low by African standards. Indeed, Congo's per capita income has essentially been flat between 1995 and 2012—the time when many African countries were experiencing significant growth—reflecting the cost of conflict and poor economic policies. At the same time, some (but certainly not all) small countries have registered high economic growth. In particular, Botswana and Namibia have all done better than the continental average.

Region	Average	Average when recalculated without highest ranked nation
Central Africa	625	295
East Africa	495	444
Horn	430	227
Southern Africa	2686	2488
West Africa	1696	889

Table 8. Regional Per Capita Income

The Average African

Graph 4. Per Capita Income, Un-weighted and Weighted

Size is a surprising determinant of a country's economic growth prospects, a finding that starkly contrasts the usual assumption that big countries will, all other things being equal, do better because of their larger markets and the greater likelihood that they will have significant raw materials, by dint of their larger surface area. Larger countries, as demonstrated by the trajectories of DRC, Ethiopia, and Nigeria are harder to manage and pose real challenges to how governments project power over distance.

It is notable that each of Africa's three giants has had a civil war and a history of considerable violence over their post-independence histories. In contrast, the relatively good record that small countries have had suggests that economic management is aided by relatively compact populations. It may also be the case that the impact of natural resources in some small countries (e.g., oil in Equatorial Guinea) will be proportionately greater.

When it comes to growth rates of individual countries for the period under review, there is clearly considerable variation. Amongst the relatively high performers, it is perhaps notable how many (Liberia, Angola,

Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique) have emerged in recent years from conflicts that reduced their economic foundations to near ruin. The relatively high growth these countries experienced in the 2005-12 period is, of course, important but is partially a statistical mirage that reflects the simple restarting of economic engines at the onset of peace. Whether that growth can be sustained is a separate issue. The post-conflict economic "bump," as welcome as it is for the countries that have endured such trauma, is another reason why actual economic growth in Africa may be less than the statistics suggest.

Africa's stronger economic performance has been pervasive but not universal. There are warning signs. We believe that the relatively good continental economic performance in recent years has been due to relatively high commodity prices fuelled especially by China and difficult governance decisions that African countries have made. It is now clear what some called the commodity "supercycle" is over, if it ever really existed, and African countries are likely to face less robust export earnings in the near future. The "taper" by the U.S. Federal Reserve may also cause the depreciation of

Graph 5. Average Per Capita Income

some currencies and a decline in the number of foreign investors seeking African projects, if they can get more for their money by investing in U.S. Treasuries.

Conclusion

There have been significant accomplishments across Africa over the last 15 years. The number of wars has decreased, multiparty elections are now held routinely in the vast majority of countries, and economic growth is projected across the continent to average four to five percent in the next two years. The image of Africa

has certainly evolved from what *The Economist* called "The Hopeless Continent" in 2000. However, we find that some achievements in areas that the U.S. has identified as critical are in danger of being reversed, not shared by all countries, or are overblown once a more nuanced analysis is conducted.

These conclusions are not surprising because nation-building, democratization, and proper economic management are each extremely difficult processes to manage and many African countries are attempting to undertake at least two of these simultaneously.

Top quartile	Second quartile	Third quartile	Bottom quartile
Liberia	Seychelles	South Africa	Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia	Uganda	Kenya	Senegal
Angola	Tanzania	Congo, Rep.	Malawi
Ghana	Zambia	Niger	Gambia, The
Rwanda	Botswana	Chad	Cote d'Ivoire
Central African Republic	Sudan	Togo	Guinea
Sierra Leone	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Mali	Swaziland
Mozambique	Namibia	Gabon	Madagascar
Nigeria	Burkina Faso	Benin	Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho	Mauritania	Burundi	Zimbabwe

Table 9. Economic growth (GDP per capita), 2005-12

There are thus bound to be setbacks and out-right reversals. In the next two to three years, the ultimate challenge for American policy-makers will be to appreciate the extremely difficult context in which reform processes are evolving so as not to oversell welcome, albeit ultimately short-term, accomplishments. The descent of Mali into civil war serves as a particular warning in this regard. PRISM

[10] The Index of Economic Freedom regional scores for 2014 are: Central Africa, 49.4; East Africa, 58.3; Horn, 48.1; Southern Africa, 55.9; and West Africa, 54.1, where the higher the score, the greater the economic freedom.

[11] (Number reported for Middle East is for 2011). The source for this and following charts and tables: World Bank, World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

[12] These calculations were done before Nigeria rebased its GDP figures.

[13] These calculations were made before Nigeria released its recalculated GDP figures.

NOTES

[1] Human Security Report. www.hsrgroup.org

[2] At http://ffp.statesindex.org/images/fsi-trendmap-2008-2013-hires.png.

[3] See http://populationpyramid.net/sub-saharan-africa

[4] Council on Foreign Relations, Nigeria Security Tracker, http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483

[5] http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014?gclid=CIu-2qrjy7wCFfFDMgod91IACw#.UuF9cm0o6Uk.

[6] This paper uses data from several different sources. The definition of the world areas varies some-what from source-to-source. For instance, different countries may be included in "developing Asia." These variations in definition do not affect the larger conclusions drawn by the paper.

[7] This paper divides Africa into Central, East, Horn, Southern and West regions. It general it does not include island countries. Again, the data by Africa region is not completely uniform. Some sources provide data for Somalia, some do not. The advent of South Sudan is also treated differently by source. Again, these variations should not have an impact on overall generalizations.

[8] The Freedom House scores for the regions are: Central Africa, 5.8; East Africa, 4; Horn 6.4; Sothern Africa 3,65; and West Africa, 4.2, where the lower the score indicating greater freedom.

[9] At Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/index/

Photos

Page 14 photo by Pierre Holtz. *A boy in the town of Birao in northern CAR which was largely burnt down during fighting in 2007*. From http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Birao_burnt_down2.jpg licensed under the Creative Commons **Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic** license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en. Photo reproduced unaltered.

A column of rebels from the Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia

Security Threats Facing Africa and its Capacity to Respond

BY PAUL COLLIER

Africa is currently facing two entirely distinct security threats, one from the rise of radical Islam, the other from increased natural resource extraction. African security forces are ill-equipped to meet these threats. Much of this is deep-rooted, rather than due to deficiencies that could readily be addressed. I first set out each of the new security threats. I then turn to Africa's military capacity, tracing its limitations to underlying motivations. I suggest that the most straightforward way of changing the belief systems that generate motivation is strengthening national identity, but that this has been made more difficult by the divisive force of electoral competition. I conclude that Africa will need three forms of international support.

Threat 1: Radical Islam

Radical Islam is a global phenomenon, generated by the uncontrolled dissemination of extremist ideology, supported by vast private wealth in the Gulf, the use of which is not subject to scrutiny. It poses a distinctive threat to Africa partly because many African countries have substantial Muslim populations that, in conditions of poverty and poor governance, can easily become disaffected. Additionally, the threat is distinctive because the organizations needed to counter it effectively require a level of sophistication and cost that are beyond the means of most African militaries.

The threat from radical Islam has recently been evident in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Kenya and Nigeria. In Mali and CAR it was existential: without timely French military intervention both states would have been overrun and fallen to radical Islamic forces. In Nigeria and Kenya the threat has taken the form of sensational terrorism that, while not threatening the states themselves, is highly damaging to their international reputations. This difference in consequences is primarily due to the greater military capacity of Nigeria and Kenya: both countries have economies that are sufficiently robust to finance militaries with the capacity to defeat feasible

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rebel challenges. However, their security forces are not adequate for the more demanding task of preventing the escalation of terrorism.

In all four situations the Islamic terrorism is a spill-over from failing neighbouring countries in which Islamic militants have been able to build their military capacity. The meltdown in Libya, which is ongoing, provided a base from which a rebel force could equip itself sufficiently to defeat the Malian army; the endemic insecurity of vast areas of the Sahel enabled a rebel force to defeat the army of CAR and to infiltrate North-East Nigeria; and Islamists in Somalia were able to mount terrorist attacks in Kenya. Geography, more than policy differences, probably accounts for why it is these countries and not others that are facing the worst threats: these countries border on failing states. But there is clearly potential for terrorism to spread.

Threat 2: Natural Resource Discoveries

Although Africa has long been a natural resource exporter, until recently it was only lightly prospected: resource extraction per square mile was much lower than in other regions. The high commodity prices of the past decade have triggered a wave of investment in prospecting and, because Africa was the least explored region, it became the favored location for exploration. During the past decade many valuable resources have been discovered in previously resource-poor African countries, often in remote areas. During the present decade the mines and transport infrastructure will be developed in order to exploit these discoveries.[1]

While natural resources have the potential to finance development, they also have the potential to catalyze violent conflict.[2] Valuable resources have sometimes been a source of

Rwandan soldier stands guard at Bangui M'Poko international Airport in CAR

finance for rebel groups, as with diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone. They have also raised the stakes for capturing power, while reducing the need for accountability to citizens by displacing taxes as the primary source of state revenue: the resulting contamination of politics has long been illustrated by Nigeria. Further, since valuable resources are never evenly spread throughout a territory, they give well-endowed regions an incentive to try to secede from the nation, as with the Katanga region of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Biafra region of Nigeria.

The localized nature of resource discoveries interacts with strong sub-national identities to create serious security vulnerabilities. The same national and sub-national identities can be entirely compatible in the context of cooperation, but become oppositional once the ownership of valuable resources becomes salient. This is by no means Africa-specific: Scotland is an example. For three centuries being Scottish was not seen as incompatible with being British: for much of this period the most salient activity was the common task of defence against external threat. However, during the past decade of high oil prices, the oil off the shore of Scotland has replaced external security as the most salient issue, leading to strong pressure for secession. Because African sub-national identities are so strong, this interaction of resources and local identity is likely to be particularly troubling in the region. The recent oil discovery in Kenya is located in a remote area whose people, the Turkana, have never been integrated into Kenyan identity. Oil activities soon had to be suspended due to local violence. Even in Tanzania, the discovery of gas offshore of the region of Mtwara led to riots and four deaths because people in the region claimed that it belonged to them, not

to the nation. Currently, South Sudan has collapsed into civil war because the oil which is the government's sole source of finance is located in the territory of the Nuer tribe, whereas the government is controlled by the Dinka, their ancestral rivals.

African Military Capacity

The limitations of African militaries in response to these threats have been all too evident. Their weakness in Mali and the CAR was probably inevitable in view of their economic and geographic fundamentals: these territories are basically too poor to impose security on their highly dispersed populations. While retrospectively it is always easy to identify political weaknesses, prior to its collapse Mali was not on any of the three independently maintained lists of fragile states (e.g. by the World Bank, OECD, or the EU[3]). By African standards, it was one of the better-conducted democracies. Hence, any solution to insecurity in these and similar countries will require a degree of external military assistance. In contrast, the limitations of the military in Nigeria and Kenya are not fundamentally economic. In both countries the military tasks required to respond to terrorist attacks were relatively modest. In Nigeria, 200 schoolgirls were abducted by a small rebel group and taken to a forest area, yet they could not be traced by the Nigerian military. In Kenya, a shopping mall in Nairobi was overrun by terrorists and coastal villages were brutally attacked. When soldiers were called in to the Nairobi shopping mall they took the opportunity to loot the shops rather than stop the carnage; on the coast, following the attack, terrorists were able to repeat the slaughter in a neighboring village. These failings are not, fundamentally, due to

an inadequate budget, but to something both deeper and less tractable: motivation.

Conventionally, economics has analyzed motivation in terms of financial incentives linked to monitored performance. However, as argued by Akerlof and Kranton[4], in many contexts this is not an effective solution. They show that in high-productivity private sector firms the most common solution to the challenge of retaining motivation is that the organization succeeds in getting its workforce to internalize its objectives. Through internalization, scale and specialization are reconciled with motivation. While internalization rather than financial incentives is the preferred solution in many commercial organizations, it is far more important in public organizations. The nature of the work usually limits the scope for using high-powered financial incentives because individual performance is difficult to monitor, while the objectives of the organization lend themselves to internalization more readily than those of most firms. This is true of the military, par excellence. So, to understand military organizations it is essential to understand the psychological mechanics of internalization.

In summary, an "effective organization" is a locally stable constellation of identities, narratives, norms and networks that makes the workforce productive by reconciling scale and specialization with motivation.

Directly, internalization is a change in *identity*: hence the name that Akerlof and Kranton give to their book. The military recruit internalizes the proposition, "I am a good soldier." This change in identity enhances performance because it implies new *norms*: a good

soldier bravely fights the enemy. What brings about the change in identity is a changed perception of some aspects of how the world works. Psychologists have established that overwhelmingly people acquire their understanding of the world not through analytic expositions but through *narratives*. The soldier changes his perception because he comes to accept a set of narratives, such as "this army is essential for the peace of the country." Identities, narratives and norms, which I will term collectively *beliefs*, are the psychological processes that determine internalization. In turn, beliefs are generated though participation in social networks within which information circulates. In summary, an "effective organization" is a locally stable constellation of identities, narratives, norms and networks that makes the workforce productive by reconciling scale and specialization with motivation.

Most African countries are chronically short of such public organizations: shirking and corruption are debilitating and endemic. Many armies are no more effective than other parts of the public sector. Nevertheless, an army should be the easiest public organization to make effective. All militaries have at their disposal an identity, a narrative and a norm that are functional and compatible, and a network that can be used to deliver them. Indeed, while Akerlof and Kranton take most of their examples from the private sector, their archetypical example of an effective organization, used as the opening illustration in their book, is the U.S. Army. Around the developed world, armies recruit low-skilled teenage males and are able to motivate many of them to risk their lives, a degree of motivation which even investment banks using high-powered incentives to the limit seldom achieve. Globally, the military has the monopoly on the right to

promote the narrative that its workers are defending the nation. While particular circumstances can undermine this narrative, in most circumstances it is a powerful one. The narrative supports clear norms of personal courage and sacrifice both for the national interest, and that of the team. Between them, the narrative and norm support the internalization of an identity: "I am a member of a team that defends the nation."

Not only are the beliefs attractive and reinforcing, the hierarchical, team-based, and hermetic nature of military networks gives military leaders a potent vehicle for delivering beliefs to the workforce. In contrast, political leaders might lack networks for building motivation in teachers. Whereas soldiers live together in barracks, teachers live in their local communities. Above the level of headmaster, there is little organizational structure whereby Ministries of Education can deliver functional beliefs to teachers: there is little that is national about a typical teacher's experience of the job. The military hierarchy leads all the way up to the Head of State. In consequence, it may be easier for the Head of State to inculcate a common norm of public service among soldiers than among teachers. The easy communication afforded to military leaders by means of the networks they control carries a qualification. If the conduct of leaders is visibly incompatible with the beliefs they promote then the process degenerates into theatre: participants merely perform a role and understand that that is what others are doing.

In summary, it is easier to build functional beliefs through a military network than in either a democratic political party or the civilian parts of the public sector. Although other public sector organizations can invoke narratives of the national interest, none is as potent

as that of defending the nation: teenage boys do not dream of being tax inspectors.

Motivation, Nationalism and Democracy: Links and Tensions

Two key building blocks in the belief system that generates and sustains an effective military are nationalism and heroic leadership. The nation is what the military protects, and the nation's leader is visibly self-sacrificing in the national interest. Directly, nationalism provides a shared identity, but it also involves a supporting narrative, typically of a past struggle that has forged the nation, with heroes of that struggle as role models. From this follows the norm of service to protect the nation. Internalization, and the nationalism that facilitates it, are not the only mechanisms for motivation: men fight for their colleagues. But comradeship alone is not enough: lacking a sense of public duty, Kenyan soldiers chose to loot together rather than to fight together.

Most African militaries are ineffective because most African countries lack a strong sense of national identity and their leaders have ostentatiously eschewed self-sacrifice. The contrast between the founding presidents of Kenya and Tanzania demonstrates the long-term consequences. In Kenya, President Jomo Kenyatta behaved like most other African presidents, using his power to favor his own tribe over its rivals. Exceptionally, and in contrast, the Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, prioritized building national identity. He introduced a national language, a common school curriculum, and a neutrally sited new capital city, while requiring civil servants to work in regions other than that of their birth. Also exceptionally, Nyerere lived modestly making his narrative of a common national struggle

credible, whereas Kenyatta amassed one of the largest fortunes in the world. Forty years later Eduard Miguel compared similar multi-ethnic villages on either side of the border to see whether people could cooperate to maintain a well.[5] On the Kenyan side of the border people had not learned to cooperate across tribal lines whereas on the Tanzanian side they had.

When President Nyerere set about building a sense of common Tanzanian identity, he was concerned that multi-party democracy would make the task more difficult. Inevitably, political parties would be organized on the basis of established sub-national, tribal, identities. The rivalry and competition between parties would likely reinforce these identities, overriding his desired new narrative of shared identity based on shared endeavour. His opposition to multi-party politics was not based on a personal calculation of power retention. Elections were held in which the population was given a yes/no choice of whether to re-elect the President, and in 1984, feeling responsible for the failure of his economic policies, he resigned.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union practical international action has promoted, and increasingly insisted, on multi-party electoral competition as the defining feature of the passage to modernity. This policy has not been directed specifically to Africa: its core foci were in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. But aid to Africa gave Western governments the power to insist. An inadvertent consequence is that in most African countries at no stage has there been an environment conducive to building a strong national identity. Polities passed directly from ethnically divisive autocracy to ethnically divisive electoral competition.

The weakness of national identity has made motivation more difficult in all public service organizations. Teachers do not show up for class; nurses steal drugs; tax officials extort bribes rather than raise revenue for government. But arguably, it is the military that is most reliant upon national identity for the vital psychological process of internalization of organizational objectives. In the absence of a sense of shared national identity, teachers may still be motivated by a desire to pass on learning, and nurses by a desire to heal the sick. But without a sense of shared identity it is difficult to see why soldiers would risk their lives.

The most striking exceptions to African public sector weakness are in Ethiopia and Rwanda. Not only have both got effective militaries, but both have very low levels of corruption and have delivered rapid, broad-based economic growth for their citizens. Neither of these political systems is a conventional democracy: while elections are held, neither government would acquiesce in a loss of political power. In consequence, they have been subject to much international criticism. In place of multi-party electoral competition, they have a mass national party: the public officials who administer government functions are members of the party. In turn, the party has emerged out of a successful rebel movement. The conditions necessary for military success were not only military patterns of command, but a set of beliefs – an ideology – in which the key tenets were personal sacrifice for the goal of national liberation and development. This ideology could only be made credible to ordinary rebel fighters if the leadership itself set an example. In both countries leaders and leadership teams lived frugally. Not only was this imperative for the practical military functioning of the rebel organization, once these beliefs had been internalized across the higher

cadres of party membership they enabled a wider range of functions to be performed to an adequate standard once in government. While both rebel organizations were ethnically based and retain a strong ethnic core, their ideology was national rather than ethnic. Consistent with their ideology, in their evolution to mass national parties they have gradually broadened their membership to include other ethnic groups. For example, upon the death of Meles Zenawi in 2012, his replacement as Head of Government was from southern Ethiopia rather than his native Tigray.

The internalized ideology of party cadres has provided an effective, albeit unconventional, form of checks and balances on the use of power. Elsewhere in Africa, alongside electoral competition there is now a conventional suite of checks and balances such as courts and audits. However, while more readily recognizable to the Western eye, they have proved to be easy to circumvent.

Implications for International Policy

For the next decade the security threats from radical Islam and natural resource discoveries are likely to be important issues in Africa. African militaries are mostly in no condition to meet these threats. If my diagnosis is correct, that the underlying problem is the weakness of national identity, this is unlikely to be remedied. On the contrary, localized natural resource discoveries, religious polarization, and multi-party winner-take-all politics played for heightened stakes, may all further tend to weaken national identity.

This prospect has three broad security implications for international policy. One is that in the neighborhoods of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, it might be advisable to

Malian soldier establishes security in a landing site during the multi-national exercise Flintlock

strengthen some states that could become neighborhood anchors. A second is that the confidence placed in electoral competition may need to be questioned: some unconventional forms of governance may nevertheless work reasonably well in African conditions. The third is that for several states external military assistance is likely to be necessary. It is, however, important to recognize that each of these has the potential to go badly wrong.

Using international policy to favor countries that are judged to be strategically important can backfire. The favored governments can exaggerate their fortune and relax the necessary focus on delivering services to citizens. Neighboring governments can become resentful, impeding cooperation. Nevertheless, there are currently some situations in Africa where promoting neighborhood bulwarks would be sensible. In Francophone West Africa two countries have recently emerged from fragility and now have considerable potential. Guinea has its best government since independence and is beginning to exploit its vast natural resource wealth. By harnessing this wealth, the country has the opportunity for economic transformation over the next decade. Similarly, Cote d'Ivoire, having emerged from a decade of civil war, now has the opportunity for rapid resource-financed development. In both countries a legacy of conflict has left them short of management capacity across the public sector. International action to strengthen this capacity has been slow to scale up so as to accelerate recovery.

In the Horn of Africa Ethiopia and Kenya are vital bulwarks. Yet the core economic strategy of the Ethiopian government to industrialize on the back of cheap hydropower has been frustrated by international opposition to dams. This matter should be recognized as a legitimate choice of a legitimate government. Analogously, the Kenyan government is currently facing international pressure to cooperate in the trial of its President and Vice-President at the International Criminal Court in the Hague. While the international desire to end political impunity is commendable, the Kenyan situation is highly peculiar. While the President and Vice-President are accused of having previously sanctioned organized violence against each others' supporters, they are now manifestly reconciled in a political alliance which has been endorsed by citizens through an election. In consequence, the action of the court appears locally as re-enacting colonialism rather than as breaking the cycle of impunity.

A more eclectic approach to African political development risks giving license for the repeat of past political abuses: autocracy, ethnic dominance, and corruption. However, properly done it would shift emphasis from the forms of power acquisition to the substance of how power is being used. Financial integrity and wider ethnic social inclusion would become more important, with a particular focus on the good management of natural resources. Conversely, in those contexts in which these criteria were being met, the right to challenge power would become less important. Manifestly, the task of building national identity cannot be assisted externally. But the current insistence upon multi-party electoral competition in contexts of weak checks and balances on the use of power once won, has created powerfully divisive forces. Ultimately, the most desirable remedy for this situation is much stronger checks and balances. But checks and balances are processes rather than events, and they have proved to be difficult to build in African conditions. In some countries they

may require a much longer time horizon than the timetables of radical Islam and resource discoveries are likely to permit. In such contexts a more rapidly achievable outcome might be for ruling parties to be encouraged to evolve into mass organizations with an ideology of national development, ethnic inclusion, and leadership self-sacrifice.

External military assistance has had a terrible decade and the potential for mistakes is evident. However, Africa is a far less demanding security challenge than the Middle East in this regard. The immediate priorities arise from radical Islam. There is an urgent need for strengthened security in the Sahel, and enhanced intelligence against terrorism, especially in East Africa. Countering the security risks from the growth of natural resource extraction is less immediate but it is also more difficult to achieve a military solution.

The threat from radical Islam in the Sahel requires security cooperation among African countries. The regional hegemons, South Africa and Nigeria, have both recognized this need but neither is strong enough to be able to satisfy it. For example, South Africa had a force in CAR at the time it was overrun, but the force was too small and was rapidly withdrawn after taking casualties. As in the Europe of seventy years ago, cooperation is impeded by a long history of rivalries: Sahelian countries have periodically been at war with each other; Nigeria and South Africa are bitter rivals for the role of leadership, while both are viewed with suspicion by smaller countries. As in Europe, the solution is to catalyze cooperation externally. Either the African Union, or ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), could be the African partner organization. The international partner could be the UN, NATO, or an *ad hoc* consortium of

interested parties such as China, the U.S., France, and the UK. The key elements of cooperation would be mutual commitments. The external parties would commit to substantial and sustained financial, logistic, and training support for an African military force, but would eschew troops on the ground. The African parties would commit to contribute sufficient manpower to a standing force, a genuinely unified command structure, an unambiguous mandate for combat operations, clear rules for when such an engagement would be authorized, and a precisely specified and speedy authorizing mechanism. It might be a decade before an effective force was fully in place. But both Islamic radicalism and natural resource extraction are probably still in their early stages: in a decade the need for containing the associated security problems is likely to have increased.

The pervasive corruption of the African public sector therefore precludes substantial sharing.

The need for enhanced counter-terrorism intelligence, especially in East Africa, may be more difficult to meet. Intelligence cannot reasonably be shared with organizations that are too weak to keep it secure. The pervasive corruption of the African public sector therefore precludes substantial sharing. The alternative is to finance and train self-contained intelligence gathering capacity country-by-country.

While the threat from radical Islam is immediate, that from natural resources is likely to build up gradually over the decade. Unfortunately, neither the pan-African force needed for the Sahel, nor enhanced counter-terrorist intelligence would address it. It would

be highly problematic to use a pan-African military force to suppress rebellions in resource-rich regions demanding greater autonomy. The commitments would risk being open-ended, and would encourage government intransigence. Cumulatively, such uses would undermine continued international support. The only feasible military counter to resource-based rebellions is to have a strong and effective national army, but building such nation-by-nation military capacity is beyond the power of international actors. The revealed weakness of the Nigerian military was not due to a lack of budget: the Nigerian military commands a budget far higher than could be attained in any other African country. The revealed weakness of the Kenyan military was that its soldiers were less interested in protecting citizens than in shopping: such a deficiency is not amenable to foreign training. It is worth noting that there is nothing specifically African about these failings: the revealed weaknesses of the Iraqi army, despite external efforts far in excess of anything conceivable for Africa, are informative.

Rather, the most credible solution to the threat posed by the enhanced importance of natural resources is political: better domestic governance of natural resources can reduce the risk of violence. This has several key components: resolving tensions between national and local interests; building trust in the financial integrity of budgets; and managing expectations.

There are two sources of tension between the local and the national: ownership of the revenues and environmental damage. By far the best time to resolve ownership issues is before the resource has been discovered. Sir Seretse Khama, the first president of Botswana, had the foresight to tour the country prior to

prospecting for diamonds with the message, "can we agree that anything we find belongs to all of us?" Prior to discovery, brute self-interest is sufficient to get agreement to such a proposition; after discovery, self-interest drags the fortunate locality into indignant assertions of ownership. Environmental damage is necessarily borne locally not nationally. Building systems that ensure speedy and proportionate compensation in remote and weakly governed areas is difficult but essential. The Delta region of Nigeria illustrates the disastrous consequences of early neglect: local populations resorted to violence to force compensation, and this evolved into an extortion racket. Without trust in the financial integrity of budgets, local populations come to believe that their valuable resources are being stolen by distant elites. Since African governments start from a position of deep suspicion among citizens, building trust requires drastic enhancement of practical budget transparency. In the absence of an active policy to manage expectations, the announcement of a valuable resource discovery is liable to trigger wildly exaggerated hopes. Poor people have no familiarity in digesting news expressed in billions of dollars and millions of barrels. Again, the political leadership of Botswana provides a model. Citizens were educated in the need for patience – "we're poor and so we must carry a heavy load." This narrative was operationalized into a policy of using diamond revenues to accumulate assets rather than to finance immediate increases in consumption. Such political wisdom remains rare.

There is a lot that international political action can do to enhance the governance of natural resources. To date, there has been considerable progress in revenue transparency, but there has as yet been little attention to the

transparency of expenditure, which is obviously of more concern to citizens. The onus for building effective systems of compensation for environmental damage is on the international companies that extract resources. The management of expectations through a positive narrative of prudent accumulation is beginning: the Norwegian model of a sovereign wealth fund has become fashionable. However, as yet this probably reflects isomorphic mimicry of institutions, rather than a genuine attempt to harness an economic opportunity: alongside sovereign wealth funds, governments are issuing bonds to finance consumption.

Conclusion

Africa has been through a successful decade of rapid growth. However, it is facing new security threats that are likely to be beyond its current or feasible domestic military capacity. While the threat from the increasing importance of natural resources can best be countered by improved economic governance, that from Islamic extremism probably requires international military assistance, at least to the neighbourhoods of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In the longer term, African governments will need to improve domestic military effectiveness. However, I have suggested that the current lack of effectiveness is rooted in a more general lack of worker motivation in the public sector. In this case, rectifying it may depend upon resetting the identities, narratives and norms which underpin motivation. Leaders may be able to achieve such a reset through national parties, embodying an ideology of ethnic inclusivity and personal sacrifice, as appears to be underway in Rwanda and Ethiopia. Such a strategy differs considerably from the preferred Western approach of multi-party electoral competition. But in retrospect,

the emphasis on the process by which power is acquired, as opposed to how it is used, may have been misplaced. PRISM

Notes

[1] Collier, Paul. The Plundered Planet: Why We Must, and How We Can, Manage Nature for Global Prosperity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

[2] Collier, Paul. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York: Harper, 2009.

[3] Please see the following for more information: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence and http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/

[4] Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-being. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

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Opening match of the FIFA World Cup in Johannesburg, South Africa

Shaping Africa's Peace and Security Partnerships for the 21st Century

BY AMANDA J. DORY

The release of white balloons around Berlin's perimeter served as a vivid symbol for the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall -- a key moment as the Cold War came to an end. In Africa, perhaps unsurprisingly, there have not been commemorations to mark the Cold War's conclusion nor its superpower proxy conflicts that served to disrupt the process and progress of African post-colonial development. The majority of African states now have 50 years of experience in self-governance, following the wave of independence occurring in the 1960s. (There are of course outliers such as the never-colonized Ethiopia and Africa's newest state, South Sudan, now three years old.) Africans and their governments have spent the last 25 years forming their states amidst the considerable challenges and opportunities afforded by the globalization of commerce, communications, and technology rather than the polarized international dynamics of the Cold War.

The trinity of governance, economic development, and security as interlocking elements required for nation-building has become a well-accepted formula during this period, to include the recognition that security is a pre-requisite for the other elements to flourish. All these elements are interdependent and must advance for success. A quick tour d'horizon indicates forward progress over the last half-century across each of these elements in much of Africa.

- GOVERNANCE. Existing within borders inherited from colonial powers, and subsequently affirmed by the Organization of African Unity (the predecessor of today's African Union or AU), African peoples and governments today are still in the formative stages of advancing national identities and institutions. Post-colonial African states face substantial challenges to state formation and consolidation efforts as well as to defending their territorial integrity. In the context of unprecedented flows of information, goods, and people across long and often unsecured borders, this difficult work is advancing in the face of centrifugal forces and without the luxury of time. On the positive side, of the 54 countries in Africa, the majority now hold regular elections, although in many countries a single party dominates. As noted by the United Nations

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(UN), "Overall, Africa has made progress, with some indicators – such as respect for human rights and the rule of law, legislative capacity, civil society engagement and civil liberties – generally increasing. However, democracy remains vulnerable, and requires greater institutional and procedural certainty to be consolidated."[1]

◾ ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. At a macro level, African countries weathered the recent global recession reasonably well, with continental economic growth projections at 4.8 percent for 2014, and 5.7 percent for 2015, to include growth in domestic demand.[2] African economies remain primarily providers of raw materials – whether export crops or extractive industries – with value-added processing happening elsewhere. At the level of the individual, however, about half of Africans still survive on less than $1.25 per day. After decades of development investment, ambitious UN Millennium Development Goals that are indicators of human security are not on track to be fulfilled by the 2015 goal in many African states that started from a lower point of departure relative to other regions of the world.[3]

◾ SECURITY. In the security arena, following South Africa's transition from apartheid to democratic rule in the mid-1990s, southern Africa, in particular, has been a region of relative peace and stability. Similarly, in this same timeframe, post-colonial internal and

SASOL gas pipeline in Temane, Mozambique

cross-border conflicts have subsided in West Africa, for example in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In other regions, however, long-standing conflicts have continued, especially in Central Africa.

In an echo of the Cold War proxy conflicts in Africa, in some cases, today's conflicts on the continent are being fanned by external actors, especially non-state entities. In the Maghreb, what began as an indigenous Jasmine Revolution (Arab Spring) in Tunisia against an authoritarian leader unable to deliver economic benefits to the general population, then spread to Libya and Egypt, with less dramatic reverberations in Morocco and Algeria. In today's globalized world, these events were communicated in real-time within the region and to the international community. Three years post-revolution, the free flow of individuals across borders has resulted in both the inflow to North Africa of those seeking to capitalize on socio-economic tensions to advance more extreme ideological agendas, as well as the outflow of several thousand alienated individuals who have become "foreign fighters" in Syria and Iraq. For those not consumed by the conflicts they are joining, their eventual return and potential to radicalize others in their countries of origin poses a serious threat.

In the Sahel region, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Horn of Africa, longstanding grievances among ethnic groups over power and access to resources are being influenced by external actors with a variety of agendas as well. Until recently, al-Qaeda has been the most prominent outside extremist influence, forging connections of varying degrees with indigenous groups in all directions. These include the Algeria-origin al-Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the north, the Somalia-origin al-Shabaab in the east, and the Nigeria-based Boko Haram in the west. The growth in the number of terrorist incidents globally, in particular from 2010, is mirrored in Africa. As reflected in the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database, incidents in Africa more than tripled from approximately 300 in 1989, to more than 1400 in 2012. In the early 2000s, only Algeria appeared on the global top 10 list for the largest number of attacks. By 2007, Algeria had been replaced by Somalia, and in 2013, Nigeria and Somalia were in the eighth and ninth position, globally.[4]

The rapid geographic advances accomplished by the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq in 2014 may also lead to additional traction in ISIL's outreach campaigns in Africa, setting up an ideological competition with al-Qaeda for influence with indigenous African extremist groups. Some groups are already beginning to take sides, as in the case of Boko Haram, which has aligned with the ISIL camp. In an alternative scenario, if the al-Qaeda franchise and ISIL manage to find common cause as was recently reported in Syria, this could pose an increasingly potent and unified alternative to those who are disaffected or lack better choices.

Combating a new era of conflicts inflamed by outsiders will significantly test Africa's citizens, states, regional organizations, and external supporters. As articulated by the African Union, there is a continental imperative to develop "African solutions to African problems." Africa's partners, to include the United States, recognize and support this imperative. At the same time, however, some of today's most pressing problems are transnational in nature – including organized crime and illicit

trafficking, violent extremism, pandemic disease, and climate change – and do not lend themselves to resolution at national or even continental scales. Even as the AU's peace and security architectures make important advances, such as measured progress in establishing regional stand-by forces and the newly invigorated concept of a rapidly deployable crisis response capability, the threats to peace and stability in Africa are evolving faster than these architectures, capabilities, and doctrines are coalescing.

For Africa and its partners, the 21st century requires different approaches in order to seize opportunities and manage threats to national and human security. Key characteristics include:

■ Rapid assessment and response: Whether facing competitors or threat vectors, individuals, nation-states, or organizations require information fused from multiple sources and coupled with competent analysis in order to enable timely stakeholder decisions. "Stakeholders" must be viewed broadly, consistent with the AU's evolution from an earlier focus on sovereign non-interference to its more recent articulation of collective non-indifference.

■ Scalability: Responses must be designed with the capacity to scale or ramp up – from the local or village level to regional, national, or multi-national echelons; and

■ Flexible, multi-dimensional approaches: Whether manmade or natural, threats adapt asymmetrically or mutate over time seeking advantage. Effectively countering them requires a level of flexibility and coordination across sectors that national and international institutions struggle to achieve.

The multi-faceted, international response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus in multiple West African countries that began in mid-2014 is a good example of the new type of challenge facing Africa and demonstrates the relevance of these characteristics. Affected countries and responders at first struggled to fuse data from an array of local and national sources to determine the nature and scope of the outbreak in order to develop a blueprint for national and international response. Feedback loops between local and national authorities, supplemented by external expertise, have been critical to developing preventive information campaigns and responsive treatment approaches. Coordination among elected officials, health providers, and security forces at all levels – local, national, and international – has been a continuous imperative and daily effort in order to apply resources to save lives and forestall additional infections in a dynamic environment. Additionally, in order to scale up the response, local and external security forces, to include U.S. and European military forces, have been mobilized to support the massive humanitarian health intervention in the absence of sufficiently robust civilian options.

In contrast to the fast-moving Ebola outbreak and response mobilization, other types of transnational threats are manifesting at a more gradual pace, although they similarly thrive in an enabling environment where governance, state institutions, and economic opportunity are weak. The slow, deliberate process of state formation that has taken centuries in other parts of the globe must begin to move faster in Africa if African states are to outpace those forces that seek to undermine or even displace existing national authorities and institutions. Some social science research indicates that on a global basis, younger

democracies experience higher rates of terrorism than those that have survived for 50 years or more, suggesting the importance of institutional maturity. Improved governance and more inclusive politics are therefore critical elements not only to reinforce still nascent practices of democratic governance, but potentially to counter radicalization as well.

Economic growth, investment, and the generation of legitimate employment opportunities must also scale up in tandem to match Africa's growing and youthful population. In the globalization context, the security-governance-development trinity must also be supplemented with compelling and uniting national narratives that can combat extremist ideologies. Since the end of the Cold War, few countries in either the developing or the industrialized world have developed explanations to their own people that describe their economic approach, and political platforms typically fail to make meaningful policy-based distinctions or arguments.[6] In an era of ubiquitous communication, this gap must be filled.

African neighbors and regions must work in greater partnership to address threats to peace and security that do not respect borders. Just as oceans or seas do not serve as a buffer in a globalized world, neither does the vast distance from one end of Africa to the other. While the Maghreb and Sahel are thousands of miles from the countries of Central and Southern Africa, all nations must assess their vulnerabilities realistically, especially considering the status of youth and disaffected populations, and take action where required. Recent events in Burkina Faso that saw a youthful, student-led population make a successful stand against a long-serving president pursuing constitutional revisions to stay in power have the potential to influence governance practices

in other countries in the region and beyond. Finally, internal African capacity-building efforts must be more effectively coordinated with those sponsored by external supporters.

An often-quoted African proverb observes that in order "to go quickly, go alone; to go far, go together." Adjusting for the realities of the 21st century, to include the continuing importance of partnerships coupled with the need for swifter mobilization to address threats to peace and security in Africa, an updated version might instead emphasize the imperative "to go far – we must go both quickly and together." PRISM

NOTES

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Al-Shabaab: Guardians of Somali Identity?

Upcoming Inflection Point:

Tracing and Optimizing the Amisom Trajectory in Somalia

BY PHILLIP CARTER AND RYAN GUARD[1]

T he outbreak of the Somali civil war in 1988, the toppling of Siad Barre's dictatorial regime in 1991, and the subsequent disbanding of the Somali National Army (SNA) created a decade-long power vacuum in Somalia. In the wake of this collapse, many of the disparate anti-Barre opposition groups seized upon the vacuum in central authority to compete for influence. Within this vacuum of effective governance, the condition of lawlessness produced a sundry series of actors (variously termed as warlords, insurgents, and militants) who prospered on war, chaos, and criminality. A grassroots response to the disorder – the formation of the Union of Islamic Courts – brought a religious dimension and provided an opportunity for extremist religious organizers to insert themselves into local governance. Out of the more radical remains of the Islamic Courts, al-Shabaab arose and eventually evolved to formally become part of the al-Qaeda enterprise.

The focus of this paper is to examine the nexus of Somali security sector development, Somali political development, and international efforts to foster effective governance despite the countervailing pressure of a domestic terrorist group with regional ambitions. It will identify the impending critical juncture in the process, and provide recommendations for the establishment of a durable central authority within the specific context of Somali culture which will be resilient enough to counter al-Shabaab and re-establish effective Somali governance outside Mogadishu.

The Vacuum

Since the early nineties, Somalis have carried on with commerce and local or regional governance while resisting or dismissing attempts by the international community to impose or broker the reestablishment of Mogadishu-based constitutional government. Despite the overall chaos and recurring instability, business owners and clan interests were disinterested or non-supportive of U.S. and UN mediated political conferences in the 1990s. The current Somali national

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government can trace its origins back to the post-9/11 political era, to a conference held in 2004, at Eldoret, Kenya. This conference, sponsored by the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), succeeded in creating a Transitional Federal Charter and a Transitional Federal Parliament with a five-year mandate.[2] Embracing the concept of Federalism, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inclusive of existing state governments and regional administrations such as Somaliland and Puntland, but was a weak, donor-driven institution with little public support in Somalia. Though formed as a Somali unity government, it soon split into two camps: a pro-Ethiopian, pro-federalist and anti-Islamist wing concentrated in areas outside Mogadishu, and an anti-Ethiopian, centralist one that was inclusive of Islamist groups with a power base in Mogadishu.[3]

In 2006, armed clashes broke out between a U.S.-backed alliance of militia leaders and a coalition of Islamist militias which culminated in a decisive Islamist victory, the elements of which organized themselves as the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU). Consolidating control over Mogadishu in June 2006, the ICU then quickly expanded its control over south-central Somalia. In six months, the ICU made impressive gains in the provision of public order and rule of law in Somalia. Most Somalis – including many who did not subscribe to an Islamist agenda – strongly supported the ICU as a result. Hard-line Islamists in the broad umbrella movement of the ICU took a series of provocative actions against the U.S. and Ethiopia which led to a full-scale Ethiopian (with U.S. support) military offensive against the ICU in late December, 2006, which in turn, routed the ICU in a matter of days. The shattered ICU and its defeated militia – including

a core force of several hundred well-trained and committed fighters known as al-Shabaab – scattered throughout the countryside.[4]

The international community attempted to revive the TFG, strengthen its governing and security sector capacity and enhance its legitimacy. In order to broaden the TFG's appeal among Somalis by creating a more equitable power-sharing agreement, plans were drawn up by IGAD to deploy a peacekeeping force to provide security for the TFG. Though this effort failed, a subsequent push developed into the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Initially conceptualized to use African troops from non-neighbouring countries to Somalia to avoid complications from those neighbors' shared history and vested interests in the country, it was difficult to find governments willing to send troops to such a high-risk mission. Eventually 2,000 Ugandan and Burundian forces were deployed to the AMISOM mission, far short of the 8,000 initially sought. Ethiopian troops remained deployed in Somalia as a result, and their presence provoked Somali armed resistance, all of which produced a TFG unable to control much of Mogadishu, coupled with heavy fighting that wracked the city.[5]

Out of the debris of the ICU, the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) became the umbrella resistance group, which eventually split into two camps: one more moderate known as ARS-Djibouti, and a more hard line group, ARS-Asmara. Meanwhile, the al-Shabaab militia broke with both ARS groups and established control as the strongest armed group between the Kenyan border and Mogadishu. The subsequent reconciliation of ARS-Djibouti and the TFG as part of the Djibouti Peace process in 2008 set the conditions for Ethiopian withdrawal and also called

for the replacement of Ethiopian troops with a UN international stabilization force to deploy within 120 days.[6]

The TFG became the Somali Federal Government in 2012, and has subsequently gained international recognition. A key part of this success was AMISOM, which has protected, supported, and continues to provide development space for the reconstitution of the Somali government in Mogadishu and beyond.

The Security Sector

Out of the collapse of the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006, al-Shabaab emerged as the greatest threat to both international and internal Somali governmental forces by virtue of its ties to al-Qaeda and its ability to generate both conventional forces and an asymmetric threat. By 2009, it held administrative and social control over more than 40,000 square kilometers of territory with a population of five million; it possessed the capability to recruit fighters from Somalia and beyond; it was able to provide basic social services to a portion of the population that at least tolerated the regime; and it also quickly terrorized non-supporters into submission.

AMISOM was initially supported by Ugandan troop contributions in early 2007, followed late that year by Burundian forces. Together, these two Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) saw the AMISOM mission through the difficult period in the wake of the Ethiopian withdrawal from Mogadishu in 2009. Several factors turned the tide in 2010. The first was the Kampala bombings by al-Shabaab. Though designed to negatively impact Ugandan willingness to continue its participation in AMISOM, the attack had the

An improvised fighting vehicle in Mogadishu, 1993

opposite effect by redoubling Ugandan efforts and led to a significant AMISOM force cap increase that paved the way for eventual offensive operations. The second was the failure of the al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive to dislodge AMISOM forces, which showed the growing capability of AMISOM forces to withstand large scale assaults and also revealed al-Shabaab's limited ability to fight conventional engagements. The Burundian soldiers, based out of the former University of Somalia campus, were in dire straits until several months later when Ugandan AMISOM forces, largely supported by the Somalia National Police and the *Alhu Sunna wal Jama'a* militia, were able to link the University and the airport. There were numerous complaints about how the Ugandans conducted operations, largely resulting from Ugandan indiscriminate indirect fire; it took extensive training/mentoring to assist the Ugandans with their targeting. The Burundians suffered extremely high casualties in February, 2011, while taking the Ministry of Defence compound, which precipitated a

focused training effort to improve Burundian capabilities.

Nonetheless, AMISOM and its Somali allies continued to make progress to such a degree that al-Shabaab decided to withdraw its fighters from Mogadishu in August, 2011. It is important to note that this was a tactical decision by al-Shabaab to withdraw, and that al-Shabaab was not defeated on the battlefield. Also contributing to greater AMISOM effectiveness during this time were both the stand-up of the UN Support office for AMISOM (UNSOA) which gradually helped to ease AMISOM logistical burdens from the TCCs, and the ramped up U.S. training assistance to TCCs through the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The 2011 famine in Somalia also dealt al-Shabaab a major blow as it was unable to adequately address the drought and its effects. As a result, it failed its first real governance test in south/central Somalia and made it possible for AMISOM and the TFG to find sufficient support within the Rahanweyn clan to liberate Baidoa.

Abandoned "Green Line" dividing the warring factions in North and South Mogadishu, 1993

Kenya entered southern Somalia in the fall of 2011 following a series of kidnappings of tourists and aid workers by al-Shabaab or those associated with it. With its tourist economy under attack, Kenya concluded that it had no choice but to send a force into Somalia. Kenya then entered into protracted negotiations with the AU about incorporating its forces in Somalia under the AMISOM umbrella. Kenya's entry into Somalia was viewed suspiciously by some in the international community and by other regional partners who saw it as an effort to establish a buffer zone controlled by Somali allies that could be managed from Nairobi. Kenya was also joined in AMISOM by re-hatted Ethiopian forces already deployed in Somalia, as well as forces from Djibouti and Sierra Leone in 2012 and 2013.

Subsequent surges have seen AMISOM take additional towns, but have also illustrated al-Shabaab's pattern of rarely putting up serious efforts to defend those towns. Instead, al-Shabaab has largely used the tactic of resisting to a degree and then abandoning the towns. AMISOM Operation Eagle, completed in March, 2014, liberated key locations and increased the pressure on al-Shabaab. After this offensive, AMISOM assessed that as the liberation of the remaining major communities under al-Shabaab reaches completion, it will need to shift from ground offensives to counter-insurgency, i.e. the disruption of the al-Shabaab network. As al-Shabaab's conventional force wanes, al-Shabaab has increasingly favored asymmetric over conventional warfare, while seeking to exploit clan conflicts to destabilize communities and undermine the Federal Government of Somalia. Thus, to separate al-Shabaab from the population and isolate the group from its sources of support, AMISOM has endeavored to finish the job of seizing, securing, and stabilizing additional cities from al-Shabaab.[7]

Compared to its beginnings seven years ago, AMISOM has steadily become a more capable multidimensional force of over 22,100 soldiers with more robust (though still developing) capabilities of command and control, logistical sustainment, and countering improvised explosive devices (CIED).

AMISOM's ability to plan and execute multi-contingent offensives has steadily improved. Though the earlier contributors Uganda and Burundi still continue to constitute the bulk of AMISOM forces, today's AMISOM includes military and police forces from the TCCs of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone. Logistics, materiel, training, financial, and intelligence support to AMISOM's troops are provided by the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), with additional support from an international coalition of donors, including the United Nations, European Union, Turkey, and the United States. On an annual basis, total donor support for AMISOM is approximately $900 million. Operationally, AMISOM seeks to coordinate its operations and activities with the Federal Government of Somalia and with the Somali National Army while effectively utilizing international support. The current overarching goal of AMISOM is to build peace and stability so that a Somali political process leading to elections and a permanent national constitutional government can proceed to completion in a secure environment.

During this period of AMISOM offensive operations, it could alternately be argued that al-Shabaab has not necessarily suffered defeats, but has sought to change the character of the conflict. As AMISOM capability increased,

al-Shabaab has changed tactics from fighting pitched battles against increasingly better trained and equipped AMISOM forces in major cities, to insurgency tactics that continually cut stretched AMSIOM supply lines, seriously challenge AMISOM's nominal control of the countryside, and use lulls between AMISOM offensives to re-gather strength. Al-Shabaab has often chosen not to contest an AMISOM offensive, but instead has sought to generate mini-humanitarian crises by destroying pumps, agricultural equipment, and blocking commerce. With the loss of charcoal revenue from coastal ports, al-Shabaab has been forced to modify its revenue model to one

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focused on levying increasingly onerous taxes on Somali agricultural production, livestock trade, and telecommunications. The al-Shabaab business model will likely continue to shift to a greater juncture with criminal activity such as the trafficking and production of illicit drugs and poaching and trafficking of wildlife. We should also expect the relationship between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab to evolve as well. With Djibouti joining AMISOM, later followed by Kenya and Ethiopia, the original premise of purposely keeping Somalia's neighbors from becoming TCCs because of the inevitable historical baggage and varying national interests in Somalia dissolved. This allowed an opening for al-Shabaab to change tactics and expanded regionally through the conduct of terrorist strikes in neighbouring TCC capitals.

This evolving situation has shown al-Shabaab to not be a static organization, but one able to effect structural changes in strategy and tactics. The net effect in Somalia is that al-Shabaab has lost much of its ability to govern broad swaths of Somalia including Mogadishu, regional capitals, and major ports, but AMISOM and the Somali Federal Government have not been able to assert more than nominal governance over those liberated areas. The international community is increasingly focused on assisting the Federal Government of Somalia to restore governance in newly liberated areas and the provision of "quick-impact" peace dividends through small-scale, but immediately implementable, infrastructure and development projects.

The Security Sector Inflection Point

To date, security efforts in Somalia have largely been externally driven. AMISOM's success has been largely due to a fusion of strong and enduring international support to a group of regional TCCs dedicated to neutralizing a regional threat and stabilizing the security environment in the Horn of Africa. Mogadishu and its environs has been the battle space in which these African Union forces have operated and created space for Somali Federal Government institutions to take root. However, as AMISOM forces push al-Shabaab farther into rural areas, an important inflection point is arriving. This will be the transition from AMISOM-led security operations liberating towns and communities from al-Shabaab to the establishment of Somali forces (civilian and military) capable of securing and holding national territory – in essence: the transition from externally-driven security with internal support to internally-driven security with external enablers.

The development of a Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali National Police Service (SNP) has been a recurrent central feature in the international donor community dialogue. The recent AMISOM offensive has highlighted the need to carefully consider the most appropriate security architecture for Somalia. Somali security forces will have to assume responsibility for holding the towns and countryside that AMISOM operations have secured from al-Shabaab. The Federal Government of Somalia has expressed aspirations for a 26,000 person SNA, along with a small coast guard and comparably-sized SNP. This is an unrealistic vision given the Somali government's economic and financial capacity, parochial clan dynamics, international donor willingness, and the security interests of Somalia's neighbors who also make up AMISOM. The recently completed London conference on SNA development established a 10,900 person force as a goal for Somalia and international donors.

The Somali National Army exists more on paper than in practice. Elements of the SNA have been trained by AMISOM TCCs as well as international partners such as the European Union and the United States. However, trained troops are not necessarily functional troops without the requisite support in leadership, equipment, logistics, transportation, communication, and administration. All of these elements are generally lacking with regard to the Somali National Army. The same is true of the Somali National Police Service, perhaps even more so given the current state of that institution. Questionable accountability for salaries and equipment, and frequent SNA and SNP episodes of human rights violations and criminality present additional grounds for concern.

The affordability and sustainability of the SNA and SNP pose a question for the Somali government to consider: what kind of security force does it need rather than what it wants? The issues of clan dynamics and the security interests of Somalia's neighbors highlight a second question that must also be answered to the satisfaction of the national population: what will be the character of these forces and how will they deployed given local sensitivities? Somalia's complex clan dynamics play a role in the determination of where and how SNA troops may or may not be deployed. Although local communities are generally accepting of national army units that reflect local clan representation and character, the acceptance by these same communities of SNA troops from outside the vicinity and composed of different, even rival, clans is problematic. SNA troops not reflecting local clan dynamics often find communities that are cool, if not hostile, to their presence.

A deeper examination of these factors coupled with an appreciation of Somalia's

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neighbors' security concerns raise three additional fundamental questions that the Federal Government of Somalia must address: what will be the respective roles of the Somali National Army and the Somali National Police? The SNA will be created to protect Somalia against which threats, particularly in a "post al-Shabaab" Somalia? What will be the scope of the internal security role of the National Police?

The Governance Challenge

The answers to those three questions above rely on the current political process in Somalia, and that process is directly linked to the establishment of governance throughout the country.

The political progress in Somalia has been notable, particularly when one compares the political landscape of today with that just three years ago. Though while AMISOM has been effective in recapturing territory once held by al-Shabaab, the concomitant political process has been an uneven one. Some could argue that AMISOM's security gains have outpaced the Federal Government of Somalia's political and economic reform program. The fledgling Federal Government of Somalia, recently recognized by the international community, is developing basic institutions while it contends with an insurgency intent on its destruction. Currently, the Somali government lacks the essential capacities to extend governance beyond Mogadishu. Its effort to extend basic services into the interior is nascent and fully dependent upon donor support. Negotiations between regions and the central government on the division of responsibility and authorities under a national consensus of federalism has yet to begin.

Around the world, the linkages between security sector reform and politics are long established. However, in Somalia this challenge is made even more complex and is shaped by the lack of basic infrastructure and governing institutions to effect reform. Somalia, the once infamous failed state, is striving and struggling to establish legitimate governance after twenty years of violence and chaos. Twenty years was a generation ago and there is no viable Somali model from which

Somalia's polity and leadership can draw upon as they set out to rebuild their nation. The average Somali has no memory of what it is to live within the constructs of a national state. Among older Somalis who can recollect a previous era, their memories recall the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre. In short, there is no tradition of national representative governance in Somalia. This is a rather unique circumstance compared to other countries that have recovered from conflict. Without a historical reference of "what is right," state building and security sector reform in Somalia must follow a pragmatic path that advances a federal model of governance while balancing national, provincial, clan, and regional interests. The one advantage of the lack of historical reference is the opportunity to draw from wide and varied best practices available from other nation's experiences.

In this context, it must be acknowledged that the critical question of balance also applies to the process of security sector reform. Broadly writ, security sector reform is more than just police and soldiers. It must incorporate courts, judges, civil society, penal systems, traditional leaders and community relations. The Somali government must look beyond a vision of institutional state security to one of enhancing the basic human security of its citizenry. The federal government's pursuit of security sector reform must also offer a regional balance that recognizes the interests of Somalia's neighbors, IGAD and the AU. This issue of balance, internally and externally, is critical to the legitimacy of the Somali state, to its citizens, and to its regional neighbors.

What Next?

International support to AMISOM's effort to blunt, degrade and destroy al-Shabaab must

continue unabated. However, AMISOM and its international supporters must continue to be attentive and adapt in order to counter al-Shabaab changes in tactics on a battlefield that now extends beyond Somalia. The defeat of al-Shabaab is the essential element and necessary precursor for the Federal Government of Somalia to fully reconstruct governance and shape an enduring peace in the Horn of Africa. The defeat of al-Shabaab will require both a military element and the effective establishment of Somali Federal Government authority outside Mogadishu. An effective Somali Federal Government itself is as much a defeat for al-Shabaab as are al-Shabaab's reverses in the trenches.

It is the authors' view that the role of AMISOM should be extended to include playing more of a role in securing the territory it liberates. One idea is to expand the authorized number of AMISOM forces with those additional forces being dedicated to training and mentoring Somali security forces. Expanding AMISOM's role is likely the most expedient way to allow space for the Somali Federal Government to effect real political and security sector reform, which will likely also require adjusted expectations by Somalia's leadership. The key aspect of this political progress is the effective utilization of federalism, which must be embraced and implemented without delay. The future of the Somali state depends upon it.

In addition the Somali government and the international community should proceed in a more measured fashion in terms of security sector reform. Essentially, the international community should forego, for the time being, a central focus on formation and training of a Somali National Army. The focus of security

Burundian troops preparing to deploy to Somalia, 2006

sector reform should shift from training troops to institution building, in particular support for building police and judiciary institutions. For the military, the defence institutions to support, sustain and lead the SNA should be in place before the first SNA unit is recruited, trained or deployed. Without civilian governance structures to support them, the training of security forces could, at worst, prove destabilizing to the Federal Government and, at best, be a waste of donor funds. The international community must effectively utilize its disparate resources to better assist the Somali Federal Government in balancing the development of the correct security institutions that mesh with the tandem development of Somali political and government institutions. To press Somalia to develop a military without a functional government, or a military that does not reflect the Somali political context on the ground, is a recipe for folly.

With 22,100 troops, though short of the initial AU estimates of a 30,000 man requirement, there is an opportunity to use this significant force to spur Somali Federal Government security sector development after the needed political (federalism) and security sector (defence institution building) reforms are consolidated. As more and more areas are liberated, AMISOM should continue to advance, not remaining in garrison. This would place the onus on the Somali Government to start effectively moving in behind AMISOM forces.

The donor community must demand greater accountability and transparency from the Somali government and from AMISOM. However, donors cannot ask more from the AU, IGAD, AMISOM, and the Somali government without looking at themselves. The donors must become better organized and accountable in their efforts and activities in Somalia. To date, the donor response to the Somali question has lacked coordination and organization. Moreover, the agendas and programs of some donors have been studiously opaque.

The timetable for this enterprise must be conditions-based and grounded in honest metrics. The time has passed for aspirational deadlines extolled by United Nations Security Council Resolutions or African Union Declarations. Peace enforcement operations, state building and security sector reform are non-linear in character and are defined by local conditions rather than by political debate in foreign capitals. Somalia has endured over twenty years of conflict and deprivation. The gains of the past few years, achieved by the blood, sweat and tears of Somalis, their neighbors, and international partners are not insignificant. Somalia is approaching a tipping point of sustainable governance but this approach is a fragile one. In order to complete its transition from failed state to a functional one, Somalia will need to rely on the continued security and sacrifice of AMISOM TCCs and the support of international donors as it pursues - with a laser focus - its ambitions of governance modeled on inclusive federalism with a matching security sector structure. **PRISM**

Notes

[1] This paper presents the views of the authors and does not reflect the policy of U.S. Africa Command, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

[2] See http://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/somali-peace-process/

[3] Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: A National and Regional Disaster? (UNHCR, April 2009), pp. 1-9, Available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/49f180d82.pdf.

[4] Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: A National and Regional Disaster? (UNHCR, April 2009), pp. 2-5, Available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/49f180d82.pdf.

[5] Ibid, pp. 5-9

[6] Apuuli Phillip Kasaija, "The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia, 2008-2009," Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28:3 (2010), pp. 269-74.

[7] Bruton, Bronwyn and Paul Williams, Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013 (The Joint Special Operations University Press, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 2014) pp. 5-72

Tuaregs at the Festival au Desert near Timbuktu, Mali 2012

The Recurrent Security Crisis in Mali and the Role of the African Union

BY PIERRE BUYOYA

This paper looks at the recurring security crises in Northern Mali since the independence of the country in September 1960. It is structured around three main sections. In the first, I provide a brief historical overview of the repeated security crises in the country, particularly in its northern regions, through the four main waves of these crises, highlighting their main explanatory factors and triggers and paying particular attention to the current and fourth wave that started in late 2011. The second section considers the efforts of various regional and international actors in the resolution of the current wave – both political/diplomatic and military – with a focus on those of the African Union (AU). In the third and concluding section, I take stock of all the above and try to draw some lessons that could be learned from these crises and the efforts of various actors.

Brief History of the Malian Crises

Mali won independence from France on September 22, 1960. This came after a short-lived union with Senegal in the "Mali Federation" that had been proclaimed a few months earlier and from which Senegal had withdrawn. Composed of a vast territorial space of 1,240,192 square kilometers, Mali is landlocked, and about two-thirds of its landmass is desert or semi-desert. Its three northern regions (Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal), constituting two-thirds of its territory, are home to less than 25 percent of its population. One of the demographic groups inhabiting this region is

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called Kel Tamasheq, the people speaking Tamasheq, popularly known outside the group as "Tuareg."[1] The Tuareg are a largely nomadic, pastoralist (camel herding) population of the North African Berber culture and language. They tend to have lighter skin color than the rest of the Malian population, apart from the Arabs. In the current post-colonial settings of Western and Northern Africa, Tuareg are found in Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya and Burkina Faso.

Various cycles of armed rebellions have been recorded in the north of post-independence Mali and are described by many as "Tuareg rebellions," as they originated from Tuareg-dominated areas and were composed mainly, but not wholly, of elements of Tuareg identity. There have been four such cycles: the 1963-64 revolts known in Tuareg milieus as *Alfellaga*; the 1990s rebellion (1990-1996) known by some locals as *Al-Jebha*; the 2006-07 cycle; and the current cycle that began in late 2011/early 2012. Let us look at these waves in more detail.

The First Rebellion, 1963

The first wave of armed rebellion in northern Mali occurred between May 1963 and August 1964. Led by Zeyd ag Attaher and Elledi ag Alla, some historical accounts argue that the aim of the revolt was to obtain independence for a "Kel Tamasheq" state separate from Mali, although others see it as a mere "revolt." In either case, it was a rebellion against the Malian state. Those who argue that it was a rebellion for independence cite the widely held belief in Tuareg quarters that the French

Tuareg militants seen driving near Timbuktu, May 7, 2012

colonial authorities had promised an independent Tuareg state and that their inclusion in post-colonial Mali was either a betrayal of this promise or a temporary arrangement. What is clear however, and seems to be a matter of consensus, is that there was resentment amongst many Tuareg vis-à-vis the administrative authorities of the newly independent Mali. The latter had taken measures that led to a change in the political order of the Tuareg world which had initially been shaped by colonial administration, but which now consisted of a central government ruling from Bamako, more than 1000 km away in the south. There was also an alteration in the social structure of Tuareg society whereby some people – including within the larger Kel Tamasheq group – that were otherwise considered as lower castes, became equal or even rulers of "noble" or higher strata.

Apparently, the lack of quality developmental projects in spite of the taxes and customs duties collected in the region, and the relations between security forces and the civilian population did not help matters. To many Tuareg, the security forces of the newly independent state were behaving like the colonial-era police officers and gendarmes. It was therefore not a surprise that one of the leaders of this revolt, Elledi ag Alla, was the son of Alla ag Albachir, the "rebellious" or "outlaw" Tuareg man who had refused to obey either the French colonial administration or the traditional order represented by the *Amenokal* (Chief). The colonial administration arrested and beheaded him in July 1954, exposing his body to the public to convince them of his death and warn them against any revolt. The Malian authorities terminated this first revolt/rebellion in blood. There was no need for a peace agreement.

The Second Rebellion, 1990

The second rebellion was launched in mid-1990, a period that coincided with a tumultuous moment in Malian political life in Bamako, culminating in a March 1991 military coup. A similar rebellion also broke out at the same time in northern Niger. Spearheaded by the Popular Movement of Azawad (*Mouvement populaire de l'Azawad* – MPA) and the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (*Front islamique arabe de l'Azawad* – FIAA), the leaders of this rebellion expressed a clear separatist agenda, calling for an independent territory that would be called Azawad. Many of the fighters of this movement and others that were created had come from Libya and other countries of the region. They had left Mali partly due to severe droughts that afflicted both Mali and Niger in the 1970s. Against the backdrop of earlier discontents linked to perceived or real marginalization and the repression of the 1963-64 revolt, many of those that found themselves in Libya were enlisted in Qaddafi's revolutionary wars in various places, including in Chad in the 1980s.

Using the skills and military experience that they returned with, as well as the organization, the apparent popular adherence and the resources that they had, this rebel movement registered a series of military victories against the national army. Thus, unlike the previous revolt, the rebellion was ended through two main peace agreements with the Malian state, generally facilitated by Algeria: the Tamanrasset Agreement (January 1991) and the National Pact (April 1992), culminating in the 26 March, 1996, "Flame of Peace" during which about 3000 weapons were symbolically burned in the marketplace of

Timbuktu, marking the end of the rebellion and the beginning of national reconciliation.

The Third Rebellion, 2006

The National Pact provided for a strong decentralization of the Malian state and devolution of power and resources to local authorities. It also led to the disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration (DDR), mainly in the various units of the defense and security services, of former combatants of armed groups. Claiming the violation of the terms of this agreement, a renegade Tuareg soldier who had been integrated into the army within the framework of this DDR process, Ibrahim ag Bahanga, launched a "rebellion" in mid-2006 against Malian troops in the region of Kidal.

The National Pact provided for a strong decentralization of the Malian state and devolution of power and resources to local authorities.

This rebellion did not have the same popular support that the previous and current cycles of rebellions had and have among the Tuareg population. In fact, the overwhelming majority of Tuareg disowned his actions, considering him and his Democratic Alliance of 23 May for Change (*Alliance démocratique du 23 mai pour le changemen*t) as fringe elements that did not represent the community or its interests. It was nevertheless the subject of the Algiers Accords of July 2006.

Despite this agreement, ag Bahanga and his men resumed attacks against government positions in May 2007, withdrawing from the peace process in September of that year. He continued these attacks until he was

apparently subdued and forced out of the country in early 2009. Many analysts suggest that he fled to Libya where he remained until early 2011 when he returned to Mali. He died in a car accident in northern Mali in August, 2011, shortly before the start of the current wave of rebellion.

The Fourth Rebellion, 2011

The current and fourth cycle of armed rebellions in northern Mali began in late 2011 and had the additional aspect of being mixed with criminal and terrorist activities. With some differences in their declared strategic and ideological drives, as well as the characteristics of their actions, there were four main groups acting in this initial period of insecurity: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Particularly from January 2012, these groups intensified their attacks and occupied all three northern regions of Mali (Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal) by mid-April 2012.[2]

Having conquered the northern regions, with the support of Ansar Dine, the MNLA proclaimed an "independent secular AZAWAD" in the north, claiming that the Tuareg population is marginalized in Malian society and that earlier agreements to address this issue were not honored by the central authorities in Bamako, claims reminiscent of those voiced to justify the rebellions of the 1990s. It should be noted, at this stage, that there was a subsequent institutional crisis occasioned by the March 22, 2012 coup d'état in Bamako, which overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré, about a month before the presidential elections. With the disarray that this brought in the government's

actions, the institutional crisis contributed significantly to the rapid successes of the armed movements in their occupation of the northern regions, which occurred in a matter of a few days following the coup.

As in the 1990s movements, although to a different degree, the MNLA that spearheaded the armed rebellion was comprised mainly of combatants that had fought in Libya and had returned to Mali with their arms following the downfall of the Qaddafi regime in October 2011. The 2011 civil war in Libya, therefore, played an important triggering and/or aggravating role in the resurgence of armed rebellion in Mali. But there are other factors that must be taken into account in any attempt to explain the situation. Among these, one could mention the weakness of the state security apparatus and forces that were unable to defeat the armed groups.

With the collapse of the state presence in northern Mali, the armed groups had greater latitude to pursue their criminal and terrorist activities. This is perhaps what drove their daring attempt to extend their occupation southwards in the first week of January 2013. This strategically-miscalculated move justified the deployment of a French military operation called "Serval" around January 10, 2013. It also accelerated the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA) from mid-January 2013. By March 2013, one could argue, all three northern regions had been liberated from armed groups, except the MNLA, because the French military operation had approached it in a different manner, sparing it from any attack.

As this group was opposed to the redeployment of the Malian state authority and its Security and Defense Forces in the region of Kidal, there was a need to engage in

negotiations with the MNLA group and others that adopted the same position, hence the Ouagadougou Agreement of June 18, 2013. This agreement, whose full title is "*Preliminary Agreement to Presidential Elections and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali,*" allowed the holding of presidential and legislative elections throughout the country. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, the

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current president, emerged victorious in the run-off of the presidential poll held on August 11, 2013. The Ouagadougou Agreement also permitted a timid and gradual redeployment of state authority in regions where it was absent because of the armed conflict in the north. This brought about a lull in the conflict, as the armed movements awaited the launch of the inclusive talks called for in the Ouagadougou Agreement to address the root causes of the conflict. The talks were to start about two months after the formation of the new government following the August 2013 presidential elections. However, with the delay in the launch of this process, a visit of the Malian Prime Minister to Kidal on May 16, 2014, to which the MNLA, still armed and present in the city, was opposed, triggered violent confrontations between rebel forces and

the national army, resulting in great losses in the governmental camp, as well as among civilians. An attempted attack by government forces on May 21, 2014, aimed at regaining control of the situation, ended in yet another rebel victory. This did, however, give renewed impetus to the peace process, leading to the on-going Algiers process that started on June 16, 2014.

With the military coup, ECOWAS and the AU not only condemned the unconstitutional change of government, particularly occurring as it did at a time when they were striving to address the armed rebellion in the north, they also made concerted efforts towards the restoration of constitutional order in the country.

Efforts of the African Union in Resolving the Malian Crises

Discussions about the efforts of the AU – and of other actors – to resolve the Malian crises concern mainly the fourth and current wave of armed rebellion in the north of the country. With regional and even global implications given the terrorism element in the conflict, efforts have been holistic both in terms of the range of actors and the scope of responses. As the AU works with other actors, particularly Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN), I shall not distinguish between the various actors as such, as their efforts are complementary and often intertwined. I will nevertheless focus on the AU and categorize efforts in terms of their diplomatic, political, and military nature.

Diplomatic and Political Efforts

Diplomatic and political efforts in the Malian crisis began in early 2012 through the various summits of ECOWAS and meetings of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU. Already in December 2011, in anticipation of potential regional ramifications of the Libyan crisis, the AU Commission (AUC) and the UN Secretariat jointly undertook a multidisciplinary fact-finding mission in the Sahel region from December 7 to 23. On March 14-15, 2012, the two institutions organized a joint experts meeting in Addis Ababa that analyzed the report of this fact-finding mission and developed a series of recommendations on how best the AU and the UN, working together with countries of the region and other international partners, could assist in addressing the numerous challenges identified in the Sahel region.

In the context of growing concern at the turn of events in northern Mali, the PSC held a ministerial level meeting in Bamako, on March 20, 2013, to examine and endorse the conclusions of this joint AU-UN experts meeting. With the military coup, ECOWAS and the AU not only condemned the unconstitutional change of government, particularly occurring as it did at a time when they were striving to address the armed rebellion in the north, they also made concerted efforts towards the restoration of constitutional order in the country. ECOWAS had appointed President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso as its official mediator in the Malian crisis. The latter managed to negotiate a Framework Agreement for the restoration of constitutional order, which was signed on April 6, 2012, with the military junta. In accordance with the Malian Constitution, this Agreement saw the transfer

of power from the head of the military junta, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, to the Speaker of Parliament, Dioncounda Traoré.

In June 2012, a Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali (SFG) was established under the co-chairmanship of the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN. The SFG held its inaugural meeting in Abidjan on June 7, 2012. This meeting, and subsequent ones, ensured a more inclusive and coherent transitional government in Mali, which was important for the success of other aspects of the international community's engagement in the country.

The AU and ECOWAS also decided to engage in dialogue with the armed groups, while not excluding the military option in support of the diplomatic one, or in case the latter failed. After these groups had indicated their readiness to negotiate under the mediation of ECOWAS, the Mediator urged them to clearly articulate their demands for the dialogue with the Malian authorities. More formal talks were held in December 2012, which were interrupted by the aforementioned attempt by armed groups to move southwards in early January 2013, and the subsequent international military intervention.

In summary, between April 2012 and September 2014 the PSC held no less than eight meetings on Mali and the Sahel, including one at the level of Heads of States and Government, on January 25, 2013. The latest such meeting was held on September 16, 2014. Meanwhile, the SFG held five meetings between June 2012 and November 2013. ECOWAS also held several summits, including emergency ones, during the same period.

The Algiers Process, 2014

It is these efforts that led to the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement on June 18, 2013, in the negotiation of which I played an active role as a member of the "college of international facilitators" that assisted the Burkinabe mediators. I have already mentioned some of the fruits of this Agreement and the challenges it faced in the implementation of some of the clauses, particularly with regard to the start of the inclusive peace talks. At this point, it is worth recalling that these inclusive peace talks effectively started on June 16, 2014, as noted earlier. The efforts made by Algeria enabled the actual launching of this process with the support of a number of regional and international organizations (i.e. the AU, ECOWAS, UN, European Union, and the Organization of

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Islamic Cooperation) and the following four countries of the region; Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. After several weeks of preliminary work, particularly with armed movements, the Algerian authorities assembled in Algiers from July 7-14, 2014, a group of experts representing the aforementioned regional and international organizations and the countries of the region in order to prepare the inclusive talks through a "Draft Roadmap of Negotiations within the framework of the Algiers Process."

On July 16, 2014, a ministerial meeting involving all these actors considered the draft roadmap prepared by the experts, which was

eventually adopted and signed by the Parties (the Malian Government and the armed movements) on July 24, 2014. This Roadmap spelled out the basic principles and references of the talks and determined the different issues to be discussed in order to resolve the Malian conflict. It established the format of the talks and the composition of the Mediation team led by Algeria but including the representatives of the aforementioned five regional and international organizations and the four countries of the region. It also identified the parties to the talks and laid down a calendar for them that provides for a process lasting approximately 100 days, subdivided into different phases marked by periods of suspension or consultation on the ground in Mali. Indeed, after a pause in the process from July 26, the phase of the actual talks was launched on September 1, 2014, starting with a week-long

hearing of civil society organizations identified by all the parties, which is a novelty compared to all the previous peace processes in Mali.

Military Efforts

The AU and ECOWAS had a two-fold approach to the situation in Mali: giving priority to diplomatic and political efforts, while preparing for an eventual military intervention should the first option fail. This explains the preparations for a military deployment in parallel to diplomatic efforts. First, ECOWAS took steps towards the deployment of a stabilization force in Mali (MICEMA) from early 2012. With the active involvement of the AU, UN, and other partners, a number of planning meetings were convened for this. As time passed, however, it was decided to broaden the scope of the mission from a regional level to a continental one. Chad and other countries outside

Assisting the French in Mali

of West Africa had expressed readiness to contribute and it was observed that the involvement of countries such as Mauritania and Algeria, which are also outside of the ECOWAS space, was crucial for the success of efforts in Mali.

Thus, in accordance with the relevant decisions of ECOWAS, the PSC, and UN Security Council Resolution 2085 of December 20, 2012, it was decided to deploy AFISMA. The Mission was mandated, among other things, to support Mali in recovering its territories under the control of terrorist and armed groups, maintain security, and consolidate state authority throughout the country. It was also tasked with supporting the Malian authorities in creating a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees. I had the honor of heading this Mission, in addition to my capacity as the High Representative of the AU for Mali and the Sahel. As an illustration of how the AU worked together with ECOWAS, the latter's Special Representative in Mali became my deputy as Head of AFISMA, and the civilian personnel of the Mission were deployed from both the AU and ECOWAS Commissions.

UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) of April 25, 2013, transformed AFISMA into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was deployed from July 1, 2013, with an authorized troop ceiling of 11,200 military and 1,440 police personnel. It essentially absorbed the military and police personnel of AFISMA before integrating new elements, and was therefore a "re-hatting" process. Security Council Resolution 2164 (2014)

of June 25, 2014, extended the mandate of MINUSMA by one year.

Conclusion and Lessons Learned

Northern Mali has been a theatre for recurring armed rebellions since its independence in 1960. These crises have their roots in the question of political governance, particularly the issue of management of the ethnic diversity of Malian society, economic governance – in that corruption has hindered the undertaking of many meaningful developmental projects – and the weakness and limited resources of the state. Any attempt to find a lasting solution to these recurrent crises must therefore address these issues.

The criminal and terrorist dimension in the 2011 crisis added to its complexity. The flourishing of terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime in the Sahara in the build-up to and during this crisis in Mali brought to the fore some of the main challenges facing the region that make it difficult to police effectively.

The criminal and terrorist dimension in the 2011 crisis added to its complexity. The flourishing of terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime in the Sahara in the build-up to and during this crisis in Mali brought to the fore some of the main challenges facing the region that make it difficult to police effectively. These challenges include the following: (i) the desert nature of much of the region; (ii) the fact that many parts of it, particularly in the Timbuktu and Kidal regions of Mali, the southern parts of Algeria and the northern regions of Niger, are sparsely if at all populated; and (iii) lack of adequate financial

and logistical resources at the disposal of governments of the region, particularly Mali and Niger. Some observers have added the apparent complicity of some local communities or even some government agents with the rebels and traffickers. One important lesson here is the need for regional cooperation, for no single country can face, on its own, the whole gamut of these challenges.

This is why the AU Commission and the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), which I have headed since its establishment in August 2013, strive to convince the countries of the region to engage in more collaborative work, through what is known as the Nouakchott Process, which was initiated by the AU Commission in March 2013. This Process brings together the chiefs of intelligence and security services of the countries of the region every two months to discuss the challenges and strategies for strengthening regional cooperation in the areas of information-sharing, border control, and the fight against terrorism, amongst others. The AU is now working on a generic concept of operations for the effective establishment of joint patrols and mixed units along the borders.

International involvement in Mali has been remarkable, as shown above, and crucial in the resolution of the complex crises that began in late 2011. This makes Mali very fortunate compared to other countries in similar situations. What this proves, and the lesson to be drawn, is, that when there is a combination of efforts by the various regional and international actors concerned, the chances of success are greater, particularly when there is coordination among them. The Support and Follow-up Group was a successful mechanism to ensure the coordination of efforts of the international community. Another illustration of this

international coordination is the collegial way in which the Ouagadougou Agreement was negotiated and the way in which the Algiers Process is being facilitated. This approach ensures effective complementarity between the various actors and their comparative advantages.

Another important lesson to be learned, particularly from the latest Malian crisis, is the acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of the crisis. This explains why various actors seem to have adopted holistic programs for addressing the root causes of the crisis in Mali, where these causes have manifested themselves into an armed rebellion, but also in other countries where different interventions are aimed at structural conflict prevention. This is very clear in the focus of the Sahel strategies developed by a number of regional and international organizations, particularly the AU, ECOWAS, the UN, and the EU. Almost all of them have identified issues of governance, security and development as their main pillars. The hope is that these strategies are effectively implemented, with true national appropriation and in a context of genuine coordination between all the actors. Should this happen, chances are great that some of the root causes of recurring conflicts in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel-Saharan region will be transformed into opportunities for the countries and the people of the region. PRISM

Notes

[1] "Tuareg" is pluaral of the Arabic term "Targui". It should not hterefore take "s" to signify plurality.

[2] Other groups later emerged, generally as a result of splits with or metamorphoses from groups, particularly in the course of 2013 and 2014.

Congolese soldier takes position behind a wall in Kanyarucinya in eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo

Dynamics of Conflict Management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

BY CLEMENT NAMANGALE

T he situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) presents a classic ongoing conflict with many tragic twists that is testing the resolve of sub-regional actors and the entire international community. Any indicators of success are often quickly snuffed out, giving way to palpable collective frustration. Even when the international community attempts to ignore it, the problem keeps coming back with new challenges. Negative events, which are most common in the Eastern DRC, affect both the Great Lakes and the South African Development Community (SADC) Regions, and ignoring the problem is no longer an option. This conflict is particularly unique because, with no tangible enduring solution in sight, the international community keeps experimenting with "new concoctions" of interventions in the vain hope that they may succeed.

As is always the case in such situations, the conflict draws in numerous actors and continues to test the international community's ability to manage conflicts. Many different actors have been lured to the core and yet do not seem to actually influence events on the ground, rendering particularly the Eastern Region highly dysfunctional, and allowing the conflict to drag on seemingly interminably. That situation now appears to be changing. The advent of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) seems to have brought a glimmer of hope that may just be the solution, or at least the beginning of one, if only it can be sustained. But is the FIB the lasting answer to such an asymmetric conflict? Is the FIB concept a new template for future UN missions?

This paper attempts to put the dynamics of the whole DRC conflict into perspective, while critically focusing on and analyzing the effectiveness of the concept of the FIB by using the experience of Malawi as one of the three Troop Contributing Countries (TCC's) fighting rebels in the region. This is not an easy task considering that, despite the defeat of the M23 rebel group, there are still about 40 armed rebel groups dangerously prowling the region. Government control is

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NAMANGALE

almost non-existent in most areas for seemingly genuine reasons, but as Mills states, "as Kinshasa pretends to govern, the world pretends to help."[1]

The cycle of violence continues to contribute to the inability of the government of President Joseph Kabila to function properly and stamp its authority on the territory. Vestiges of all sorts of official and non-official criminality are all too familiar to the locals. With either weak institutions or none at all, many disparate localities are simply inaccessible and in the hands of undisciplined rebel functionaries.

The FIB has, however, achieved some significant gains in terms of stabilizing the region by keeping some rebels on a leash and others on continuous run since 2013. The question then raised is how long the FIB can continue to maintain the status quo given that rebels in the region have a tendency to bounce back once government forces or peace enforcers begin to show signs of losing momentum.

It follows therefore that the ability of the rebels to rebound will very much depend on the tenacity and synergy of the FIB and the Congolese Forces (FARDC) to maintain the initiative through containment and, gradually, the building of institutions that will guarantee lasting peace.

Background to the DRC conflict

No study of the DRC or any part of the DRC can be complete without anchoring it within history, since this is the only way of avoiding the risk of generalization and oversimplification. The DRC has been plagued by conflict since independence, with civil wars that originally revealed broad political and economic root causes. The situation has since become more complex and, because of its

asymmetrical nature, there are now multiple challenges compounded by the absorption of numerous players during its relatively short history.

To this end, it must be emphasized that any simple analysis of the conflict is bound to be superficially flawed if one chooses to dwell on the widespread violent spin-offs. They, in the author's view, are only symptoms of the original serious animosities that were planted at the birth of the nation, and the tragic residual effects of greed which were accentuated along the way. Understanding the origins of the clash of interests and the dichotomy in the country is a more useful starting point in the desperate attempt to manage the present.

The DRC has a long history of colonization, exploitation and slave labor that goes back well before its independence in 1960. Within weeks of independence there was a number of dramatic events: the Katanga secession under Moise Tshombe; Joseph Kasavubu's military coups; the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the involvement of foreign powers and the UN Forces. By the time Dag Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash on the way to mediate the issue, the conflict had taken on a new dimension that drew worldwide interest. Eventually Kasavubu himself was ousted by Mobutu Sese Seko.

General Mobutu Sese Seko took over the government in 1965, changing the country's name to Zaire, imposing a long dictatorial rule before being ousted in 1997 by Laurent Kabila with the help of neighboring countries. In 1998, Congolese rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda almost toppled Kabila until Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe came to Mobutu's rescue under a controversial interpretation of the SADC collective security principle. When

Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001, his son Joseph succeeded him. This marked the end of almost all central government influence over the territory as tribal loyalties that extend beyond borders began to resurface, leading to an unprecedented breakdown of law and order that continues to the present. A terrain fertile for insecurity was now in place.

The Military Factor

Just like most of the African militaries who found themselves heavily politicized and embroiled in civil wars, the DRC armed forces were subjugated by autocratic rulers and rules that were, in part, a result of the colonial legacy and subsequent dictatorships that saw them often used as ruthless political tools. The military developed a habit of toppling its own governments, sometimes for "seemingly justifiable reasons."

The conflict itself is a unique reflection of many facets – the domestic political, economic, military, geographical and ethnic aspects – that combine with external

Mobutu Sese Seko with Prince Bernhard of Lippe-Biesterfeld in 1973

interference to provide an interplay that leaves all sides seizing the opportunity to plunder the country's vast natural resources. Nzongola-Ntalaja sums this up by stating that throughout the 116 years of Congo's existence as a state external interests have always been a major factor in the political equation because of the strategic position of the country and its enormous natural wealth, which has made it a prime candidate for imperial ambitions, mercenaries and looters of all kinds.

There are some significant similarities with the South American state of Colombia. The sheer vastness and inaccessibility of the land make it a complex military affair far from traditional civil war. This has left the society to endure instability in the human, physical and environmental security spheres. By 2003, DRC was hobbling toward complete collapse and state failure. This finally prompted the battle-weary warlords to agree to experiment with democracy once more.

The Role of External Actors

Several international state and non-state actors have tried to assist, but their efforts have ended as merely tragic twists in the tale. Peace is still elusive because of the deeply entrenched mistrust: to such a degree that whichever leaders emerge, whether through the gun or falsified ballots, face the same challenges. William Zartman describes such a scenario by stating that when so many actors and beliefs are present in a collapsed system, loyalties shift to various individual rulers and not to the nation.[3]

Perhaps this explains why so many politicians and the locals do not seem patriotic enough to rebuild their nation. As Mills advises, "foreigners must not be seen to love the country more than the citizens themselves."[4] It follows therefore, that when the system breaks down, many Congolese people often find themselves reverting to their tribal lineage, which makes them too proud to follow any leader they consider not to be their own. These dynamics tend to produce a picture-perfect conflict that is easy to define but very difficult to resolve.

Any analytical narrative of the recent history of the DRC shows that some actors tend to appear and disappear depending on the situation. This lends itself to the explanation that the international community has only rushed to the assistance of the DRC when the need became especially pressing. There seems to be an eerie correlation between interference by the so-called "international community" and deteriorating conditions for the local population. Colette Braeckman states that the real reasons and answers to why Africa's "first World War" has dragged on for so long lie outside of the Congo.[5]

The DRC has seen a lot of activity and frantic reconstruction efforts that have tried to stitch the military together to avoid lapsing back into anarchy. Although thinly deployed, the 22,000 strong UN Peacekeeping Force in DRC is the largest such effort and covers almost all the regions, with the Eastern Region being the main focus.

The TCCs in particular have made tough decisions to intervene driven by their collective moral conscience. In 2005, almost ten years after the genocide in Rwanda, a UN Summit formally agreed that the responsibility to protect does indeed rest with the state, and that if peaceful methods fail, all states - meaning the international community - have a responsibility to act collectively in a "timely and decisive manner," through the UN Security Council and

with the use of force. This has been termed the "responsibility to protect."[6]

The question of involvement of other countries in the Great Lakes Region is another important storyline. Many experts have rightly stated that one root cause of the conflicts can be traced to the arbitrary carving of states during the colonial era that was done without due regard to the then-existing nations and tribes, which were subsumed within the newly-created colonial states. These inherently divided nations created problems of irredentism, power struggles, the search for identity and divided loyalties, leading to intra-state conflicts.

Although this argument is generally accepted, it is exposed if one is asked to suggest any alternative formula of how boundaries should have been drawn without causing equal dispute. The other contention is to ask why other states are symbols of stability today and yet they were also created out of the same "Berlin" arrangement. This lends credit to the assertion by Barry Buzan who argues that peace and security are simply derivatives of power, and as long as there is a desire to dominate others, conflict will always be inevitable. His prescription is a willingness to accept others as equals.[7]

The entry of China and of private companies constitute another phenomenon that needs to be analyzed with regard to its impact on the security landscape in the DRC. There is no denying that their influence extends beyond the confines of commercial parameters. Can these be brought on board to assist if we all accept that the DRC situation needs help from every corner?

The common thread passing through the security analysis of the Eastern DRC is that it is an aggregate of many ills, all characterized by endless storylines of internal and external negative spinoffs.

Amidst the special relationship between the DRC and its neighbors, one must never lose sight that simmering tensions between the Congolese and neighbouring Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have never entirely subsided, and hence their footprints remain visible. Rwanda has repeatedly been accused of supporting the M23 militia, while the Congolese are in turn accused of not doing enough to combat the FDLR (the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – remnants of the genocidal primarily Hutu forces that escaped Rwanda following the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front under now President Paul Kagame in 1994). It also remains to be seen how the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGL) / SADC Meeting's decision to forcefully disarm the FDLR will pan out, recognizing that the group had offered to surrender but, like some other militia groups though unlike the M23, they are not distinct from the population. Will the SADC TCCs be willing to face the likely humanitarian consequences?

Malawi and the Force Intervention Brigade

Having participated in the UN Mission in Rwanda (1994-1995), it was no surprise that Malawi became part of the AU and UN Missions in the DRC and elsewhere, recognizing that the capacity of the UN to reduce human suffering was severely constrained by the unwillingness of member states to respond by contributing troops. Nothing that Malawi does in the future should detract from her place in history as a humble but regular contributor to a greater cause.

Since the 2003 ceasefire in Eastern Congo, the Kabila Government had been pressing for these forces to pull out. The force was accused of doing very little and in 2010, these accusations took a new turn when 150 women were captured and repeatedly raped only few miles away from a UN encampment. In an attempt to recover from this, the UN mandate became to protect civilians and help reconstruct the country and the mission changed from United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to the UN Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO).

The situation deteriorated to a new low in 2012 when Goma fell into rebel hands, followed by reports and horror stories of atrocities committed. The ICGLR and SADC felt duty-bound to do something immediately to ensure the protection of civilians. The UN adopted the recommendation proffered by the countries of the Great Lakes Region to create an offensive-oriented fighting force to "neutralize and disarm" the notorious March 23 Movement (M23) and other violent forces in the region. UN Resolution 2098 was adopted to create a specialized "Intervention Brigade" on an "exceptional basis" within the already existing MONUSCO, to deal with the situation. The parameters for disarming the rebels "'in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner," including the exit strategy, were clearly spelt out in the mandate.[8]

There were reservations in some quarters arguing this could compromise the "neutrality" of the force. Others argued that it was indeed a "new territory" but doable if executed meticulously.[9] In short the Resolution *per se* was the culmination of a long decision-making and consultative process that required brinkmanship to succeed.

Pledges for troop contributions came from Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa – all SADC member states – and their activities were placed under the operational control of MONUSCO. It was a bold decision in that Africa had demonstrated a rare determination to ensure that a humanitarian crisis was averted. The German politician, Martin Kobler, was appointed UN Special Representative for MONUSCO and Head of Mission in June 2013. General Carlos dos Santos Cruz, a Brazilian was appointed Force Commander.

The specialized Brigade is made up of 3,069 troops and consists of three Infantry Battalions, one Artillery Battalion, one Special Forces Company and one Reconnaissance Company. MONUSCO itself has a troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel countrywide, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 formed police units. It has one Pakistani and Indian Brigade each in North Kivu and South Kivu respectively.

FIB Successes: Reprieve at Last?

With a semblance of stability appearing, but residual effects of the bitter past just thinly buried underneath, everybody believes that the taming of the country's own Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), first by letting them tackle the threats, may just provide the right window of opportunity needed to prevent this democratic experiment from going wrong yet again. The conflict has taken a long winding road but the military has been the common denominator throughout. The irony is that the citizens have suffered in the past at the hands of their own army - the very institution that was supposed to protect them. That seems now to be changing.

The first Malawi Battalion (MALBATT I) completed its full deployment on 10 October, 2013. In military parlance, the FIB had to undertake the aggressive task of striking whereas the tasks of *finding, fixing,* and *holding* were assigned to brigades of MONUSCO. On the ground, the FIB worked in close support of FARDC.

The initial successes of the FIB have been widely documented. This section seeks to critically analyze what the future holds for the FIB and suggest possible solutions to the challenges by drawing lessons from a case-study of Colombia and the FIB's own experience.

When the FIB managed to dislodge the notorious M23 from towns such as Kibumba, Rumangabo and Rutshuru within four days (25-28 October 2013), it brought a sense of triumph and confidence to many as nobody had predicted such a quick defeat of the rebels. Apart from the mastery of tactical ground successes, much can also be attributed to the professional complementarity of both the strategic and operational planning efforts. In essence, the FIB's role was supposed to remain that of providing direct combat service support to FARDC and striking where necessary. To this end, the tactics employed included multinational configuration of the Task Forces. These were organized into three sub-units and deployed near Kiwanja, Munigi, Kibati and Rutshuru as blocking forces to provide forward passage for the three FARDC Task Forces. The infantry units (41, 805, and 806 respectively) were backed by heavy artillery, rocket and air support near Kiwanja, Kibati and inside Virunga National Park. Despite the poor road infrastructure, the FIB ensured it prepositioned logistics in each axis, thereby overcoming the challenges of sustainment.

At the height of the resistance, Malawian troops were placed in Task Force C, which was responsible for the Luindi-Mabenga-Kiwanja Axis. With Force Headquarters at Goma and the Main Operating Base at Sake, the Malawi Contingent established its own Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) at Luindi, Tongo, Ishasha and Lubaru. Apart from the routine missions in the area of responsibility, Malawian troops had at one time to provide relief to the Republic of South Africa contingent by manning one of the South African Defense Force's (SANDF) FOBs for about a month as its troops were conducting rotations.

The fiercest combat took place between 25 and 28 October 2013, in a battle which dislodged the main M23 rebel group. The Malawian Defense Force (MDF) had deployed on 10 October 2013, much later than the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) and SANDF. They entered the fray straight away at this crucial moment, thereby ensuring there was full capacity to maintain the tactical initiative and keep the rebels on the run. The new leadership of the 8th Military Region, under the late Major General Bahuma Ambamba, ensured that there was total discipline in the force, well aware of the events of 2012, which had embarrassingly led forces to abandon the town of Goma.[10] With these initial successes, the triumphant mood became palpable and the people's confidence grew. MONUSCO itself played a critical role in pushing the rebels back and pursued a more nuanced proactive stance within the new more robust mandate.

The sound tactical utilization of the integrated assets available was embraced by leaders at all levels, and became the trademark of the FIB. M1-24p and Rooivalk attack helicopters, artillery, mortars, surveillance equipment and anti-air assets all added synergy as combat

multipliers. The Force Commander and the Special Representative have continued to give calculated, decisive strategic directions, mindful of the possible ramifications if not handled well.

Although this is not the first time that Malawi has operated under a robust UN mandate, the uniqueness of the FIB and the dynamics on the ground are forcing the mission to explore new territory, and increase the pressure to succeed. At the outset of the mission the rationale for creating a 3,000 strong force of the FIB, to carry out tasks that a 20,000 strong MONUSCO force had been unable to achieve over many years was questioned. One year on, this has come to pass.

It will be recalled that while the MDF has participated in peace-support operations missions in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, each mission has had its fair share of distinct challenges. There are no templates that fit all scenarios. The decisiveness exhibited at the beginning of the engagements under examination set the tone and served as a signature and a statement of the FIB's serious intent.

Perhaps one of the most remarkable operations that came early in Malawi's deployment took place at Kahunga and Mabenga during FARDC's advance to dislodge M23 rebels in Kiwanja and Rutshuru. In October 2013, FARDC's advance had been halted at Kahunga by heavily armed M23 rebels who had dug in and threatened to disrupt the FIB's plans by denying them access on this axis. There was incessant heavy fire and as the Congolese began to withdraw because of injuries and fatalities the two Malawian platoons and a medical team proceeded not only to conduct casualty evacuation, but also got heavily involved and, supported by a Tanzanian

A soldier from the Force Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO aims his rifle during a training exercise

Artillery Battery, regained the initiative, counter-attacked, and successfully overran the position, surprising the enemy's main force at the rear, in the next town.

Casualties were heavy but Task Force C's resolve was not affected despite losing a Congolese Commanding Officer during the battle. Friendly forces, especially the forward Congolese elements, suffered some casualties while the FIB itself had a remarkably small casualty figure. Elsewhere, at almost the same time, the FIB also lost a Tanzanian Lieutenant – shot dead in an almost similar situation. Since then, the momentum has been sustained with no sign of mission creep, resulting in the rebels fleeing or surrendering before any contact. Rebel positions at Karengera and Tonga are a case in point.

Lessons Learned

The FIB mandate was extended an additional year and upon exit the force will be replaced with an independent Rapid Deployment Brigade (RDB) to carry out similar tasks. This suggests that future operations can be assured of having a "readily available insurance cover" that will give them more flexible latitude.

The FIB deployment continues to be a test case for the UN's future missions, and the UN is all too aware of this, hence the proposal of the RDB concept. For now there is overwhelming evidence that the existential threats in the region have been drastically reduced.

On Malawi's part, it has been yet another learning curve and a more fulfilling, challenging experience which has thus far not put a negative strain on the physical and moral components of the force, nor has it affected the psyche or public opinion at home.

Africa has come of age by ensuring that decisions made at political levels are not mere rhetoric, but that they are backed by timely and decisive action. Once the decision was taken, pledges came from Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa. The nagging question is what happens if any of the TCCs decides to withdraw from the FIB prematurely. There is no doubt in the case of Malawi that at least today there is sufficient political and public determination to see this through with no skewed interests but, politics and perceptions being what they are, one cannot guarantee that forever.

The UN's swiftness in changing to a more proactive mandate once the situation deteriorated helped avert anarchy. The process is usually long and tedious, typically causing frustration and unnecessary suffering. By letting the FARDC take the lead misconceptions on the sincerity of the UN were avoided. This brought confidence and much needed co-operation from the local population. The concept of having a Joint Task Force Planning Cell, although not new, ensured maximum utilization of resources and continuous consultation through sharing of information. Visits and briefings also ensured development and continuity of buy-in. However, the question of using UN civilian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, whose valuable information is used for military purposes, needs to be addressed quickly to avoid challenges to mission legitimacy.

The professional attitude that is being inculcated into the new FARDC, as exemplified by the improved discipline, is doing a lot for the image and reputation of the force. There is a growing sense of goodwill among the locals.

Although there are some Congolese who do not seem to care for their own country, exemplified by their plundering acts and association with unscrupulous foreigners, the

majority would like to see the peace process work. One of the locals, questioning the level of patriotism and lack of desire to seek solutions for his motherland, sums up these feelings by lamenting:

> *Are we genetically predisposed to seek solutions in violence, with an innately warped view of the world? Are we ignorant of any other peaceful solutions? Are we so backward looking and blinded by clan loyalties that we are unable see we are all blood brothers and sisters? Why do we hate even those who come to help us?[11]*

Indeed there are many Congolese with such passion for their motherland. The challenge is how to identify them within the large constituency in the diaspora in order to harness their collective desire to live in harmony, particularly in this part of the region where geo-politics seems to deny them the opportunity to unite on the basis of collective human identity. That primordial prejudice has enabled different detractors to take advantage of the vacuum to create anarchy.

Many experts warn that stability in the DRC must be looked at with guarded optimism because of the root causes of the war. Mills states that conflict in the DRC is an example of the wars that never ended. These wars, otherwise termed as "the forever wars," are not fought over national interests, grievances or even over resources and greed, but have their own tautology where groups fight as a way of life precisely because there is no state. They become conflict entrepreneurs, making money rather than aiming to seek power from fighting.[12] Given such circumstances, caution ought to be taken to ensure that well-meaning players do not unconsciously become part of the problem.

Can the offense-oriented Force Intervention Brigade become a new kind of template for the future in handling these "forever wars?" One thing is clear: if the FIB concept succeeds, it will create a dilemma for the UN since many will view it as a panacea for all conflicts given the number of other failed peace missions. The war-weary international community will believe that the benefits of ending the violence early with an aggressive force far outweigh the disadvantages, particularly because of the *problème diplomatique* and the usual fatigue of watching perennial violence on our TV screens whose *raisons d-êtres* were artificially created decades ago.

On the subject of local governance and policing, it is common knowledge that the police have notoriously been more a part of the problem than the solution. This sector needs equally urgent innovation and reform. There are currently only three pilot reform programs in three regions with assistance from civil society and the hope is that these can be expanded to additional areas. Given the fact that there is some correlation between governance, security and weak institutions, it is up for conjecture as to what strains such challenges as the Ebola outbreak or Jihadism will impose on the situation. The impacts of such additional responsibilities can be catastrophic and indeed these threats are not too far away.

Conclusion

Extrapolating from this discourse, and having seen a glimmer of hope in what once appeared a hopeless situation, one can draw lessons from Colombia on how to recover from a devastating conflict. A more nuanced Colombia-style recovery plan is suggested as a possible solution because there are similarities, but

emphasis must be placed on political will as the point of departure.

This approach has been suggested mindful of the fact that solutions to the DRC conflict cannot holistically be achieved by providing "total recipes" that have succeeded elsewhere, because of some of its unique conditions which tend to evolve and follow different patterns over time, allowing detractors to take advantage of these dynamics. To this end, the approach should focus on simultaneously rebuilding institutions that complement one another in phases, such as the security sector along with judicial institutions.

This plan requires international assistance to help the DRC embark on a broad rebuilding process even before the FIB begins to withdraw. Realizing that resources are a key factor, ways of harnessing the country's own resources such as by attracting genuine investments, taxing the rich and stopping corruption, must be put in place to help finance and sustain what the author terms, "the DRC's Marshall Plan."

Caution should also be taken on how to handle the socially-constructed nature of the root causes of conflict, and other dominant assumptions. To this effect, some experts suggest a concept of "conflict sensitive assistance," which means that the reconstruction, policies and projects should consider their potential impact to ensure any interventions do not contribute to the escalation of the conflict.[13] Previous assistance efforts have created numerous subaltern entities of armed groups and international actors that are benefiting from a situation of stateless disorder, rendering any conflict management efforts seem like diplomatic exercises in futility.

For now, peace seems to be holding, but this current situation must be embraced with cautious optimism mindful of the complex dynamics of the DRC. The concept of the Force Intervention Brigade is simply a new tool that is being tested for the first time and it must be given time. Given the circumstances, it is only fair to conclude that it is a work in progress. PRISM

Notes

[1] See Mills Greg (2014), Why States Recover, Changing Walking Societies into Winning Nations-from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, Picador Africa, p 220.

[2] Nzongola-Ntalaja Georges, (2002), The Congo: From Leopard to Kabila – A People's History, Zed Books, p258.

[3] Zartman William I.,(1995), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Lynne Rienner.

[4] See Mills Greg, *Perspective on African Security*, Brenthurst Foundation Paper 3/2014.

[5] Braeckman Collette, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, " Congo: A War Without Victors," (April 2001).

[6] See The UN Millenium Report, 2000.

[7] Buzan Barry,(1983), People, States and Fear, Ecpr Classics

[8] The UN Security Council 6943rd Meeting (PM), Resolution 2098 (2013) Enables Offensive Combat Force to 'Neutralize and Disarm" Congolese Rebels, Foreign Armed Groups. 28 March 2013.

[9] Ibid, United Kingdom's representative Beetiner Lionce '(Nov 2013 is UN Offensive Intervention in Congo New Model of Peacekeeping, http://politicalviolence@glance, accessed 30 June, 2014, p 2.

[10] General Ambamba died in RSA Hospital after suddenly collapsing while attending a meeting in Uganda on 31st August, 2014.

[11] See Abdcadir H., (2007), A Failed State, The Red Sea, p 2.

[12] Mills Greg (2014) Why States Recover, Changing Walking Societies into Winning Nations – From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, Picador Africa pp 216-17, Quoting Jeffrey Gentleman's article by the same title in Foreign Policy, Feb 10, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.articles/2010/02/22/africas-forever-wars

[13] See West G Garry (1997), Conflict and its Resolution in Africa, University Press, MD, p 56.

May 18 celebrations in Hargeisa

Somaliland:

Where There Has Been Conflict but No Intervention

BY RAKIYA OMAAR AND SAEED MOHAMOUD

Visiting Colombia in June, 2014, as part of the Africa-Colombia Dialogue of the Brenthurst Foundation, was an opportunity to reflect on the power of misconceptions. Even among conflict veterans, which the people of Somaliland have become, the prospect of a journey to Colombia provoked concern about safety and security. Talking to people in Colombia about Somaliland elicited expressions of sympathy for a far off place they knew very little about. This is unsurprising, given the fact that what they thought they knew was based on the recurrent headlines about war and violence, bombings by al-Shabaab militants, famine and displacement in Somalia.

The distinction between Somalia and Somaliland is lost on most outsiders, but for the people of Somaliland, who made the decision to separate from Somalia in May 1991, it is both very real and immensely significant. It has meant living in peace for two decades – a peace brokered, implemented and sustained by local people. There has been neither a military intervention to end a conflict nor substantial political, military or economic engagement with the international community, focused as it has been on the mayhem in Somalia.

There is a bloody backdrop to the decision to "go it alone." Somaliland was a British Protectorate until it elected to unite in June 1960, with the Italian colony of Somalia, to form the Northwest region of an independent Republic of Somalia. Unhappy with the union, and frustrated with what appeared to be a policy of neglect, an anti-government rebel movement called the Somali National Movement (SNM) was established abroad to challenge the hardline military regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. The SNM established a rear base in neighboring Ethiopia from which it made incursions into the Northwest and fought a guerrilla war.

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The government's response was swift and unforgiving: civilians suspected of having ties to the SNM faced harsh interrogations, were imprisoned and, in some cases, disappeared. Much of the Northwest became an occupied territory. SNM's entry into Somalia in May 1988, led to an outright declaration of war against the civilian population in an effort to deprive the SNM of its support and intelligence networks. An intense campaign of aerial bombings in many of the main cities demolished homes, businesses and infrastructure and drove the population out of the country into nearby Ethiopia and further afield. Three years of living in Ethiopia as displaced people, in difficult terrain, took a heavy toll on lives. Many people died of malaria and other health-related causes, and children succumbed because of the lack of clean water.

Exile also politicized people to a point of no return as far as a political future with Somalia was concerned. When Siad Barre was forced out of power in January 1991, the refugees returned home. On 18 May, at a congress in Burao, it was declared that Somaliland had reclaimed the sovereignty it had ceded in June 1960 and was no longer an integral part of Somalia.

For two decades, the pain and struggles of Somalia – the spiral of violence, the absence of an effective central government, the failure of successive interventions and peace negotiations and the grip of extremism – have been the subject of international concern and debate. Somaliland, on the other hand, has remained largely invisible to the outside world. Left to its own devices, it crafted a painstaking, locally-driven peace-building process to resolve a series of internal conflicts and lay the foundation for a system of governance and administration.

It is difficult to pinpoint the political watershed where Somalia crossed the line so as to render a home-grown solution to war and conflict impossible. Although at the time there did not appear to be a choice, Somaliland successfully ended the internal fighting in the early 1990s, nurturing the trust necessary for healing and reconciliation. A collective effort by traditional elders, leading political and civic figures, as well as senior military officers forged, with patience and sensitivity, a meticulous, systematic and comprehensive peace plan responsive to local needs. Political organization, social cohesion and a person's sense of security and belonging have historically, in the Somali context, come from clan affiliation. When the fault lines in a conflict are defined along clan lines, often among neighbors and even relatives, the violence is personal and deep. "Intimate" violence is much more difficult to resolve than war between strangers. Making peace between people who had previously enjoyed the ties of kinship, marriage and friendship must encompass strategies for overcoming hurt, rekindling trust and creating a sense of common purpose. In a largely pastoral society, moreover, where the prospects for avoiding harm and doing well economically are dependent on gaining intelligence from other communities, the notion of peace is shaped by social harmony. The internationally-led search for peace in Somalia has focused on a formula for power sharing; in Somaliland, the emphasis was on the achievement of peace and sharing its benefits.

While Colombians were generous in acknowledging the critical support from the U.S. and EU in their military efforts to eliminate the threat of the FARC, they also spoke at length about the importance of ownership in how a people and a country tackle and resolve

conflict in order to mold the society they want to live in. This approach resonates strongly with the people of Somaliland.

In the course of 23 years, Somaliland has worked hard to achieve many important milestones. Not only has it enjoyed relative peace, it has also established a functioning system of government, with an executive presidency, an elected parliament, an upper chamber known as the *Guurti* intended for clan elders and akin to a senate, an array of political parties, as well as an army and police force. Despite its tenuous position as a self-declared independent nation, it has held a series of democratic elections since 2003, including two presidential elections, which saw an orderly transfer of power from a sitting President to the head of the main opposition party in 2010. Although

criticized for issues related to multiple voting, efficiency and the distribution of state resources, Somaliland was applauded for conducting elections that were relatively fair and free of violence.

Though it remains a very poor country, there has been a dramatic increase in economic growth and reconstruction as well as in revenue generation for the public sector. Private sector and community initiatives were, and still are, the main drivers of the economy. The spirit of entrepreneurship has been a central and critical thread in transforming the economy. From war-torn rubble, it is now a place where telecommunication, airline, money exchange and construction companies are thriving, including companies which provide electronic money transfers. Private

An abandoned M-47 Patton tank lies in a Somaliland desert

schools, universities and clinics attract an ever-growing clientele and shops and markets offer a wide choice of goods. This is not to say that Somaliland is where it should be: the economy remains precarious, poverty is still widespread and youth unemployment is exceptionally high.

The ultimate goal – international recognition as an independent state – has remained elusive, a fact which remains incomprehensible to the majority of people who are not interested in, or privy to, international debates about statehood and concerns about the wider impact of recognition. What they do understand are the practical, tangible consequences of non- statehood: the inability to travel on their passports, the absence of foreign embassies, the impediments to trade and the knowledge that Somaliland remains ineligible for large-scale support from the international community.

Maintaining and deepening peace, as well as strengthening governance, remains a work in progress. In a context of poverty, isolation and non-recognition setbacks are inevitable. Without understating Somaliland's achievements in the most testing of circumstances, the difficulties of state building remain daunting, especially in a region which continues to be volatile.

To the Colombian military officers and politicians tasked with defeating the FARC rebels, the definition of the "battlefield" included the economic and social prospects the state offered the people and regions affected by the war. There was an unequivocal understanding that in the eyes of parents who envisioned a better life for their children, jobs, roads, schools and hospitals represented the government, and expressed the quality of its engagement with citizens. It is a lesson the

post-independence governments of Somalia ignored at their peril, and one Somaliland would do well to heed.

Outside the main towns of Somaliland, basic services and facilities are scarce and openings for the young remain rare. Much of the population in the rural areas is pastoralist. The livestock they depend on for their livelihood is also the economic backbone of Somaliland; the export of livestock overseas is a major source of foreign currency. Yet successive administrations have failed to successfully invest in pastoral communities. Veterinary services and drought mitigation efforts, especially the provision of clean water and better range management, can improve the livelihoods of pastoral communities.

Those living in the periphery (rural populations in particular) are all too easy to forget. They are too far away from the capital to be politically visible and too disenfranchised to worry politicians. In Colombia, for far too long, the military and political leaders believed they could afford to contain the threat from the rebels, operating as they did in more remote areas. It was not, we heard, until the "problem" appeared to be getting uncomfortably close to Bogota that it became a matter of vital and immediate national concern, concentrating minds and creating the necessary partnerships to harness all available resources.

This is a lesson Somaliland has yet to apply in the politically tense region of Sool, contested by both Somaliland and Puntland – an autonomous region that remains part of Federal Somalia. The creation of a Sool-based separatist movement, which wants to establish a state of "Khatumo" as part of Somalia, has led to a military build-up in both Somaliland and Puntland in 2014 and provoked a war of words.

Somaliland's military has been present in Las Anod, the regional capital of Sool, since 2008. Their visibility as a force needs to be balanced by sustained investment in social services. Much of the money Somaliland spends in the region has been earmarked for political personalities believed to wield influence in the area. There are, of course, likely to be others who can sway public opinion and who feel resentful at being sidelined. Many believe a policy of extending social services in the area – building schools and health centers, strengthening the local Nugaal University and improving access to water and power supplies – would contribute more to stability. The extent to which the government's recent initiative to construct a tarmac road in the neighboring region of Sanaag was welcomed, underlines what officials in Colombia repeated many times; security is important but so is service delivery.

On the streets of Hargeisa, as on the pavements of Cali and Buenaventura, it is difficult to avoid the impression of being in a city of young men with nothing to do and little to look forward to, except perhaps a bleak future. We heard a great deal in Colombia about the interconnections between youth unemployment, the drug trade and the proliferation of criminal gangs.

While the cultural and economic contexts are quite different, high rates of unemployment are also drivers of fragility in Somaliland. The staggering level of unemployment among young men in Somaliland is a daily reminder of what can go wrong. They represent an army-in-waiting for ambitious politicians to use for personal gain and a constituency for disgruntled clan elders to call upon as a political bargaining chip and as potential fighters to advance their parochial interests. They are also a ready-made pool of rudderless youth from which militant extremists with an agenda can recruit. Low skill levels and a poor education exacerbate the problem.

Joblessness is not only the absence of financial security and social networks. Going to work exerts its own discipline and brings with it a sense of value for the individual. The emphasis placed by extremists on the urgency and importance of accomplishing a mission contrasts sharply with the sense of drift and weight of time that is the life of too many young men in their prime. It is therefore all too easy for hardliners with extremist ideologies to entice vulnerable youth with talk about fulfilling a religious obligation which will be handsomely rewarded in the after-life. Hopelessness and despair about future prospects for meaningful, productive lives provide a fertile ground for that message to resonate with many young men.

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An increasing number of youth, both men and women, many of them university graduates, are embarking on a perilous trek overseas in search of work and education. This phenomenon, known as *tahrib*, usually facilitated by unscrupulous human traffickers, reflects a desperation born, in part, from the belief that opportunities lie elsewhere. Those who have tried to reach Europe by way of Libya or Yemen have become hostages in the conflict-ridden states through which they travel. Families

unable to pay ransoms are forced to borrow money or sell whatever property they have to pay for the release of their children. Failure to do so may well result in their deaths. Despite the harrowing stories broadcast regularly by the BBC Somali Service and Voice of America (VOA), the exodus persists. Seduced by misleading Facebook photos showing a life of affluence and fulfilment in Europe, the documented dangers have not proved to be sufficient deterrents. The frustration of those who come to believe they have been "left behind" means this journey of death will continue unabated.

The private sector is the ultimate creator of jobs. This is true in Somaliland as elsewhere, especially given the narrow base of the public sector in Somaliland. But rising from the ashes of a destructive conflict, with the entire asset base stripped away, private

companies had to start from scratch in 1991, with none of the external assistance provided by the international community to other post-conflict economies. Despite the tremendous constraints it faces, visitors to Somaliland are immediately struck by the vibrancy of the private sector, the first sign of which are the ubiquitous metal cages on the sidewalks containing millions of shillings left unguarded. There is no expectation of theft; the clan system is the best intelligence network. The culprit will not only be found but his clan will be held accountable for his actions.

While there are examples of "conflict entrepreneurs" who benefitted from the turmoil of the early 1990s, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the private sector as the unsung heroes of Somaliland's struggle for survival. In circumstances which would have discouraged experienced capitalists,

Courtesy of Petterik Wiggers/Panos Pictures

Hargeisa after the civil war

businessmen in Somaliland helped establish a rudimentary police force, financed peace conferences, contributed substantially to the government coffers, provided jobs, facilitated remittances and unleashed hope and pride in self-reliance. They imported supplies that made it possible for people to repair their homes and start their own businesses. In the absence of state structures, people turned to the private sector for water, power, transport, schools and healthcare facilities.

The lack of international recognition has inevitably undermined the capacity of the private sector to develop itself in Somaliland. Being invisible translates, in practical terms, to being cut off from international markets. Banks and insurance companies cannot risk engagement outside the rules that apply to other countries. Furthermore, governments do not extend direct budgetary support to ministries and most of the assistance given is indirect. It is difficult for any government to demonstrate its legitimacy to its own people when essential services are provided by international organizations, local NGOs and the private sector.

It would be unrealistic to expect local businessmen to finance large-scale and expensive infrastructure projects, such as the port in Berbera, as well as the roads that connect Berbera to landlocked Ethiopia. But without this infrastructure, Somaliland's economic potential remains untapped, trapping people in an endless cycle of dependence. Over-reliance on the private sector risks excluding the poor, which constitutes a large percentage of the population in Somaliland.

"Fragile" states are inherently those with weak institutions. Somaliland and Somalia's past shows what can happen when there are no institutions that can withstand the onslaught of war and conflict but that can also assist in providing solutions. Somaliland is now in a political twilight zone: it has gone beyond the point where its nascent institutions can, or should, rely on the resilience of traditional institutions of conflict management, which address problems at the community level.

It was apparent in Colombia that the decision to confront the problem of FARC and other rebel movements brought to the forefront questions about the state's responsibility towards its citizens. One of the greatest challenges facing Somaliland is to open up a debate about the nature of the state and the political institutions which can ensure a stable future free of strife. A great deal of time and energy has been spent in forming new political institutions to modernize the body politic without revising the old one. The result is a hybrid system of the old and the new – one which risks diluting the authority of the traditional structures, while failing to fully embrace the new ones intended to lead to democratization.

At the heart of this debate is the future of the Guurti. Instead of remaining a body outside the political arena with the authority and moral standing to provide an alternative mechanism for dispute resolution, they have become more of an adjunct of the government rather than an asset to the community. Because they are no longer seen as entirely independent, they cannot be relied upon to challenge government policies. The material advantages and proximity to power have proved damaging. Instead of experience and respect within the community as the criteria for nomination, families have come to regard the position as hereditary, leading to a huge inflation of

individuals seeking and being bestowed with traditional titles.

The politicization of the role of elders has blurred the lines between the government and those who should be holding the executive in check, and very importantly, between the affairs of the state and the responsibilities of communities. In a context where the state (which lacks funds, human resources and adequate infrastructure to maintain peace) must rely on elders to contain violence and address underlying problems, the confusion and dilution of roles is a cause of concern in Somaliland given the ever-present shadow of conflict.

Instead of limiting discussion of contentious clan issues to competent institutions, namely the Guurti, political elites are using clan politics to advance their own aims, irrespective of its relevance and whether they have been mandated to speak on their behalf. Although political parties are mixed, the arithmetic of electoral politics is based on clan considerations. By maintaining the divisive issue of clan identity at the forefront of public discussions, Somaliland is holding back its political evolution and social integration. It is also slowing down the pace at which respect for the rule of law becomes the foundation for public life, making it unnecessary to look to clan identity for protection.

The overlap between "clanism" and governance can have serious implications for entry into, and dismissal from, the civil service, in the award of contracts, in the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary and in many other aspects of public life. It is difficult for the notion of a civil service based on merit to take root if candidates can too easily rely on the influence of their elders. But without the ability to develop technical expertise and

experienced managers, Somaliland's ability to develop will be stymied.

The extent to which many current conflicts in Africa and elsewhere owe their origin to competition over natural resources has been well documented. The discovery and exploitation of natural resources in fragile environments can usher in instability and sharpen inequality. Many African countries have paid a heavy price for what has come to be known as the "curse of oil." The recent commercial talks between Somaliland and a number of foreign companies over oil concessions highlight the importance of ensuring Somaliland does not find itself choosing between peace and the lure of uncertain prosperity.

The decision by one company to pull out of Somaliland, citing threats of insecurity as a result of local reaction to the deal, illustrates the political and social minefield, and the security concerns, oil exploration represents. This is further complicated by the existence of prospective wells in the eastern part of Somaliland to which Puntland also lays claim and where it too has awarded concessions.

In May 2014, the Somaliland government announced its intention to establish a 580-strong force named the Oil Protection Unit (OPU), which it said will protect oil companies from terrorist attacks since al-Shabaab elements use the mountains which straddle Somaliland and Puntland. Although the OPU will, according to the government, be under the control of and accountable to the government, the response to the proposed deployment of troops has been mixed. Critics worry about a wide range of implications surrounding the oil concessions, given the fact that Somaliland lacks the wherewithal to negotiate equitable deals. They question the potential for destabilization, the use of oil resources and

the security risks associated with the OPU. It would be shortsighted to urge Somaliland to abandon all ambitions related to oil exploration. A thoughtful strategy based on consultations with affected parties and a transparent and clear framework is necessary if the hard-won stability is to be preserved.

To defeat the rebels who finance the war through narcotics, Colombia must work closely with its neighbors; regional collaboration, the only bulwark against fluid borders, is a prerequisite in the war on the drug trade. The parallels in Somaliland's efforts to shield itself from the murderous activities of al-Shabaab in Somalia, and beyond, are striking. The long and porous borders with Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia, and the cross-border nature of al-Shabaab's operations dictate a policy of cooperation with neighbors.

After more than twenty years of waiting for international recognition, the feeling of being a voiceless people, of not belonging to the community of nations, has left an indelible mark on the national psyche. The all-pervasive aspiration for recognition has come to occupy a dominant and permanent position in political discourse, to the detriment of Somaliland.

Visitors often say they intend to become ambassadors for Somaliland when they return to their countries. Many of us who visited Colombia in June 2014, left with the same determination. We were surprised at how different the country is from popular perceptions. We were impressed by the achievements in security, peace and development, and the commitment and thoughtfulness of those we met to transform their country. PRISM

The Abuja National Mosque

Lessons From Colombia For Curtailing The Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria

BY AFEIKHENA JEROME

Nigeria is a highly complex and ethnically diverse country, with over 400 ethnic groups. This diversity is played out in the way the country is bifurcated along the lines of religion, language, culture, ethnicity and regional identity. The population of about 178.5 million people in 2014 is made up of Christians and Muslims in equal measures of about 50 percent each, but including many who embrace traditional religions as well.

The country has continued to experience serious and violent ethno-communal conflicts since independence in 1960, including the bloody and deadly thirty month fratricidal Civil War (also known as the Nigerian-Biafran war, 1967-70) when the eastern region of Biafra declared its secession and which claimed more than one million lives. The most prominent of these conflicts recently pitch Muslims against Christians in a dangerous convergence of religion, ethnicity and politics. The first and most dramatic eruption in a series of recent religious disturbances was the Maitatsine uprising in Kano in December 1980, in which about 4,177 died.

While the exact number of conflicts in Nigeria is unknown, because of a lack of reliable statistical data, it is estimated that about 40 percent of all conflicts have taken place since the country's return to civilian rule in 1999.[1] The increasing wave of violent conflicts across Nigeria under the current democratic regime is no doubt partly a direct consequence of the activities of ethno-communal groups seeking self-determination in their "homelands," and of their surrogate ethnic militias that have assumed prominence since the last quarter of 2000. Their grievances have typically found expression in bitter political complaints, sectarian crises stoked by political elites and incendiary media rhetoric, and violent insurgencies.

The latest among these violent and decimating sectarian grievances is the Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram, a violent but diffuse Islamist sect, has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in recent years. It feeds on a narrative of historically

deep-rooted resentment against, and vengeance for state abuses in order to recruit members and sympathizers. With increasing regularity since 2009, the sect has attacked Nigeria's police and military, rival clerics, politicians, schools, religious buildings, public institutions, and civilians. The brutal insurgent activities of Boko Haram have included the bombing of the national police headquarters in June 2011; a suicide attack on a United Nations building in Abuja in August 2011; the destruction of the Air Force Base in Maiduguri in December 2013; and innumerable other repeated attacks that have killed dozens of students, burnt and devastated villages, and destroyed infrastructure. Their grievances against the police are particularly deep-seated as many of their followers are locked up in police cells, and their late leader, Mohammad Yusuf, was killed in police custody in 2009.

Boko Haram's April 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok has attracted extensive international attention, thanks to the on-going global mobilization in this regard by the *#BringBackOurGirls* social media campaign.

An ocean away, Colombia has come a long way in its half-century fight against insurgency, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and murder. The country entered the 21st century on the brink of becoming a failed state. By 2000, the Government of Colombia no longer had a monopoly on the exercise of authority in a considerable area of Colombian territory, where guerrillas and drug traffickers ruled instead. After decades of bloody conflict, Colombia has begun in recent years to make unprecedented strides in its war against insurgency. The strength of the major insurgency group, the 50-year-old Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), once considered the best-funded insurgency in the world, is at its most vulnerable state in decades. The numerical strength of FARC declined between 2002 and 2010 from 16,000 fighters to 8,000, and 967 municipalities representing 88 percent of the country registered no terrorist attacks from FARC or other insurgent groups in 2013. Kidnappings have dropped by more than 90 percent since 2002, and the country has been able to rein in narcotics trafficking to some extent. There are other successes too: in October 2012, the authorities began peace talks with FARC, which, if eventually successful, will put an end to one of the world's longest conflicts; trade and the GDP are up; Medellín, the nation's second-largest city, is lauded as the "most innovative city in the world;" and Colombia is popping up on tourist "top 10" lists everywhere. The country also even made the final round at the 2014 Soccer World Cup.

This study investigates the useful lessons from Colombia's experience in dealing with insurgency, especially with FARC, for Nigeria's on-going strategy to curtail the Boko Haram insurgency, based on field study conducted in the summer of 2014.

The Evolution of Boko Haram

The beginnings of the insurgent activities of Boko Haram – often translated as "Western education is forbidden" or, using its Arabic name *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati wal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad)– in Nigeria date back to the early 2000s. It emerged as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect in the 1990s that worshipped at the al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State. The group advocated a strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Its leader, Mohammed

Yusuf, was a charismatic and popular Qur'anic scholar who not only proselytized widely throughout northern Nigeria but also assisted in the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law) in several northern states in the early 2000s. The failure to achieve the expected full implementation of Sharia in northern Nigeria helps explain some of the deep-rooted resentment and anger of a considerable number of Muslim youths at what they perceived as the government's "deception" and "insincerity." This resentment fueled their call for an authentic Islamist revolution.[2]

While the sect's leadership did not initially engage in violence, its followers were involved in periodic skirmishes with police during its formative years.[3] At that time, the group's activities were limited in scope and were contained within several highly impoverished states in the predominately Muslim North.

In 2003, Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to study, but in reality to escape arrest after the police had declared him wanted following incessant attacks and the burning down of some police stations by a more radical splinter group of about 200 members led by Abubakar Shekau and Aminu Tashen-Ilimi. This group had split from the mainstream movement in 2012 and settled in neighbouring Yobe State. Then Borno state deputy governor, Adamu Dibal, reportedly met Yusuf while on Hajj and used contacts with the security agencies to obtain permission for him to return to Maiduguri.

Yusuf rose to much greater prominence when he reportedly formed an alliance with Ali Modu Sheriff, a politician and wealthy businessman who became Governor of Borno State. Yusuf allegedly promised to deploy his influence and religious authority to provide political support for Sheriff if, upon becoming Governor, Sheriff would implement Sharia.

In fulfilment of this agreement, the state government allegedly provided funds to Yusuf through Buji Foi, a disciple of Yusuf whom Sheriff made religious affairs commissioner when he became Governor in 2003. Yusuf used the money to organize an informal micro-credit scheme that gave his disciples capital to set up businesses. They in turn gave part of their profits as alms to the group, which began amassing arms, mostly Kalashnikovs from neighbouring Chad.

Cracks appeared in the purported Yusuf-Sheriff alliance, however, after the latter reneged on his promise to implement Sharia fully in the state. Yusuf began to direct sermons against Sheriff and his government, ultimately branding him an apostate. In 2007, Buji Foi resigned as religious affairs commissioner in protest.

The year 2009 marked a turning point in Boko Haram's transformation. In July 2009 at least 700 people were killed during an attempt by Nigerian security forces to suppress the group. In the aftermath of the attempt, their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in police custody. The group subsequently appeared to dissipate, but re-emerged a year later under new leadership. It orchestrated a large prison break in September 2010 that freed hundreds, including many of its members. Some Boko Haram militants may have fled to insurgent training camps in the Sahel in 2009-2010. The group has built ties with transnational extremist groups in the region, which have reportedly provided Boko Haram with insurgency training and increasingly sophisticated weaponry. Since 2011 Boko Haram attacks have featured improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, and, periodically, suicide attacks, but

fighters also continue to inflict a heavy toll using small arms and arson.

Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization.[4] It has several splinter groups, some of which have formed alliances with foreign Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab in Somalia, which have helped in bringing about the radicalization of its leadership. The number of Boko Haram fighters is estimated in the hundreds to low thousands and its organizational structure is often described as diffuse, and increasingly so since the death of Yusuf.

Boko Haram's attacks have increased substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality since 2010, occurring almost daily in parts of northeast Nigeria, and periodically beyond. Their attacks were directed initially and primarily against state and federal targets, such as police stations, but they have also targeted civilians in schools, churches, mosques, markets, bars, and villages. Cell phone towers and media outlets have also been attacked, for both tactical and ideological reasons. The group has assassinated local political leaders and moderate Muslim clerics. Its deadliest attacks include a coordinated series of bombings in Kano, northern Nigeria's largest city that killed more than 180 people in January 2012; an attack on the village of Benisheikh in September 2013 that killed more than 160 civilians; and an assault on another northeastern village, Gamboru, that may have killed more than 300 people in early May 2014.

Since July 2014 the Boko Haram insurgency has entered a dangerous new phase in which the insurgents are beginning to operate like a conventional army. In Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states the insurgents are now aggressively challenging the Nigerian military through direct confrontation in open and sustained battle. They are reported to be using armored vehicles, including tanks and heavy weapons, some stolen from the demoralized Nigerian army.

Boko Haram has erected flags over the towns it has invaded, forcing any remaining residents to follow its strict version of sharia or be killed in what appears to be an imitation of the caliphate proclaimed in parts of Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State.

More than 5,000 people are estimated to have been killed in Boko Haram-related violence since 2009, including at least 2,000 in the first half of 2014, making Boko Haram one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Borno State has largely borne the brunt: it accounts for 3,136 deaths between 2006 and 2013, as shown in figure 1, followed by Yobe and Adamawa respectively. United Nations and Nigerian officials report that more than six million Nigerians have been affected by the conflict between Boko Haram and Nigerian state authorities. By another account, more than 650,000 people had fled the conflict zone by August 2014, an increase of 200,000 since May 2014. Nigeria's heavy-handed response to Boko Haram's insurgent and terrorist operations has also taken a toll on civilians.

Responses to the Insurgency: Military

The Nigerian Armed Forces has 130,000 active frontline personnel and 32,000 reserve personnel, ranking it 47th in the world in terms of conventional potential strength.[6] It is reputed to be well-versed in counterinsurgency due to its wealth of experience in operating in insurgency environments such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and the recent operations in Mali, as well as successive participation in both the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) led

peacekeeping operations across the world. Since the Congo crisis in 1960, Nigeria has contributed both military and police personnel to more than 40 peacekeeping operations worldwide. By June 2013, about 5,000 officers and men of the Nigerian Armed Forces were serving in nine UN Peacekeeping missions within and outside Africa.

Nigeria's major response to the insurgency since 2010 has been the deployment of its Joint Task Force (JTF), consisting of the Army, Air Force, Navy, State Security Services, and Police under unified command structures. It encourages increased intelligence-sharing, force coordination and unity of direction, which are considered essential for any counterinsurgency operation, although this has been limited. The Nigerian parliament passed anti-terrorism legislation, originally introduced in 2011, in 2013. The law was designed, in part, to facilitate greater counterterrorism coordination, but interagency cooperation and information sharing remains limited by Nigeria's federal structure, which has caused confusion between chief state security officers and federally-controlled security forces.

Nigerian JTF counterinsurgency operations in the northeast have been "generally repressive," relying heavily on military-led


Figure 1: Boko Haram attacks and Violent Deaths (2006 - 2013)[5]

operations to kill and capture "scores" of Boko Haram insurgents since the movement was first brutally crushed in 2009.[7] While this use of force has clearly enabled the JTF to pressure Boko Haram strongholds in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and reduce the scope of its activity, it has also produced large-scale extrajudicial killings, mass arrests and intimidation of civilians, who are treated as insurgent sympathizers.

The JTF, augmented by "civilian vigilantes," has been implicated in extrajudicial killings of militants and civilians, which may have galvanized support for the insurgents. Such excesses have further alienated both the population and international observers.

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Several factors have constrained the Nigerian security force response, most notably security sector corruption and mismanagement. The $470 million Public Security Communications System (PSCS) project, initiated by the late President Umaru Yar'Adua's administration and handled by the Chinese contractor ZTE Corporation for the installation of CCTV cameras in Abuja to detect or prevent crime, was poorly executed and has been abandoned. Nigerian troops are also not adequately resourced or equipped to counter the insurgency. A lack of investment in training, failure to maintain equipment and dwindling cooperation with Western forces has damaged Nigeria's armed services. Unlike Nigerian

peacekeepers in the 1990s, who were effective in curbing ethnic bloodshed in Sierra Leone and Liberia, those in Mali in 2013 lacked the equipment and training needed to be of much help against al-Qaeda-linked forces. A recent report by Chatham House points out that soldiers in the northeast are suffering from malfunctioning equipment, low morale, desertions, and mutinies. Despite a large increase in government spending on the army from a security budget totaling almost $5.8 billion, little of it has found its way to the front lines. Four hundred-eighty Nigerian soldiers were alleged to have fled to Cameroon in August 2014, when they were confronted with superior weapons in the hands of Boko Haram insurgents. In June 2014, ten generals and five other senior security staff were reportedly court martialed for arming and providing intelligence to the group, with 12 of them sentenced to death in September 2014.

Civilians/Local Peoples

In response to escalated attacks, "Civilian JTFs," or *Yan Gora* ("those who hold the cane") comprising local militia, have also been formed by local communities in the areas affected by and under siege of the insurgency. Since June 2013, they have supported operations in Maiduguri and also serve as a source of intelligence and a proxy force to avoid direct confrontation with the sect.

Armed with machetes, axes, bows and arrows, clubs, swords and daggers, these "Civilian JTFs" (CJTF) usually invade the homes of known and suspected Boko Haram members, hacking them to death or manhandling and then handing them over to the military.

With their assistance, the security situation around Maiduguri has improved significantly.

Their success in helping to drive many insurgents out of Maiduguri and largely stopping Boko Haram killings and bombings in the city is said to be at the cost of a proliferation of human rights violations.

Political, Socio-Economic, and Diplomatic Response

Since 2012, Nigeria has tried to address the Boko Haram challenge on multiple fronts, though these efforts have so far met with little success. The first effort was an increase in the defense budget from N396.5 billion ($2.56 billion) in 2012 to N968.127 billion ($5.69 billion) in 2014. The justification for much of this increase was to combat Boko Haram. In September 2014, the National Assembly approved a $1bn external loan for the Federal Government to upgrade the equipment, training and logistics of the Armed Forces and security services in order to enable them to confront the insurgents more forcefully. Other measures include strengthening anti-terrorism legislation, boosting the capacities of the military and other security agencies, exploring dialogue with the insurgents, declaring a state of emergency in the Northeast and launching military offensives against the group.

Political negotiations with Boko Haram have largely been unsuccessful despite rapprochement overtures towards the Government in 2011 and 2012. A major factor has been the group's unreasonable demands, including, for example, calls for the Islamization of Nigeria and President Goodluck Jonathan's conversion to Islam.

The consensus among analysts is that the Government must attack the root causes of disaffection that push unemployed youths towards radicalization by Boko Haram, such as poverty and unemployment. A similar approach was taken in the Niger Delta with the Niger Delta Amnesty Program that was used to douse the insurgency in that region.

Recent presentations from the National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki, suggest that a shift may be taking place towards recognizing this, with the unveiling of a "soft approach" in the form of the March 2014 "Countering Violent Extremism" program that outlined plans for capacity-building and economic development in the northeast, as well as for developing partnerships with faith groups and local stakeholders in a bid to co-opt these groups in a de-radicalization campaign. Not much has been heard in terms of its implementation.

International Response

The June 2014 Paris Conference deepened international support for Nigeria's counterinsurgency campaign through an agreement by regional powers such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin to share intelligence with Nigeria. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel, having already provided counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, logistical and capacity-building assistance in recent years, have increased support as part of the effort to find the Chibok girls. It remains unclear to what extent Nigerian officials are cooperating with foreign advisers and experts. The government has been criticized in domestic and international press reports for what has been widely perceived as a slow response to the abduction of the schoolgirls in April 2014, and to offers of international assistance in support of the investigation and possible rescue efforts. Nigeria's record of human rights abuses, combined with suspicions of malicious Western intentions, has limited the scope

of future Western counterinsurgency support beyond the Chibok search operation.

Colombia: A History of Violence

The deep divisions in Colombian politics that were to shape the country's modern history and development emerged shortly after independence from Spain in 1810, precipitating a battle between the two dominant political parties, the Conservatives (Partido Conservador Colombiano, or PCC) and the Liberals (Partido Liberal Colombiano, or PL).

This intense rivalry between the conservatives and the liberals continued throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries and came to a head in "La Violencia" (1948-1958), sparked by the assassination of a presidential hopeful, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a period during which an estimated 250,000 people lost their lives. This marked the beginning of the current violent internal armed conflict that has lasted for more than half a century.

Following bipartisan support of a bloodless military coup in 1953 and the signing of a power sharing agreement in 1957, the National Front system emerged. Liberals and conservatives agreed to alternate the presidency and apportion government positions.[8] The agreement excluded other political parties and was elite-controlled, catalyzing a new phase of violence where the state perpetrated massive atrocities against peasant farmers. The country then entered into a long period of intense crime and mayhem, characterized by drug lords controlling large swaths of the state, and kidnapping and assassination on a scale unprecedented anywhere else in the world.

In the mid-1960s there was a blossoming of insurgencies with the emergence of multiple armed guerilla groups, most notably the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC), and to a lesser degree, the National Liberation Army (ELN). This was a reaction to factors such as the exclusion of political movements outside of the National Front, the marginalization of the rural poor, the influence of communist and socialist ideologies, and the ineffectiveness of the judicial system. These groups took control of significant areas of the country and ultimately fused with much of the narco-trafficking community in widespread drug related violence that undermined the legitimacy of state power, while pursuing their original vision of political revolution.

These problems mutated in various ways, but persisted for three decades such that by 1999 Colombia was a country in deep trouble and on the precipice of being a failed state– its murder, kidnapping, and extortion rates were among the highest in the world and travel and tourism were unsafe. The resultant insecurity had pushed the Colombian economy into recession, and unemployment was moving above 15 percent. The "brain drain" and capital flight that followed took a heavy toll on the country's stability. On the military side, whole battalions of the Colombian army were being decimated in open combat. The military was demoralized and, despite some very talented leadership, headed in the wrong direction. Meanwhile, illegal right-wing armed groups were committing massacres and assassinations with the same intensity as FARC had done, and very powerful international trafficking organizations, such as the Medellin and Cali Cartels, penetrated and corrupted many government institutions and contributed to the overall climate of lawlessness.

Since then, however, the situation has dramatically improved. The major turning point in Colombia was "Plan Colombia" that began

during the presidency of Bill Clinton but was sustained and built upon by President George W. Bush, followed by the election of President Alvaro Uribe in 2002.

Uribe also brought a level of focus to the conflict that had never been previously seen, using his personality and energy to infuse a more intense and committed effort into the security forces as well. He also expanded the size of the armed forces and tightened their links with local communities, which contributed to the building of intelligence about the enemy to make attacks more precise and effective. By the end of his tenure in 2010, war-related civilian death rates were down by half. Colombia was beginning to enjoy an economic renaissance made possible by greater foreign investment and the return of many businessmen and other economic leaders who had fled the country.[9]

Uribe's defense minister, Juan Manuel Santos, became Colombia's president in 2010. He continued many of his predecessor's policies, but sought to change the narrative at a political level. He began to emphasize possible peace talks with the FARC and a post-conflict vision for the country in general. This apparent softening of the political leadership's approach to the war brought criticism from Uribe, but did not lead to a diminution of the military effort by the Colombian Armed Forces under the leadership of defense minister Juan Carlos Pinzon, who continued to take the fight to the enemy. Precise, intelligence-based attacks against high-value targets, implemented largely by skilled commandos, have continued to be the hallmarks of the recent approach.

However the job is not yet done. Colombia is still violent, and there is no peace deal yet with either the FARC or ELN. Large parts of the country remain vipers' nests of criminality and drug trafficking. Nonetheless, Colombia has several lessons for Nigeria in the management of insurgency.

Lessons from the Colombian Experience for Nigeria

Strong, effective leadership is essential to success in asymmetric conflict

The tipping point between muddling through and moving toward victory in Colombia was the election of leaders who translated bold vision into action since the beginning of Uribe's administration in 2002. There is little doubt that much of the progress in Colombia is the direct product of exceptional leadership from 2002 to 2013. The philosophy of having a clear, grand strategy, then holding people accountable down to the lowest level, has had a major impact in the current positive situation in Colombia.

Fixing the Army

Colombia has been able to transform its army from an ineffective, garrison-bound band into an aggressive force that has crippled the FARC and ELN. Reform of Colombia's army began during Andrés Pastrana's term as president (1998–2002) and accelerated during President Álvaro Uribe's tenure (2002–2010). In 1998, at the urging of U.S. officials, Pastrana replaced the top three leaders in the army with new generals who were trained at U.S. military schools and who had extensive combat experience at the battalion and brigade levels. This new trio then replaced subordinate commanders who lacked aggressiveness in the field.

Colombia also reorganized its army into a mobile and highly skilled professional component, and a conscript component formed

for local security. The professional component of the army established numerous air-mobile, ranger, mountain warfare, counter-drug, and Special Forces battalions. These units improved the army's overall effectiveness by specializing in specific tasks. To overcome Colombia's mountainous and forested terrain, the army also invested heavily in equipment such that the Colombian army currently operates the world's third-largest fleet of UH-60 Blackhawk assault helicopters.

The military, under its reform-minded leadership, is also adapting to new changes such as respect for human rights. It has consistently emerged in Colombian polls as one of the most respected institutions in the country.

The philosophy of having a clear, grand strategy, then holding people accountable down to the lowest level, has had a major impact in the current positive situation in Colombia.

Abandon the conventional military-centric approach

There are no purely military solutions to pulling a nation or region out of the death spiral of violent extremism. As the Colombian experience demonstrates, there is a need to abandon the conventional military-centric approach as the one and only option for insurgency and other asymmetric conflicts. While not ignoring the importance of using military force, stability, political-economic-social development, rule of law, popular well-being, and sustainable peace all depend on effective and legitimate control of the national territory. Thus, a military-centric approach must be

balanced with a population-centric approach for maximum effect and legitimacy.[10]

Wage war on corruption as a priority

In Colombia, frustration with inequality and corruption created the spark that set off larger anti-government movements such as the FARC. To be legitimate in the eyes of the people, governance has to be even-handed, relatively transparent, oriented toward human rights, and free of corruption.

Over the past few years, the apprehension, prosecution, and conviction of military members for human rights abuses and reporting "false guerrillas" in order to cover up extrajudicial killings also showed the public that officials would be held accountable.

Financing Counter-Insurgency

Colombia has no doubt shown the way forward with regard to the financing of counter-insurgencies. It successfully put the burden of expanding the state presence of security operations across the territory on the shoulders of the wealthiest members of society. This was accomplished by using special powers granted to the government during an emergency situation to establish a wealth tax (Impuesto al Patrimonio), popularly known as the War Tax. The first of such taxes was collected on a one-off basis in 2002 and yielded five percent of government revenue or one percent of GDP. A total of 420,000 taxpayers contributed in that year, of which 120,000 were high-income individuals.[11] Started in 2004, the War Tax was extended through 2011, however payments will continue through 2014 in the form of a surtax on the tax due in 2011.

The proceeds were entirely earmarked for security and managed by an Ethics and Transparency Commission, including 12

members from the private sector. It is estimated that the tax raked in over $800 million a year, allowing Colombia to modernize its military.

Conclusion

The Boko Haram insurgency has no doubt become Nigeria's albatross. Unless it is skillfully managed, it may become an indeterminate war and a threat to Nigeria's fragile democracy. Disparate as the two countries may seem to be on the surface, Nigeria has much to learn from Colombia in dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency. In a globalized world, surely lessons on governance and peace-building should find no barriers. PRISM

Soldier transporting munitions during the Nigerian-Biafran War

Notes

* In the print version of this issue the material at endnotes 9 and 10 was inadvertently not attributed to the appropriate sources. The Editor regrets this oversight.

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Villagers collecting firewood in Basankusu, DRC

The African Development Bank's Support to Post-Conflict States

BY SUNITA PITAMBER

Conflict and fragility are considered to pose a major challenge to Africa's growth prospects. While the continent has seen rapid positive economic growth over the last few years, there is strong evidence that this has not resulted in inclusive economic and social transformation. The High Level Panel on Fragile States, established by President of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Donald Kaberuka, and chaired by H. E. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, indicates that, "Africa is changing at an extraordinary speed." New and emerging challenges posed by rapid urbanization, youth unemployment, lack of private sector development, and pressures on natural resources, amongst others, continue to create pockets of fragility and conflict.

This article outlines the AfDB's support in some of the countries affected by fragility and conflict. It will further clarify the evolution of the Bank's approach to capture some of the most pressing emerging needs. The argument is organized in four sections: 1) the background and context of the Bank's support for post-conflict countries: 2) the tools used to address fragility and post-conflict reconstruction and development in the Mano River Union, Somalia and the DRC: 3) lessons learned from these previous experiences: and 4) new areas in which ways of providing such support are being developed.

Background and Context

The origin of the AfDB's support for the stabilization of post-conflict countries goes back more than a decade. While the Bank has responded to fragile and conflict-affected situations in Regional Member Countries (RMCs) since its inception, it was initially noted that the very institutional and policy weaknesses that characterize post-conflict countries had constrained the Bank's ability to effectively assist these countries.

Operations in post-conflict countries had been sharply reduced or stopped in the context of unstable political and economic environments and recurring conflict, as well as the increasing

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weight given to demonstrated country performance as a basis for allocating resources. However, by the early 2000s the Bank recognized the limitations of the approach of continued disengagement, and realized that simply withdrawing from these difficult environments until they righted themselves would only increase costs and risks in the long run. In addition, the significant negative spillover effects on better performing neighboring countries were increasing the risk of regional fragility.

Moreover, the buildup of large arrears to the Bank by these countries was itself a constraint to further engagement even when there was a peace agreement. In response, the Bank has progressively and significantly strengthened its engagement in post-conflict countries with much more targeted, refined and innovative approaches that seek to overcome the existing weak institutional and governance environments in these countries.

In 2001, the AfDB initiated support in the form of debt sustainability by establishing the Post-Conflict Country Facility (PCCF) that constituted a very specific instrument for arrears clearance. This was mainly a financial instrument that provided an incentive to the country and other donors to clear the debt of certain post-conflict countries under a strategic partnership where the Bank would put in a certain amount towards the arrears clearance, as would interested donors, and the country itself would contribute a certain amount, which could be as little as one U.S. dollar. The Bank, through the PCCF, cleared the arrears for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2002, and Liberia and Comoros in 2007, respectively.

In 2008, the Board of Directors approved a new Bank strategy for enhanced engagement in fragile states (SEEFS). This was another major strategic innovation in the Bank's approach to address the development challenges of fragile and conflict-affected countries

Women work at a small business in Côte d'Ivoire

(FCS) and placed it within an overall operational and financial framework.

Innovations under the SEEFS

The central element of the Bank's operational approach in FCS under the SEEFS has been to provide a distinct framework, concretized through the dedicated Fragile States Facility (FSF). The approach has aimed at providing effective and sustained support that is more integrated, more flexible and more closely coordinated with other development partners than are other Bank operations.

The new strategy allowed the Bank to engage in fragile states which were under sanctions, provide early and targeted support for key technical assistance, judicious use of development budget support in circumstances where it might not otherwise be available as an instrument of assistance, more flexible procurement rules in select circumstances, and support via a dedicated Fragile States Unit (OSFU).

■ The Fragility Continuum: the SEEFS opened the way for the Bank to engage in countries affected by fragility and conflict immediately, even as peace was being negotiated. Early engagement was seen as critical to mitigating the active conflict and providing the government legitimacy for continued peace and stability.

■ Technical Capacity Building: The dedicated resources available for capacity-building under the fragile states facility are considered very valuable by the eligible countries. This new instrument allowed countries to use (as grants) as little as USD 50,000 up to a maximum of their allocation (sometimes as high as USD 12 million) to fill critical technical and institutional capacity gaps. For example, in the case of Somalia

a technical assistant was recruited to help the Minister of Finance with the numerous tasks needed in his office. In Liberia, the recruitment of technical assistants in the taxation department helped to train the local staff in improving taxation reporting and collection systems which resulted in the country mobilizing USD 1 million in 2011, simply by auditing tax returns and ensuring that tax claims were appropriately filed. Similarly, in Guinea the technical capacity support delivered through the African Legal Facility enabled the authorities to renegotiate some of the older extractive industries contracts which resulted in huge windfalls to the country. In Togo, as another example, funds were provided to recruit an independent auditing firm to audit the backlog of six key ministries, which resulted in the unlocking of about USD 20 million in budget support from other donors.

■ Development support: The investment support provided by the Facility, in the form of grants, helped stabilize salaries and the payroll as well as urgently-needed infrastructure development. For example, Cote D'Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone received budget support programs in the early stages of peace that helped those countries to further stabilize their economies. Other support such as to the agricultural sector as well as to water supply and sanitation infrastructure rehabilitation, was key to providing food security and basic services.

■ Arrears Clearance: The Bank's leadership in providing a platform for arrears clearance for Liberia, DRC and the Comoros was another critical element for the respective countries' debt sustainability, which also enabled a more conducive investment

environment for other donors as well as for the private sector.

Innovative Funding Mechanisms

The Bank has made further efforts to support urgently needed services even in situations of ongoing democratic consultation processes. In 2010, in a bid to support priority recovery activities of the Government of Zimbabwe, a group of donors decided to create the Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund (the Zim-Fund), as a successor to the Zimbabwe Programmatic Multi-Donor Trust Fund (Zim-MDTF). The African Development Bank was designated to manage the Zim-Fund with the endorsement of the Government, the Donor Community and the United Nations at their meetings in Harare and Washington in 2010.

The purpose of the Zim-Fund is to contribute to early recovery and development efforts in Zimbabwe by mobilizing donor resources and promoting donor coordination in the country, in support of such efforts. The thematic scope of the Zim-Fund initially focuses on infrastructure investments in water and sanitation, and energy. An independent fund management firm has been recruited to oversee all day-to-day activities related to the fund while an independent procurement management firm conducts all procurement activities. The Fund has an oversight committee consisting of government and the donor partners. In 2010, the Fund had resources of about USD 80.5 million. While the Bank and the donors recognize that having parallel structures is never a good practice, the Zim-Fund delivered important basic services that, combined with the macro-economic reforms pursued at the time, provided much needed economic and social stability for growth.

The FSF was designed to provide operational support through three windows (or "Pillars") which differentiate between fragile states: Pillar I for countries that have severe needs due to conflict or other crises and that have demonstrated a commitment to consolidate peace and security; Pillar II for countries that also i) have additional financial requirements stemming from the accumulation of arrears to the Bank (and other institutions) and ii) are potentially eligible for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; and Pillar III, to provide limited and targeted support in a broader range of fragile situations, including countries at risk of drifting into conflict or crisis in areas that could "not be adequately addressed through traditional projects and instruments," including secondments for capacity building, small grants to non-sovereigns for service delivery, and knowledge-building and dialogue.

The allocation of FSF resources represents a substantial addition to what was provided through the Bank's regular performance-based allocation process (PBA). Resources allocated to the 12 Pillar I countries represent an 89 percent addition to what was provided through the regular performance-based allocation process (PBA).[1] For Pillar II, no resources would have been possible without the arrears clearance that the FSF is funding. Pillar III resources have been small in relation to what has been provided through the other Pillars and as a share of the total Bank Group support for the 19 eligible Pillar III countries, but in some cases Pillar III resources have been able to be brought in sooner than other Bank resources due to broader latitude accorded under Pillar III than for regular Africa Development Fund (ADF) resources.

Addressing Fragility and Supporting Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development

The Bank's Fragile States Facility is considered to be a valuable instrument that provides financial resources beyond the normal allocations, allowing countries – in some cases – to enjoy almost twice the amount available in a three-year cycle. In addition, the instrument provided the Bank with possibilities to engage along a continuum of fragility as soon as there were some peace negotiations in place. It also allowed the Bank to engage with countries that were under arrears, an important element which would change the Bank's policy for countries under sanctions. The following few examples elaborate the Bank's programmatic interventions that helped address fragility and promote post conflict reconstruction and development.

It is to be noted that Mali was not considered to be "fragile" under any of the previous ADF cycles. However, in 2011 the Bank extended its existing programmatic focus on rebuilding the private sector and supporting rural development with a focus on supporting employment creation. The instrument used by the Bank was budget support to help critical state-building needs in 2011. Since then, and under the present ADF cycle, the Bank has provided a special support to Mali under the Fragile States Facility that will help the country benefit from additional resources and certain key policy flexibilities.

Mano River Union

The Bank has historically provided support to the Mano River Countries (Cote D'Ivoire,

Farmers show their crops in the rural countryside of DRC

Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea - MRU) through its normal Bank operations as well as through the Fragile States Facility. For example, the Bank was one of the first donors to provide debt relief and budget support to Liberia in 2006. The Bank provided similar support to Cote D'Ivoire in 2010 aimed at arrears clearance and budget support. The Bank's approach to assisting Guinea has been focused on providing budget support as well as strengthening the country's capacity to negotiate and manage the extractive industries through the African Legal Facility. The latter is aimed at enabling Guinea to generate potentially significant resources from the extractive industries, which could help the country implement its extensive infrastructure development plans.

The Bank has outlined, as one of its priority focus areas, support to regional integration and for strengthening the role of the regional economic communities (RECs) to play a critical role in both political dialogue and regional economic interventions. Specifically, the regional integration agenda will promote infrastructure for trade while aiming to address the negative regional spillovers of conflict and fragility. In this regard, the MRU Secretariat (based in Freetown) has been provided support by the Bank to build its internal capacity in the areas of financial and procurement management, ICT skills, project development, and partnership dialogue.

In 2013, the Bank committed to accelerate its support to the Mano River Union countries through a dedicated initiative. The MRU initiative proposes a major effort to address the region's infrastructure gap, in particular in transportation and energy. The Mano River Initiative will connect people within and between these countries, and promote trade and private sector development, thereby

helping the region transition out of fragility and instability. The initiative has an investment plan of about USD 3.2 billion over the next five years.

In its most recent efforts, the Bank has further accelerated its support to the region to stop the Ebola epidemic. Three operations have been approved in the form of emergency humanitarian support, a donor coordinated intervention to channel funds through the World Health Organization and regional budget support for quick-disbursing funds. The three programs are valued at more than USD 210 million.

Somalia

The Bank's support to Somalia was facilitated by the 2008 Fragile States Strategy and the Fragile States Facility that allowed for engagement with countries under arrears with the Bank. The Bank has worked, together with other partners, to support the Government's peace, state building and economic recovery program, as well as the Public Financial Management Self-assessment and Reform Action Plan by the Federal Government of Somalia as a framework for international support. The Bank is also working closely in line with the Somalia New Deal Compact that was endorsed on 16 September 2013, by the Federal Government and the international community. The Compact lays out the critical priorities under the five Peace and State Building Goals (PSGs) that have been endorsed as part of the New Deal principles for engagement in Fragile States, and also includes a Special Arrangement for Somaliland. The PSGs pillars are: (i) inclusive politics; (ii) security; (iii) justice; (iv) economic foundations; and (v) revenue and services. The Compact will guide international

support to Somalia over the next three years (2014-2016). Based on this donor-coordinated approach the following table provides an overview of investments by the Bank in the country.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The positive trend towards political stability in DRC since the 2000s, as well as the implementation by the Government of economic and structural reforms backed by development partners, has contributed to the gradual consolidation of the country's macroeconomic framework. However, this positive trend of the macro-economic aggregates has not been accompanied by an improvement in the country's social indicators, since economic growth has been driven by a very small number of areas of activity in sectors with little job creation. The DRC is also faced with the episodic and recurrent resurgence of political and security tensions that are sources of vulnerability. This situation underscores the fragility of this Central African giant and the need for the

Project	$USm
Building statistical capacity	1.45
Economic and financial governance institutional support project	3.70
Economic and financial governance institutional support project (phase 2)	11.86
Drought Resilience and Sustainable livelihoods project	51.00
Water Resources management and investment plan for Somaliland	2.67
Arrears clearance support and debt management unit technical assistance	0.29
Socio economic reintegration of youth at risk	4.44
Institutional and policy infrastructure development	5.18
Set aside for arrears clearance	105.20

Table 1: AfDB support to Somalia 2007 -2012

country's authorities to speed up institutional, economic and social reforms with a view to creating the necessary conditions for lasting peace and sustained and inclusive economic growth.

Therefore, the main challenge for the DRC authorities and population is to lift the country out of its fragile situation and raise it to a new level of development commensurate with its potential. Indeed, despite significant natural resources and a geo-strategic position conducive to regional integration, the DRC has not yet succeeded in engaging in a development process allowing it to achieve a decisive and lasting transformation of its economy. The main constraints on this process are; (i) a lack of infrastructure services, (ii) weak governance and inadequate institutional capacity, and (iii) a non-conducive business environment.

The country had been classified both by the World Bank and the African Development Bank as a fragile state. It therefore benefitted from arrears clearance support and additional resources to help build institutional capacity in the key transparency and accountability sectors such as the Auditor General, the taxation systems, and generally improved financial and economic governance.

Lessons Learned

The Bank's support to post-conflict countries saw a real turning point with the approval of the new strategy for enhanced engagement in fragile states (SEEFS) in 2008. However, there are a number of lessons that have been drawn from this experience:

Financial Support: The Bank's engagement model was largely oriented to supporting post-conflict reconstruction and development through financing and stabilizing the macro-economic framework. This was indeed what

was needed for creating political legitimacy and stabilization, and countries drew heavily on this support. However, as we know, there are huge development needs during the period of rebuilding. As such, the financial resources provided by the Bank and other donors were used mainly for the most urgent needs in the process of rebuilding. This turned out to be a short to medium term outlook. The focus on developing local production in key sectors was left to the governments to plan for. Because of the fact that the duration of the cycle of fragility is not predictable, long term sustainability and resilience targets should be pushed further into the future.

Strategic interventions must have a significant private sector development focus in situations of fragility and post-conflict.

Donor Coordination: Post-conflict reconstruction and development requires extensive donor coordination, which, if done correctly, will yield great benefits to the recipient country. However, in many cases coordination was limited to those budget support operations that explicitly required that partners have such a coordinated approach. In other sectors, donors engaged based on their own respective priorities in other sectors, which resulted in some services not having significant resources.

Capacity Building Support: Institutional capacity building and development, while being the highest priority in post-conflict development, remained the weakest engagement area in terms of outcomes and results. Major challenges related to insufficient knowledge transfer from technical assistants to government staff. In some cases there were no government staff available that could be trained, and therefore the technical assistants ended up performing the day-to-day job of the ministry and left when their contracts ended.

Private Sector Development: Strategic interventions must have a significant private sector development focus in situations of fragility and post-conflict. Most donor support to date has focused on supporting governmental economic and financial stabilization programs, which are a top priority in economic recovery. Such programs expected that private sector development and increased private sector investments would be an automatic outcome of the economic recovery programs; however, this has not typically been the case. Job creation levels outside the government have been lower than expected.

New Areas

The Bank, in its effort to continue to provide an accelerated and game-changing response to situations of fragility and post-conflict development, has instituted the following innovative instruments in its approach:

- The elements of the Bank's qualitative assessment will be determined country by country in line with the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and the 2012 peace and state building goals (PSGs: Legitimate Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; and Revenues and Services).
- The Bank's qualitative assessment will complement the PSGs and focus on areas not assessed by the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), such as political inclusion; arrangements to meet the expectations of the vulnerable population in a country, including women and youth; and vulnerability to exogenous

factors that fuel conflicts or crises, such as regional spill overs and climate change. On the basis of the qualitative assessment, the African Development Bank will classify countries as fragile and will be able to extend them eligibility for the FSF even if they are not on the Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) harmonized list.

■ Three ADF countries have recently been added to the MDB harmonized list of fragile state: Madagascar, Malawi and Mali. Guinea has exited the list. However, Bank Management considers that Guinea merits close qualitative monitoring due to internal political instability and regional security risks (and the same for Niger).

■ The rationale here is to help fill current analytical and assessment gaps in a more systematic, regular and standardized manner. As a supplementary diagnostic tool to the CPIA, the Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment (CRFA) will cover the current missing areas. Similar to the qualitative assessment, the starting point for the CRFA is the New Deal's PSGs. Unlike the qualitative assessment, the CRFA will not be used for the purpose of classifying countries as fragile, granting FSF eligibility or for resource allocation purposes during the ADF-13 period.

■ CRFA is therefore different from the implemented qualitative assessment in terms of timing (CRFA will be implemented on a longer term after having been tested) and in terms of structure (CRFA is standardized while qualitative assessment is more flexible to take into account context-specific challenges).

Conclusion

The Bank's support for mitigating fragility and promoting post-conflict reconstruction and development spans over two decades. The Bank has gathered rich and extensive experience in supporting state building and peace building. The Bank has continued to build upon its experience to ensure that the support is well designed, focused and results-oriented. The Bank has also recognized the importance of the existence of a legitimate political process. This will only work if it is combined with peace and security. However, the Bank also realizes that political processes and security are not within its direct domains and therefore partnerships will be critical. The Bank has committed itself to provide the support needed in the long haul because fragility will block any efforts for economic development and inclusive growth. PRISM

Notes

[1] The MDB harmonized list of 'Fragile Situations' classifies a country as fragile or conflict-affected if it has (a) an average AfDB/World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating of 3.2 or less or (b) the presence of UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building missions during the past three years.

Al-Shabaab Fighers

The Soldier and the Street:
East African CIMIC in Somalia and Beyond

BY MARIE BESANÇON AND STEPHEN DALZELL[1]

T he African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a watershed in African security – a truly multinational, all African, peace support operation.[2] While there will be many strategic, operational, and tactical lessons to be drawn from this experience, one that is already yielding changes within African military forces is the awareness of the need for effective civil-military operations (CMO) to complement other components of the campaign. Not only are the AMISOM leaders and units adapting on the ground, the troop-contributing countries (TCC) are implementing changes in their organizations and training programs at home. For the "tactician" in global security, this poses interesting questions regarding the operational role of CMO and its impact on regional security; strategically, it is important to evaluate how this increased awareness of CMO is driving changes in East African armed forces and the implications for civil-military relations in all the countries involved.

The AMISOM Experience with CMO

A 2012 Africa Union Commission Report estimates that it will be 2020 before Somalia is stable enough for AMISOM troops to entirely withdraw.[3] Between now and then, the daunting task for the Somalis is to solidify professional military and police institutions to secure the internal and external safety of the population. In the meantime, how long will it be before the local population begins to view the AMISOM forces as an occupying army, if they don't already?[4] What can the TCCs and the soldiers on the ground do to promote positive relations with the Somali people, government, and civil society? What should the role of the American military be in this endeavor?

As the AMISOM troops slowly encroach upon the Islamic insurgents' (al-Shabaab) territory militarily, what can appease the local population while the Somali government stabilizes and embeds its brand of African/Muslim consensual democracy politically?[5] Western military doctrine

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suggests effective CMO planned and conducted by the AMISOM forces could help this process; this is occurring to a certain degree already. As the population grows restless and al-Shabaab is not yet defeated, there is little doubt that the presence of the AMISOM forces in Somalia may be needed for quite some time.[6]

Somali Backdrop to AMISOM

In a country divided by complex clan ties, in the past 40 years Somalia's attempts at governance have included nine years of democracy, a dictator (General Siad Barre), warlords, UN/U.S. troops, three transitional governments, an Islamic ruling structure (Islamic Courts Union), Ethiopian troop occupiers, al-Shabaab insurgents, and AMISOM. The formation of the temporary governments with the help of the international community began in 1999; then re-formed in 2004, and expanded to include the opposition in 2008 with the Djibouti Peace Agreement.[7]

The advent of the Islamic Courts Union in the mid-2000s, fairly strict Islamic law, and militias hired by wealthy businessmen together rendered some stability to the otherwise volatile country. However, Ethiopia and the U.S. had concerns about Somali collaboration with terrorists, and Ethiopia invaded in late 2006, staying through 2009. Somalis tended to back the Islamic militias (al-Shabaab being the major faction evolving after the invasion) in the face of foreign invaders.[9] The Islamic insurgents have varying goals, ranging from uniting Somalia under an Islamic regime to worldwide *jihad*.[10] These insurgents are still in control of large parts of southern Somalia and are present throughout the country in a diffused form, which makes them difficult to defeat, causing

Courtesy of UPDF PAO

Ugandan forces interacting with Somali civilians, 2013

concern to Somalia's neighbors and the U.S.[11] The current government (Federal Government of Somalia– FGS) was formed through a representative parliament in 2012, which then voted for the president.[12] The FGS, with all of its flaws, has managed to reach fragile agreements with the "clan-states" of Jubbaland and Puntland, and to make some progress with plans for services badly needed by Somalis. Additionally the Rahanweyn have formed a separate state backed by the FGS.[13] AMISOM forces can both limit further violence and help fill some of the roles in providing services normally provided by a government until the current government matures.

The Conflict Continues with Pockets of Ceasefire

News reports and military situation reports indicate that the only real peace in southern Somalia is in areas controlled by African Union (AU) peacekeepers – peace enforcers. Areas in and around the airport in Mogadishu, where foreign aid and military groups have bases and compounds, are fairly secure, but the growing force of Somali police and soldiers have training and corruption issues as well as supply issues. Monthly attacks by al-Shabaab have not diminished over the past few years, and in fact spiked somewhat during the latest Ramadan season and have been on the increase since the end of 2013 and most of 2014. There are weekly news reports of attacks against government officials, IEDs (improvised explosive devices), assassinations, rocket-propelled grenades, and even suicide bombers, and attacks by al-Shabaab and others by groups wanting to affect politics. With Somalia's large geographical area, a relatively small population, and the small number of

AMISOM and Somali National Army (SMA) soldiers, securing the territory is challenging.[14]

In a recent interview leading Somalia expert Roland Marchal discussed al-Shabaab's short- and medium-term strategies.[15] "Shabaab will get weaker, will be less numerous, but will survive and will try to capitalize on any political crisis that may take place in Somalia and elsewhere."[16] Other experts like Andre Le Sage have similar opinions on the ability of al-Shabaab to regroup, remain strong and continue operations in other regions, again indicating the need for a strong support force while Somalia builds.[17] Al-Shabaab might not control people and territory, but it can terrorize, so it remains a force to contend with. The coordinated and planned attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2013 demonstrated an international capability.[18] As AMISOM has increased and reclaimed territory from al-Shabaab, so have al-Shabaab's ties to al-Qaeda increased.

Le Sage contends al-Shabaab is doing the same thing it did in 2007 following Ethiopia's invasion, it is re-forming the *mugawama/muqawama* (resistance), using assassinations, attacks and intimidation.[19] While some al-Shabaab fighters are retreating to Puntland and others are disappearing into their clan families, they are leaving weapons stashes and secret safe houses in their wake.[20] In the format of cell groups, they depart from the district, but leave appointed al-Shabaab *emirs*. In Galgala, the al-Shabaab strategy was to recruit some of the smaller, discontented clans, then take over their districts. They promote destabilization in an area, and follow up by offering themselves as the security provider.[21] In summary, Somalia remains insecure, poor and without a strong central government providing services, justice, and voice to the people.

CIMIC and the AMISOM Forces

The African Union Commission's strategic review of AMISOM in 2013 says;

> Since the deployment of a civil affairs capacity, the mission has contributed in the reinvigoration of local governance institutions, especially in Mogadishu. AMISOM's mandate includes the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, and the mission has contributed to enhanced coordination with humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the FGS. In addition, AMISOM has, through its Humanitarian Affairs section and the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) branch of the Force (as a last resort) provided access to free medical care, free potable water supply and, in some instances, basic food items to civilians.

AMISOM hosted its first CIMIC conference in Mogadishu September 19, 2013, where CIMIC officers in Somalia came together to share their experiences on implementing the mission's mandate and enhanced cooperation with civilians. The AU Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif, said "this initiative comes at a time when increasing interactions with civilians is crucial to consolidate peace dividends recently gained in Somalia. Although security improvements have been observed, civilian populations continue to be vulnerable."[22]

CMO is particularly challenging because the individual AU countries – particularly Kenya and Ethiopia – historically have had ulterior motives for intervening in Somalia, increasing Somali suspicion of all foreigners.[23] Meservey summarizes the challenges for the foreign forces intervening in Somalia by saying that a foreign force composed primarily of black, Christian troops from countries that are Somalia's traditional enemies has invaded a xenophobic Muslim country infamous for its violent tribal politics.[24]

Problems regularly follow military troops deployed in populated areas for extended lengths of time: discipline, insubordination, human rights abuses and corruption among others. The locals tolerate this as little from foreign troops as from domestic soldiers. AMISOM troops were alleged to have committed gang rape in the fall of 2013 and even earlier.[25] Furthermore, certain TCC forces (and the Somalis) claim that other TCC forces only remain because of the huge income from the UN/AU, and that they do not attack or pursue al-Shabaab, but simply occupy space already secured. Lynch says that as of late 2012, Kenyan soldiers were not running patrols into Kismayo, but staying inside their bases rather than interacting with civilians, understanding their environment and running a counterinsurgency campaign. Some reports claim that AMISOM runs "evasion tactics" rather than integration, and that AMISOM forces want the conflict to continue.[26] Nevertheless, if AMISOM troops can provide certain services and security that no one else can, their acceptance can be secured while Somalia rebuilds.

CMO, CIMIC, CAO: Distinction with a Difference?

Within the doctrine of the U.S., NATO, and other Western militaries, the preferred way to improve relations with the local populace is through conducting Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) or similar activities. Reflecting its roots in the occupation of the former Axis countries following World War II, U.S. joint doctrine includes both "coordination" tasks and the "hard CMO" of assuming roles of civil

government as needed. This doctrine defines civil affairs as the "forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations," and then (circularly) defines CAO as the "military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations."

CMO, a broader field, comprises all "activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives." Most significantly, these "may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces."[27]

These terms are closely related to CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation/Coordination), the preferred construct of most Western European armies, which NATO doctrine defines as, "The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies."[28]

In practice, all of these terms are used in connection with AMISOM training and operations, partly because of the wide range of military traditions in Africa and the variety of international actors who support training and operations, each using their own doctrine as the standard. Regardless of the label applied on the ground, there is clearly a demand for this kind of activity, and an expectation that AMISOM will provide it. One UN report stated, "No apology or amount of compensation can give back what Somali war victims and their families have lost. But our findings clearly show that an attempt to respond to their suffering in this conflict can mitigate some of the consequences and return a sense of dignity to the victims and their communities."[29] The Ugandans, Kenyans, Burundians and Djiboutians now see the need for certain skills to deal with the civilian populations. American forces contribute to CMO/CIMIC training, probably more so in the last three years than in prior years, when they focused on conducting CMO in Africa (though not in Somalia) – a strategy that brought its own challenges.[30] As AMISOM began more aggressively moving outside Mogadishu and expanded the number of troops and troop contributing countries (TCCs) in 2012 and 2013, CA forces from the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) conducted multiple training events (some with field applications) with the Kenyans and Ugandans. The American forces conducted high-level leadership training on CIMIC/CMO with most of the AMISOM TCCs (Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda) in 2012 and 2013.

The Way Ahead in Somalia

In one of his first media interviews, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said that the top three priorities in Somalia are "security, security and security."[31] However, if citizens do not receive jobs and services, as well as security, conflict will remain. Insurgent groups provide some of the key needs for the local populace in marginalized societies, including three areas identified by Africans in a 2010 conference on preventing terrorism: 1) justice, 2) voice, and 3) inclusion.[32] Injustices such as land taken from minority and Rahaweyn clans in southern Somalia have yet to be addressed, from Siad Barre's time until today.[33] If basic grievances (such as human rights abuses) and other urgent needs are not addressed, the central government will not have legitimacy. Former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon noted that the government has learned that winning hearts and minds will be more important than bullets.[34]

Voice, Services, Justice, and Inclusion

The most promising U.S. military contribution in the short run would be to enable the Ugandans, Burundians, Djiboutians, Kenyans, and Ethiopians to provide services to the locals after they secure territories, and ensure that the local justice systems are empowered to render justice on the local level while the central government builds its own national justice system. This is in addition to the other defense training projects for the Somali National Army/Somali National Security Forces (SNA/SNSF). The presence of "foreign occupiers" can actually give the local populace the "voice" they desire if they feel their needs are being made known to the international community, and delay discontent with the occupiers over time.

Unfortunately bad behavior by the "occupying" and Somali forces has already aided recruitment into al-Shabaab. "A former al-Shabaab fighter described how he yearned for revenge after Transitional Federal Government (TFG) soldiers behaved like animals by harassing Somalis and inappropriately touching women at checkpoints. Other former fighters cited AMISOM's bombing of towns, a practice that built intense hatred toward the international force, while the corruption and misbehavior of the transitional government was one of the jihadi group's biggest recruiting tools."[35] Regardless of the veracity of the reports, the insurgents can use them as a propaganda tool against any foreign actors in the arena. It is the daunting task of AMISOM and the SNA to reverse these impressions.

Long-term Development of Civil Affairs Forces in East Africa

If there were a region ripe for the development of CA forces and CMO capabilities, it is Africa. The continent remains the most "conflicted" in the world, in terms of ongoing conflicts, UN and regional peacekeeping operations, or most other metrics. Most importantly, many African militaries face a combination of internal challengers, external threats, and regional responsibilities, all likely to have civilians on the ground alongside military operations.

When the U.S. military began operations in East Africa after September 11, 2001, it faced a strategic challenge. In Somalia there was a Salafist movement that seemed sympathetic to, if not formally linked with, al-Qaeda. But the U.S. had neither the available forces nor the political will to put "boots on the ground" in a country that already symbolized many ways military intervention can go wrong.[36] The neighboring countries generally had stable

leaders, competent militaries and cordial relations with the U.S. – but some also had their own Muslim extremists to worry about, as well as challenges in sustaining the rule of law, human rights, and democratic norms. A containment strategy might check the southward spread of Islamic extremism while the U.S.-led coalition cleaned up Afghanistan and Iraq, but only if the African partners remained a positive force in the Horn of Africa and did not pour fuel on the fire with poorly executed operations. The U.S. solution included a range of activities, including direct action, information operations, intelligence support, and train-and-equip programs, but one of the pillars remained the use of American CA personnel to both conduct CAO and support the development of African CA capabilities. The latter in turn leads to questions about how these partners are developing CMO doctrine and forces

and how these developments might impact broader civil-military relations in these countries and in international combat zones (like Somalia).

Kenya: CMO without CA

Although the Kenyans have a longstanding Combat Engineer Brigade and a Combat Engineering School, they (like most African militaries) have historically considered Civil Affairs activities to be "un-military" and their initial interest was accordingly minimal.[37] After Kenya began operations in Somalia in October 2011 and encountered challenges in conducting this new type of operation, their focus broadened.[38] The Kenyans began to more fully understand the need for services on the ground in combat arenas and the beneficial effects that the combat engineers have for the populace. Kenyan clerics were specific in

Courtesy of UPDF PAO

Medical Assistance Provided by UPDF Forces to Somali Civilians, 2013

their warning that there is a risk extremist ideology will return if AMISOM forces don't take care of Somalia's needs.[39]

The Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) use Civil-Military Operations (abbreviated to "CMOPS") as their term-of-choice in referring to CMO/CA capacity. According to Brigadier George Owino, Commander of the Kenyan Army Engineer Brigade, these are defined as "those operations that use non-combat functions of the military to deal with civilian functions, or that involve the military taking on tasks typically performed by civilian authorities, NGOs, or international humanitarian organizations."[40] It is important to note that this explicitly goes beyond simple coordination to encompass civilian functions.

Starting around 2009, Kenya began developing a civil affairs capability focused on engineers supporting domestic requirements. At the inauguration of the Kenya Army Engineers Civil Affairs Course on November 1, 2010, U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Lee Brudvig recognized the purpose of the training was to "prepare the Kenyan Army Engineers in Civil Affairs which will assist them in on-going reconstruction and development efforts across the country as well as prepare them to respond quickly to inevitable disasters."[41] This would seem to fit into the country's overall disaster management model, which includes local military commanders in the "District Disaster Management Committee," in a subordinate position to the civilian leadership.[42]

By 2012, this approach had expanded to such a point that the KDF concept for CMOPS training included three pillars: 1) Building CMOPS capacity within the Engineer Corps, 2) Enhancing knowledge of how to respond to disasters, and 3) Linking the KDF's normal

Courtesy of UPDF PAO

Militia Allied to Transitional Federal Government Mans a Sentry in Mogadishu

humanitarian civil activities to the CA approach through needs assessment and analysis, project identification, budgeting, interaction with affected communities, media handling and project execution.[43] For the first pillar, by 2011 the KDF had created specific engineer-based CA forces, as is evident from news accounts of their activities within Kenya.[44] The intent is for all KDF personnel to receive CMOPS training, ranging from a five-day basic course for enlisted soldiers and a six-week course for all officers to a ten-day planning course for commanders and staff officers at the operational and strategic levels.[45]

Key to these developments is the close relationship developed with the U.S. CA forces based at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, under CJTF-HOA, and deployed to the Kenya Coast, Rift Valley, and Garissa regions. Among the first operational activities by the new Kenyan CA forces were projects in coastal areas, with Maritime CA forces from CJTF-HOA providing support and mentoring. Initially Kenyan soldiers accompanied some of the U.S. CA missions, but found them slow and irrelevant, and eventually dropped out of the missions. Kenyan soldiers, working out of their base in Manda Bay, independently conducted several projects helping repair churches and schools.[46] The Kenyan Engineers also worked closely with the American teams in the Rift Valley. Following the 2007 Kenyan national elections, the U.S. embassy requested that the U.S. military help rebuild the Eldoret, Rift Valley, an area that had been seriously affected by the election violence. The U.S. worked closely with the Kenyan engineers on these projects. This was not a priority in the U.S. campaign to counter violent extremism, nor one for the Kenyans, but it was an opportunity for close cooperation.[47] By the end of 2012, the U.S.

forces, with the aid of the Kenyan forces had completed more than three community projects, 56 missions, 14 project assessments, and 85 key leader engagements in various areas of Kenya.

Domestically, the KDF's periodic misbehavior and inability to win the support of civilians have impaired their missions. During the 2007 election violence and in areas such as Garissa and the refugee camps (e.g. Dadaab), the media and the population criticized the performance of the KDF. Human Rights Watch reported in 2012 that in Kenya;

> Both the military and the police are implicated in the abuses. Not only do the violent and indiscriminate responses of the Kenyan security forces constitute serious human rights violations, the abuses are also serving to alienate Kenyans of Somali origin at the very moment when the security forces most need the trust and confidence of the local population in order to help identify the militants behind the grenade and IED attacks and ensure public safety.[48]

Kenyan troops were accused of looting in Nairobi after the terrorist attack on Westgate Mall in 2013, a blight that the KDF will need to work hard to eradicate.[49] The Kenyan forces are concerned about their public image and behavior, and are working to improve training and adapting to different norms.

Ethics is only one area requiring both training and field experience. One Kenyan brigadier emphasized the need for metrics in the centers of excellence and training such as the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) in Kenya to make sure the students "achieved something rather than just attended the courses."[50] Training should also cover good governance and leadership in

addition to peacekeeping. Programs such as the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) could also be used to send Kenyan military leaders to U.S. senior corporate internships to learn core civilian values, as suggested by a former U.S. ambassador to Kenya.

Several 2013 interviews with Kenyan military officials and clerics yielded suggestions for overcoming various civil-military challenges in Somalia and developing closer ties with local and regional organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Standby Force (EASF), the Horn of Africa Peace Advocates, and the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims.[51] They also suggested each of the AMISOM units could have an imbedded ethnic Somali, either from Somalia, or from Kenya, Djibouti or Ethiopia, to overcome ethnic, language, and cultural differences within AMISOM and between AMISOM and the Somalis. Most of all, the TCCs should take precautions to avoid the impression of a takeover, or displacement of Somalis.

Lastly, in order to lessen the discontent over outsiders' presence in Somalia, CMO could introduce quick impact projects (as have already been planned) such as wells, dispensaries, and schools. The local population needs to see tangible and useful projects. While neither the Somalis nor the AMISOM TCCs would likely agree to an enduring American military presence in Somalia, short deployments of U.S. Functional Specialty Units for medical treatment would help fill the shortage of medical treatment and evacuation facilities.[52]

One effect of this evolution in Kenyan policy and doctrine toward CMOPs training is the demonstration effect it has on the region. For a variety of reasons, Kenya has often been the first choice for regional and international headquarters and training centers, which in turn provide venues for regional sharing of best practices and new concepts. In January 2012 and September 2013, CJTF-HOA conducted CMO Symposiums in Karen, Kenya, at the IPSTC. Senior military leaders from Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda and mid-level military leaders from Djibouti attended. One of the Kenyan generals who attended the seminar in 2012 subsequently served as Chief of Operations in Kismayo, Somalia (and head of CA).[53] Kenyan Military Engineers and the U.S. military planned multiple training/sharing best practices courses for 2013 and 2014, and beyond.[54]

Uganda: Building CA

Where the Kenyan Defense Forces have focused on the engineering side of CMO, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) has taken a broader view of CA capabilities. This may be due to a longer and more varied history of CMO, including UPDF support to relocating large numbers of civilians from areas taken over by Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) into Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps and their subsequent repatriation after Kony's departure from Uganda. Additionally, the Ugandan military has participated in the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a mission focused on cooperation and coordination due to the existence of a functioning government in Khartoum and the large number of international organizations and NGOs.[55] Lastly, the UPDF is one of the earliest and largest troop contributors to AMISOM.

U.S. CA teams from CJTF-HOA have been working with the UPDF in the Karamoja Region of eastern Uganda since June 2009,

aiming to help the UPDF gain the acceptance and trust of the civilian population and enhance security. Prior to Karamoja, U.S. teams conducted projects in Kitgum and Gulu. These domestic CMOs, were complemented by the increasing demand for CIMIC skills the Ugandans found in Somalia.

News reports in the Karamoja region intermittently reported bad behavior by UPDF soldiers towards civilians, but some NGOs claimed that the U.S. military teams working with the UPDF helped add credibility and legitimacy to the UPDF teams in the homeland.[56] The Ugandans, much as the Kenyans, are showing considerable proactive concern for training and improving their track record and image, and learning from the international community

Ugandan CA institutions have gradually developed as well. In 2009-10 there were few

signs of UPDF buy-in on local CIMIC work, and CIMIC offices in Karamoja typically had a single army private manning the station and no funds with which to conduct operations.[57] They usually sent one private for the regional, on-site CMO training conducted by the U.S. CA teams, though CIMIC cells officially had one officer and one NCO.[58] CIMIC itself continued to lack credibility and prestige in the UPDF, and if the U.S. military were not there, the UPDF would likely have marginalized the Civil Military Operation Commands (CMOCs). By 2011, most of the CIMIC personnel in the Karamoja region were field-grade officers and the UPDF participated in most of the projects done by the U.S. CA teams.[59] The U.S. teams advocated CMO training for the UPDF CIMIC, and indicated that the greater utility was in having a U.S. presence, being around the UPDF, and working with them on

Courtesy of UPDF PAO

Female UPDF Soldier Interacting with Somalis, 2013

a daily basis, an approach that worked in Djibouti as well.[60] Because of the Somalia operations, CIMIC's prestige grew to the point that the UPDF created a separate department dedicated to CIMIC and a fully operating Public Affairs Office reporting on CMO in Somalia.

At the institutional level, the UPDF had begun incorporating CMO training into larger efforts by 2010, and the U.S. had developed a multi-year training plan. The training base at Kasenyi, which had focused on training "commando" tasks and other high-end combat activities, added a multiple-week CA course, taught by CA personnel from CJTF-HOA.[61] Later, the multi-year plan to conduct training at Kasenyi was cut short by the UPDF – some postulated financial reasons, others personnel issues, and yet others cited lack of U.S. coordination with the new UPDF Chief of Operations and Training.

Efforts to renew the training partnership led to a meeting between the U.S. CMO team and the UPDF in the winter of 2013 to plan multiple CMO/CIMIC training seminars for the Uganda Battle Groups (UGABAGs) going to Somalia. With the introduction of the UPDF CIMIC "Chieftaincy" in 2013, all planned UPDF courses will have a CIMIC focus and include staff officers and enlisted soldiers. The 2013 meeting outlined a plan of action for the courses covering leadership and administrative skills, as well as practical training in and around Singo and Kampala, Uganda. Topics such as CIMIC doctrine, coordination with non-governmental and international organizations, introductory counter-insurgency, rules of engagement (ROE), scenario-based practical exercises, key leader and female engagements, human rights training, CMOC structures, and civil reconnaissance training were among the courses agreed upon by the U.S./Ugandan group. The U.S. CA team conducted an extensive joint course with the UPDF at Jinja (the Engineering School training center) in mid-2013 and U.S. teams have planned training for the UPDF for the next two years.

The UPDF named Colonel Moses Ddiba Ssentongo the first head of the new Chieftaincy of Civil Military Cooperation, which reports directly to the Joint Chief of Staff. The UPDF are in the process of streamlining and crafting the structure, but are hampered by budget restraints and implications. They are carrying out training at operational and tactical levels which has reportedly already improved their forces and operations in the Somalia mission as well as in the Central African Republic, where the UPDF is pursuing the LRA, all in addition to the CIMIC operations in Karamoja where the UPDF are continuing their "disarmament operations." The CIMIC Chieftaincy collaborates currently with the Engineering Brigade and the Medical Departments in the UPDF.[62] The proposed "CIMIC Support Unit" would be composed of the following elements: a command post team, a CIMIC reconnaissance team, a CIMIC liaison team, a project management team, a CIMIC center team, functional specialists (either military or civilian medical or similar personnel), a staff of experts in civil administration and infrastructure, and teams for disasters, emergencies, and military information support operations.

The UPDF Act of 2005 designates the CIMIC teams and functions as: (a) to preserve and defend the sovereignty and interior integrity of Uganda; b) to cooperate with the civilian authority in emergency situations in cases of natural disaster; c) to foster harmony and understanding between the defense forces and civilians; and d) to engage in productive

activities for the development of Uganda. At the time of the 2012 East Africa CMO Symposium, Ugandan CIMIC forces had been developed up to the brigade level. Participants noted, however, that "there is a lack of female officers," a significant capability for many kinds of CA tasks.[63] This has been reversed somewhat with the inclusion of females in the medical corps and even in the tank corps. Bancroft (a civilian contractor) provides CIMIC training in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Afgoya and Out Patient Departments in Baidoa and Burhakaba, which include female AMISOM medical personnel.

In the past decade, the UPDF and the KDF's emphases were primarily on domestic missions, though this is changing rapidly due to the Somalia mission. Prior to the creation of the CIMIC Chieftaincy, Uganda's 2005 defense reform law gave the UPDF four missions, two of which were explicitly domestic.[64] Importantly, the law provided none of the posse comitatus restrictions so cherished in the United States In fact, the 2005 law allowed that officers and soldiers (enlisted personnel) needed no further authority to execute "all the powers and duties of a police officer," and that they would be only liable to obey their superior officers, who would act "in collaboration" with the civilian authorities, not under them.[65] Somalia operations now include CIMIC mostly in the medical realm with training from the UN, Bancroft, the United States, and the UK, among others. Additionally the UPDF and the KDF have engineering capability to move from the domestic realm to international operations.

Other TCCs

Though the United States has worked most extensively with Kenya and Uganda with CMO,

it has conducted training and seminars in Burundi, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. The Burundians participated at high levels (general officer) in the IPSTC symposiums; the U.S. has also done course work with Ethiopian well-drillers and has courses planned for Burundi.

The Djiboutians resisted joining the AMISOM coalition for more than a year, in spite of urging from the international community. Hesitation came from two directions: 1) there was apprehension at joining a peace-enforcement campaign (which inherently involves taking sides in a conflict) when Djibouti prides itself as the peace-broker of the region; and 2) concerns over threats coming from al-Shabaab to the Djiboutian population through the Internet and Twitter.[66] UN and French trainers deemed the Djiboutian troops unprepared to join combat/peace-enforcement operations, but so far they have achieved considerable success. Among all of the AMISOM forces, Djiboutian troops received the highest approval ratings from the Somalis in the early 2012/13 UN/IST poll for their work in Beledweyne.[67]

Prior to Djibouti's entrance into AMISOM, the U.S. military worked with some of the Djiboutian Special Forces at their outpost near the Ethiopian border (Karabti San). This was learning by observing and participating rather than by formal training, and took place over more than two years. The Djiboutian military hosted and worked with several U.S. CA teams who guided the local civilians through a building project for their village. It was a long-term operation, which probably could not be duplicated in short-term classroom training. Two of those Special Forces platoons subsequently deployed to Somalia.

The years of interaction with U.S. forces at home, as well as their own Somali customs

and relative similarity to the Somalis, prepared the Djiboutians for CMO in Somalia. Lt. General Andrew Gutti, the AMISOM Force Commander, visited the Djiboutian troops who took over from the Ethiopians in Beledweyne, Somalia – some of whom worked with the U.S. military in Karabti San – and commended the troops for their efforts to help the local population by providing humanitarian assistance in response to a recent flooding, ensuring their security. The same report said that the Djiboutian soldiers also engaged in local reconciliation efforts as well as regrouping and training various militias and integrating them into the Somali National Army.[68] The Djiboutians were instrumental in bringing assistance to the civilians during a cholera outbreak in addition to flood relief efforts. Thus, in spite of little formal training, the Djiboutians have excelled in CIMIC. They are also reported to move outside their safe bases and to actually chase down al-Shabaab combatants.

A New Model for CA?

The Kenyan and Uganda experience in creating CA/CMO-capable forces illustrates numerous challenges and decision-points confronted in other militaries attempting such a transformation. One of the challenges all countries have in creating CA forces is the inevitable obstacle of "reprogramming" military minds. After a career focused on following a chain of command to achieve direct results, many officers and NCOs find it difficult to work within the ambiguity, indirectness, and collaborative environment of a multidimensional development or humanitarian relief mission.

At a more fundamental level, even defining what CA/CIMIC missions actually entail is a constantly evolving challenge. Since September 11, 2001, and the coalition missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, CAO by coalition and U.S. militaries were frequently about sponsoring projects and distributing goods and services. U.S. CA teams deployed to Africa with the CJTF-HOA mission generally followed that agenda – however East Africa (apart from Somalia) is not a combat arena, and is subject to different rules and circumstances than the

Courtesy of UPDF PAO

Somali Police Force During Crowd Control Training Provided by AMISOM

combat and post-conflict zones. These operations have generated questions from East Africans on the definition of CA/CIMIC missions, and highlighted the tension between CA as the coordination of resources and information, on one hand, and the provision of goods on the other hand.[69]

Significantly, in a 2012 symposium at IPSTC, the East African CA delegates recommended removing two sections from the draft East African manual on CA: 1) Populace and resource control (PRC) and 2) Dislocated Civilians (DC) operations. Their logic was that "this is not a core function of the military."[70] Yet both are critical areas for CMO conducted in a foreign country during wartime, and in fact are implied tasks for the military commander under international law. Removing them from the menu of doctrinal tasks reinforces the understanding that the African concept focuses on the more generic CIMIC and less CA-intense role of coordination.

The AU CIMIC concept for military support to the civilian element in conflict situations focused on two things: security and resources.[71] Implied in these are related areas like public affairs. Again, note that these are core military operations and "soft support," respectively, not the "hard CA" of conducting operations for the civilians. This also highlights the continuing difference in concepts from the U.S. approach, in which the military is explicitly taking on mission outside its "core functions."

From CMO to Civil-Military Relations

The most significant tendency from a civil-military relations standpoint is an East African tendency toward planning and preparing CA forces for domestic operations. While it is rarely stated explicitly, underlying the development and employment of CA in the U.S. has been an assumption that it was intended for use in foreign operations, not for domestic operations. This is grounded both in *posse comitatus* and other constructs that limit the military's domestic role, and in the conscious development of civilian agencies (e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency) to do the planning and coordination done by CA forces in certain overseas operations. In general "U.S. military power is projected across the globe but is barely noticeable at home," according to Hill, Wong and Gerras, who argue that is one of three primary reasons for the high levels of trust American citizens have in the military.[72]

Other countries have asked their militaries to conduct extensive domestic missions, with mixed effects on civil-military relations. The Colombian Army conducted a series of successful rural "civic-military action" programs in the context of counter-insurgency campaigns between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. As a result, military leaders developed beliefs on the country's situation at odds with those of the political leadership, leading the former to speak out on the need for deeper social and political reforms; this phenomenon became serious enough that three different presidents removed senior military leaders for their dissent.[73] That this could be done without provoking a *coup d'état* is a credit to the generally successful professionalization of the Colombian military – and something that would be unlikely in many African countries.

Looking from the perspective of countries with a history of military rule, Koonings and Kruijt have argued that many cases of military politicization include the "competence principle," according to which military officers perceive themselves as better trained and

organized than their civilian peers. De Kadt argues, "such problems around governance have probably now become the central issues that impel military men to interfere with government."[74] While considering the possibility military forces could be given new missions to occupy soldiers and keep them out of explicit political roles, they conclude that, "A strong emphasis on civic-military action and other local development activities does not justify the existence of the armed forces and weakens the functioning of the public sector and civilian authorities in the process."[75]

The Kenyan and Ugandan militaries are clearly trying to succeed where others have "failed" at sustaining both domestic CMO and civilian control of the military, so it is surprising how little public debate has been generated by this effort. One exception is a recent article by Senegalese Colonel Birame Diop, who recognized three risks in "mobilizing the military" for domestic missions: 1) Detracting from their primary mission of national defense, 2) The militarization of society, and 3) The politicization of the military, as increased power over domestic outcomes brings the allure of corruption and manipulation of domestic politics.[76] Diop's response to these concerns is to first restate the need for improved development by any means, and then to suggest safeguards to minimize the risk of the three negative outcomes. He stops at the generalities of building trust between the military and the populace, clearly defining the limits and timetable for military missions, and creating a legal framework for this to occur. His examples are limited to Kenya's development of the "environmental soldier" and various other engineering and civic education programs, including those in Senegal. None of these cases go deep enough to explain how these countries actually did mitigate the risks of domestic military missions, or how others can hope to mitigate such risks.

A potential positive effect of CA development is to promote better behavior within the military. To the degree CA personnel adopt the desired values of respect for civilian authority, human rights, and social development, they can become advocates within military circles for plans and strategies that reflect such values. The U.S. military did exert some influence on the UPDF with their work in Karamoja over time. Unfortunately, recent history would suggest that this "change agent" affect is limited in most countries. Even in the U.S. Army, CA leaders are regularly relegated to secondary staff roles. It is hard to foresee African CA leaders faring better.

In the end, history may not repeat itself. The fact that the East African armies are choosing to build military forces specifically trained, and often designed, to work with civilians comes at a particular juncture in their historical development. They not only have the benefit of their own experience in Somalia and other foreign operations, they have already been engaged for decades in their own countries' political and social development. Additionally, they can draw on the experience and analysis derived from U.S. and coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of which relied heavily on the CA/CMO/CIMIC component. Whether this prologue allows them to play the appropriate role in the future remains to be seen. PRISM

Notes

[1] Brianna Musselman of the School of International Service provided invaluable assistance to this project. Dr. Ladan Affi, a post doctoral fellow at Qatar University, provided input and editorial comments on Somalia.

[2] AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate, which has been extended. The current troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are Uganda, Djibouti, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Ethiopia (Amisom-au.org). Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Ghana are police contributing countries (PCCs)

[3] Report of the African Union Commission on the Strategic Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia, January 2013. Ibrahim Gambari: "A significant portion of Somalia remains under the control of Al Shabaab and the liberation of Somalia still requires a significant sustained effort."

[4] In a 2013 interview with Dr. Besançon, a prominent Kenyan imam said: "Kenya should be out of Somalia yesterday."

[5] Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin - HSM or simply Al Shabaab or AS—is the radical Islamic military movement in Somalia with domestic and foreign 'terrorist' support. Somalis is majority Muslim, but mainly Sufi.

[6] A senior U.N. official disclosed that 3,000 AMISOM personnel have been killed during its seven-year mission (Source (Mombasa RMS): Taifa Leo (Independent newspaper and generally unbiased), in Kiswahili, 11 May 13)

[7] Ken Menkhaus in Robert Rotberg. 2005. Battling *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* & Markus Hoehne. 2009 'Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: How external interference helped to produce militant Islamism.' http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/080818%20-%20Djibouti%20Agreement.

[8] Somali Scholar's comment 2014: the Islamic Courts have been around since the early 1990s but they were not cohesive until 2004/2005 when the CIA began to fund the warlords to go against the Islamic Courts.

[9] Somali Scholar's comment 2014: by the time Ethiopia invaded Somalia, the Islamic Courts had scattered, later on coalescing in Eritrea.

[10] *Jihad was the minority view from al Shabaab until the Ethiopian invasion*

[11] Somalia's history is complex and has been documented by multiple historians and current academics including I.M. Lewis, Gerard Prunier, Kenneth Menkhaus, Alex De Waal, Roland Marshall, and Andre Le Sage, among many.

[12] Also known as the Somali Federal Government of Somalia (SFG) and the Somali National Government SNG

[13] Central Somalia and the FGS still consider Somaliland, a self -declared separate nation, unrecognized by the rest of the world, as part of greater Somalia.

[14] UN Security Council Resolution, 2124: AMISOM is authorized to deploy 21, 586 soldiers into Somalia as well as 540 police officers. CIA Factbook places the population of Somalia at approximately 10 ½ million and the area as 647,657 square kilometers. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html, last accessed 13 July 2014.

[15] 'Approximately two of every five local or regional reports on or related to al-Shabaab argue that "al Shabaab's quasi-state in southern and central Somalia has been progressively reduced over the past thirteen months" (AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring website) as the result of "multi-pronged military operations" by Somalia government forces, AMISOM peacekeepers, ENDF, and allied militias.' CUBIC Media Analysis Report 26 November 2012.

[16] Toni Weis. May 30 2012. 'The War is Changing, not Over:' Roland Marchal on Somalia after Afgooye. http://focusonthehorn.wordpress.com/2012/05/30/the-war-is-changing-not-over-roland-marchal-on-somalia-after-afgooye-part-two/

[17] Presentation in November 2013 by Dr. Le Sage to US troops deploying to Africa.

[18] Jeffrey Gettleman. 2013. "Ominous Signs, Then a Cruel Attack: Making Sense of Kenya's Westgate Mall Massacre." *New York Times* September 27.

[19] Andre Le Sage, November 2012. Norfolk, VA.

[20] Scholar at Tufts University. November 2012. Also, on 08 November 2012, a cache of firearms and ammunition thought to belong to al-Shabaab militants was recovered by Somali and African Union forces in the port city of Kismayo after they carried out a major joint operation to the west of the town. Source: Ethiopian Radio (Pro-government), in Amharic, 09 Nov 12; Ethiopian Television (Pro-government), in Amharic, 09 Nov 12; Addis Zemen (Pro-government), in Amharic, 10 Nov 12. *The Economist.* October 2012. "The Shabab, who have dispersed their communications equipment men and

weapons, can again be expected to play a waiting game." http://www.economist.com/node/21564258

[21] Andre Le Sage, November 2012. BBC January 8, 2014 - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25651249

[22] http://amisom-au.org/2013/09/amisom-ends-a-three-day-civil-military-coordination-conference/

[23] The Somalis believe the Kenyans want the coastal territory of Kismayo and the natural resources, but the Kenyans particularly felt the need for a buffer zone to secure their coastline from attacks and protect their tourism industry. The Ethiopians and Somalis have long had border and territory ownership issues – marked by the Somali invasion in 1977.

[24] Joshua Meservey. 2013. "The Somalia Insurgency: The growing threat of al Shabaab's resurgence," pp. 87-88.

[25] Nicholas Kulish. 2013. "African Union and Somalia to Investigate Rape Accusation." *New York Times* August 15.

[26] Colum Lynch. 2013. "Soldier of Misfortune." *Foreign Policy*. August. Quoted by Josh Meservey 2013.

[27] Both definitions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-01, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, accessed 4 September 2013.

[28] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-9, "NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003.

[29] Nikolaus Grubeck, "Civilian Harm in Somalia: Creating an Appropriate Response," Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), 2011, online at http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Somalia_Civilian_Harm_2011.pdf, last accessed 1 October 2013.

[30] Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell. 2011. 'Civil Military Operations in Kenya's Rift Valley: Socio-cultural Impacts at the Local Level. *PRISM* (2) 2. Marie Besançon. 2011. Uganda Karamoja VETCAP: Partnering with UPDF and NGOs. CJTF-HOA/SCRAT Report.

[31] "President of Somalia Sets Top Three Priorities: Security, Security, Security," New Statesman http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/politics/2012/09/president-somalia-sets-top-three-priorities-security-security-security

[32] ACSS Conference (Africa Center for Strategic Studies). April 2012. Senegal. 'Preventing Terrorism.'

[33] Alex De Waal. 2007. 'Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia.' Roland Marchal. November 2012 Tufts University Workshop. Ken Menhaus. 2012. 'Stabilization Transitions, Then and Now: Lessons from the UNOSOM Experience for 2012-13 Post Transition Somalia.' ODNI.

[34] April 15 Burundi (Prime Minister Sharidon was replaced in December 2013 by Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed)

[35] Muhsim Hassan. 2012. "Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali Youth." *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, August 23. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/understanding- drivers-of-violent-extremism-the-case-of-al-shabab-and-somali-youth. Menkhaus (September 24, 2012). Mesevey 2013 Some studies also report AS fighters joining to 'avenge indignities visited on their female relatives.

[36] Note, for example, that the phrase "Black Hawk Down" has evolved from a succinct title for a U.S. newspaper story to a book, a film, and finally shorthand for the entire "Battle of Mogadishu" or any similar urban combat operation.

[37] Harvard Africa expert opinion 2009, Harvard University. & Swiss Africa expert opinion, 2013. Nairobi, Kenya.

[38] Kenya officially joined AMISOM in June 2012 – months after invading Somalia.

[39] Kenyan Muslim cleric, interview with Dr. Besançon, 2013

[40] Proceedings of the East Africa Civil-Military Operations Symposium (henceforth, "EACMOSP"), held January 30 – 10 February 2012, p. 115

[41] "The Kenya Army Engineers Civil Affairs Training," http://www.mod.go.ke/?page_link=engineers, last accessed 25 Sep 2013. Quotation is from Kenyan website, and may not reflect his actual wording. The course was a joint effort of the Kenyans supported by the US military.

[42] EACMOSP, p. 73.

[43] Brig Owino, comments summarized in EACMOSP, p. 118.

[44] See for example, US Fed News Service, "Kenya, U.S. Military Partner to Build Crucial Civil-Military Operations Capability," 8 March 2011. Contrary to the title, the article focuses on the combined effort to construct a new roof, install windows, and make other improvements to a local school.

[45] Brig Owino, comments summarized in EACMOSP, pp. 119-22

[46] Interview with Kenyan Officer at Manda Bay by Dr. Besançon. January 2013.

[47] Lee and Farrell. 2011.

[48] Human Rights Watch, *Criminal Reprisals: Kenyan Police and Military Abuses against Ethnic Somalis*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012, p.3.

49 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/10/
kenyan-army-admits-soldiers-looted-
mall-2013103082648752523.html

50 Partner nations need to solve the certification/
validation issue with schools/centers/training – the
training is free and the students get per diem, so there
is no incentive to participate or perform. They get a
certificate without any testing mechanism.

51 Muslim clerics, Kenyan Army and Navy
officers, US officials, city leaders, and contractors,
interviews with Dr. Besançon, 2013.

52 Suggestions by Bancroft – a leading training
and mentoring contracting organization.

53 Kenyan Brigadier General interviewed by Dr.
Besançon in 2013

54 AGCAP-Agricultural Civil Action Project
– Kenyan Engineers/military will join US CA team
experts in constructing food and grain storage units.
The Kenyans will see how the US coordinates projects
through local formal and informal leaders, provincial
and state/country leaders.

55 Tum, EACMOSP, p. 166

56 SITREP NGO-AFLI, 17 November 2010 (this is
an "unconfirmed statistic").

57 Don Osborn July 2010, CA team member
from late 2010, Besançon 2011.

58 Besançon 2011. Uganda Karamjoja VETCAPS:
Partnering with UPDF and NGOs

59 Ibid

60 The UPDF had not been receptive to the
British CMCC training in Soroti in 2009 – they
rejected any kind of power point presentations (Dr.
Donald Osborn, 'Summary and prospectus: Harari
and Moroto VETCAPs' September 2010).

51 Frank Montellano, "Ugandan soldiers practice
civil affairs skills during full spectrum training," US
Army website, 8 June 2010, www.army.mil/arti-
cle/40534/Ugandan_soldiers_practice_civil_affairs_
skills_during_full_spectrum_training/, last accessed
25 September 2013.

62 LTC Rukogota email communication

63 EACMOSP, p. 47.

64 UPDF Act of 2005, paragraph 7, gives these
functions as (a) to preserve and defend the sover-
eignty and interior integrity of Uganda; b) to
cooperate with civilian authority in emergency
situations in cases of natural disaster; c) to foster
harmony and understanding between the defense
forces and civilians; and d) to engage in productive
activities for the development of Uganda.

65 UPDF Act of 2005, paragraph 43.

66 The first post Somalia deployment suicide
bombing occurred in Djibouti City May 2014. http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/uk-djibouti-attacks-idUSK-
BN0E72AA20140527

67 UN/Information Support Team-IST,
Information Paper: Somalia Polling Summary, Nov/Dec
2012.

68 "AMISOM Commander visits Hiiraan, says
Somali Army will be trained," Sudan Tribune. 28
November 2012. 20 May 2013. Soldiers from Djibouti
serving under the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), provide security, water, and other services
to the residents of Beletweyne. Residents fondly refer
to the Djiboutian soldiers as brothers and helpmates
for their role in repelling attacks, resolving clan
disputes, and supporting commercial activity.
(AMISOM - via You Tube) <http://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=2InQYD1fJ0o&feature=youtube_gdata>

69 EACMOSP, p. 50.

70 EACMOSP, p.173. Ironically, this was
followed by a briefing from MG Okello, who listed
PRC as one of six generic CMO activites for AMISOM.

71 EACMOSP, p 197

72 Andrew A. Hill, Leonard Wong and Stephen J.
Gerras, "'Self-Interest Well Understood': The Origins
& Lessons of Public Confidence in the Military,"
Daedalus, Vol. 142 (2) Spring 2013, p. 53.

73 Robert H. Dix, The Politics of Colombia, New
York: Prager, 1987, pp. 137-9.

74 Emanuel de Kadt, "The Military in Politics:
Old Wine in New Bottles?" in Political Armies: The
Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy,
edited by Koonings and Krujit, London: Zed Books,
2002, pp. 320-1.

75 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, "Epilogue," in
Political Armies, p. 346.

76 Birame Diop, "Sub-Saharan African Military
and Development activities," PRISM, Vol. 3, No 3
(June 2012), p.91.

Center for Complex Operations (CCO)

Enhancing the U.S. Government's Ability to Prepare for Complex Operations

CCO, a center within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, links U.S. Government education and training institutions, including related centers of excellence, lessons learned programs, and academia, to foster unity of effort in reconstruction and stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare—collectively called "complex operations." The Department of Defense, with support from the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, established CCO as an innovative interagency partnership.

CCO Was Established to:

■ Serve as an information clearinghouse and knowledge manager for complex operations training and education, acting as a central repository for information on areas such as training and curricula, training and education provider institutions, complex operations events, and subject matter experts

■ Develop a complex operations training and education community of practice to catalyze innovation and development of new knowledge, connect members for networking, share existing knowledge, and cultivate foundations of trust and habits of collaboration across the community

■ Serve as a feedback and information conduit to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and broader U.S. Government policy leadership to support guidance and problem-solving across the community of practice

■ Enable more effective networking, coordination, and synchronization to support the preparation of Department of Defense and other U.S. Government personnel for complex operations

■ Support lessons learned processes and best practices compilation in the area of complex operations

■ Identify education and training gaps in the Department of Defense and other Federal departments and agencies and facilitate efforts to fill those gaps.